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I. INTRODUCTION
A  central  difference  between  contract  and  property  concerns  the
freedom  to "customize"  legally  enforceable  interests. The law of contract
recognizes  no  inherent  limitations  on  the  nature  or  the  duration  of  the
interests  that can be the subject of a legally binding contract.  Certain types
of  promises-such  as  promises  to  commit  a  crime-are  declared
unenforceable  as  a  matter  of  public  policy.  But  outside  these  relatively
narrow  areas  of  proscription  and  requirements  such  as  definiteness  and
(maybe)  consideration, there is  a potentially  infinite  range of promises  that
the law will honor. The parties to  a contract  are free to be  as whimsical or
fanciful  as  they  like  in  describing  the  promise  to  be  performed,  the
consideration  to be given in return  for the promise, and the duration of the
agreement.
The  law  of  property  is  very  different  in  this  respect.  Generally
speaking, the law will enforce as property only those interests  that conform
to a  limited number  of standard forms.  As  it is stated in a leading  English
case,  "incidents  of  a  novel  kind"  cannot  "be  devised  and  attached  to
property  at the fancy or caprice of any owner."'  With respect to interests in
land,  for  example,  the  basic  forms  are  the  fee  simple,  the  defeasible  fee
simple, the life estate, and the lease. When parties wish to transfer property
in  land,  they  must  specify  which  legal  form  they  are using-fee  simple,
lease, and so forth. If they fail to be clear about which legal interest they are
conveying,  or if they attempt to customize a new type of interest, the courts
will  generally  recast  the  conveyance  as  creating  one  of the  recognized
forms. Of course, the law  freely allows customization of the more physical,
tangible  dimensions  of  ownership  rights.  Property  comes  in  all  sorts  of
shapes  and sizes. But with respect to the legal dimensions of property, the
law generally insists on strict standardization.
Every  common-law  lawyer  is  schooled  in  the  understanding  that
property  rights  exist  in  a  fixed  number  of  forms.  The  principle  is
acknowledged-at  least  by implication-in  the  "catalogue  of estates"  or
"forms  of  ownership"  familiar  to  anyone  who  has  survived  a  first-year
property  course  in an American  law school.2 The principle,  however, is by
1.  Keppell v. Bailey,  39 Eng. Rep.  1042,  1049  (Ch.  1834).
2.  Standard  reference and  instructional materials present  the  list of property options  as being
closed.  For example,  a  chapter  entitled  "Introduction  to  Permissible  Interests  in  Land"  in  a
leading  treatise begins  as follows: "This  Treatise explores  and discusses  the general principles  of
law  that apply  to 'permissible  interests  in land,'  which courts  and legislatures have recognized."
1 RicHARD  R.  POWELL,  POWELL  ON  REAL  PROPERTY  §  11.01,  at  11-2  (Patrick J.  Rohan  ed.,
1999);  see also  CHARLES  DONAHUE,  JR_  ET  AL.,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON  PROPERTY:  AN
INTRODUCTION  TO  THE CONCEPT AND  THE INSTITUTION 457  (3d ed.  1993)  (" IT]he common  law
regarded  the  system of estates  as closed.");  JESSE DUKEMINIER  & JAMES E.  KRIER,  PROPERTY
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no means limited to estates in land and future interests; it is also reflected in
other  areas  of  property  law,  including  landlord-tenant,  easements  and
servitudes,  and  intellectual  property.  Nor  is  the  principle  confined  to
common-law countries;  to the contrary,  it appears to be a universal feature
of all  modem  property  systems.'  In  the  common  law,  the  principle  that
property rights  must conform to certain  standardized  forms has no name. In
the  civil  law,  which  recognizes  the  doctrine  explicitly,  it  is  called  the
numerus clausus-the number  is closed.4  We adopt  this term for purposes
of our discussion here, which focuses primarily on the common law.
As befits a doctrine that has  no name, the principle that property rights
must  track  a  limited  number  of  standard  forms  has  received  very  little
examination  in Anglo-American legal  literature.  We have discovered  only
one  full-length  English-language  article  on  the  numerus clausus. 5  This
is  again  in  contrast  to  the  civil  law,  where  the  doctrine  is  widely
acknowledged  by  commentators  as  being  a  substantive  limitation  on  the
definition of property,  as in Germany,'  or  a limitation  on the circumstances
204 (4th ed.  1998) (referring  to the "standardization  of estates");  LEWIS  M.  SIMES  & ALLAN  F.
SMITH,  THE LAW  OF FUTURE INTERESTS  §  61,  at 45-46  (2d ed.  1956)  (presenting  a short section
entitled "A  Doctrine of Fixed Types of Estates").
3.  As one leading English comparativist has  stated, "In  all  'non-feudal'  systems with which I
am  familiar (whether  earlier, as at Rome, or later), the  pattern  is (in very general  terms) similar:
there are  less than a  dozen sorts of property  entitlement."  Bernard  Rudden,  Economic Theory v.
Property Law: The Numerus  Clausus Problem, in OXFORD  ESSAYS  IN  JURISPRUDENCE:  THIRD
SERIES  239, 241  (John  Eekelaar & John Bell  eds.,  1987).  As  noted infra Section fI.B, depending
on how one does the classification,  American common  law recognizes more than a dozen forms of
property.  Still, as far as  we  are aware, Rudden's point about the number of forms being  finite and
effectively closed in all known non-feudal  property systems  is accurate.
4.  John  Henry  Merryman,  Policy, Autonomy,  and  the  Numerus  Clausus  in  Italian and
American Property  Law, 12 AM.  J. COMP. L. 224 (1963);  Rudden, supra note 3, at 240.
5.  Rudden,  supra note  3.  Certain  applications  of  the doctrine  are  addressed  in Merryman,
supra note 4, and, as we note below, the doctrine is considered in passing in a variety of sources.
6.  The  term numerus clausus is used  in Germany  alongside  Typenzwang and Typenfixierung
(both meaning "fixation  of types"  of property); the principle is considered a substantive limitation
on the definition  of property  implicit  in the code.  See  §  854 BGB  (defining property);  PHILIPP
HECK,  GRUNDRIB  DES  SACHENRECHTS  §§  23,  120(6)  (1930).  According  to  one  treatise,  for
example, interested parties
cannot  be  free  to  endow  any  right  that  they  please  pertaining  to  a  thing  with  the
character of a real  right. The principle of freedom of contract,  which dominates  the law
of obligations, has no validity in the law of property. Here the contrary principle  holds:
The interested parties  can only establish  such  rights as  are  permitted by  the  law.  The
number of real rights is therefore necessarily a closed one.
3 MOTIVE ZU DEM ENTWURFE EINES BJRGERLICHEN  GESETZBUCHES  FUR DAS  DEUTSCHE REICH
3  (Berlin  &  Leipzig,  Guttentag  1888)  (authors'  translation);  OTO  PALANDT,  BORGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH  1069  (Peter Bassenge  et al.  eds.,  59th  ed.  2000);  see also,  e.g.,  KARL-HERMANN
CAPELLE,  BORGERLICHES  RECHT:  SACHENRECHT  13  (1963)  ("Numerus  Clausus,  Typenzwang
oder  Typenfixierung");  KLAUS  SCHREmER,  SACHENRECHT  28-29  (1993)  ("Typenzwang  und
Typenfixierung");  JAN  WILHELM,  SACHENRECHT  146  (1993)  ("Numerus  Clausus  /
Typenzwang");  Jiirgen  Kohler,  The Law of Rights in Rem,  in INTRODUCTION  TO  GERMAN  LAW
227,  230  (Werner  F. Ebke  &  Matthew  W.  Finkin  eds.,  1996)  ("numerus clausus of rights  in
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in which property  rights can be enforced against  third parties,  as in Japan7
and perhaps  France,8 or at least an unstated  design principle.9
Particularly  striking  is  the  virtual  absence  of  any  treatment  of  the
numerus  clausus  by  scholars  influenced  by  the  law-and-economics
movement.  The  principle  that  property  forms  are  fixed  and  limited  in
number represents  an extremely  important qualification  to the principle  of
freedom  of contact-a  principle  widely  regarded  by  law-and-economics
scholars  as promoting the efficient allocation of resources. A willing buyer
and  a  willing  seller can  create  an  infinite  variety of enforceable  contracts
for  the  exchange  of  recognized  property  rights,  and  can  describe  these
property  rights  along  a multitude  of physical  dimensions  and  prices.  But
common-law  courts will  not enforce  an agreement  to  create a new type of
property  right. Remarkably,  virtually  no effort  has  been  made  to theorize
7.  The numerus clausus principle is well-established  in Japanese  law, although in contrast to
German  law,  Japanese  law  regards  the principle,  which  is  reflected  in Civil  Code  Article  175,
more  as a  limitation on the circumstances  in which  property  rights can  be enforced  against third
parties.  MINP0,  art.  175;  see, e.g.,  YOSIYUKI  NODA,  INTRODUCTION  TO  JAPANESE  LAW  198-99
(Anthony  H. Angelo ed.  & trans.,  1976) (noting that Civil Code  Article 175 limits property rights
to types created by legislation  and that registration is not required to create  a property right but is
required  for enforcement  of the right  against third  parties);  HIROSHI  ODA,  JAPANESE  LAW  157
(1992)  (discussing Article  175 limitations)  id. at 158-61  (noting that registration  is not required to
create a property  right but is required for enforcement of the  right against third parties); see also,
e.g.,  I J.E.  DE BECKER,  THE PRINCIPLES  AND  PRACTICE  OF  THE CIVIL  CODE  OF JAPAN  140-42
(1921)  (noting  that  it  is  the  policy  of Article  175 to  limit types  of property  rights);  J.  MARK
RAMSEYER  & MINORU  NAKAZATO,  JAPANESE  LAW:  AN  ECONOMIC  APPROACH  25-26  (1999)
(noting in passing that Article  175 limits estates in land).
8.  The  numerus clausus is  recognized  as a  principle of French  law, and  controversy  centers
on whether it is a substantive limitation  implied by Code  civil Article 543 or is created through the
rather  strict  formalities  required  for enforcement  of  property  rights.  See  generally CHRISTIAN
ATIAS,  DROIT  CIVIL:  LES  BIENS  §  1,  39,  at  44-45  (3d  ed.  1993)  (reviewing  the  history  of
limitations  on  types  of  property  rights  in  French  law).  Compare  EMILE  CHINON,  LES
D12MEMBREMENTS  DE  LA  PROPRIEI  FONCItRE  EN  FRANCE  AVANT  ET APRtS  LA  REVOLUTION
§ 60,  at  180-83  (2d  ed.  1923)  (arguing  for  the  limiting  character  of  Article  543),  and  S.
GINOSSAR, DROIT RFEL, PROPRIITt  ET CRIANCE:  ELABORATION D'UN SYSTtME RATIONNEL DES
DRorrs  PATRIMONIAUX  146-51  (1960)  (arguing  that the numerus clausus is  implied  by Article
543),  with  3  MARCEL  PLANIOL  &  GEORGES  RIPERT,  TRAITI  PRATIQUE  DE  DROIT  CIVIL
FRANCAIS:  MAURICE  PICARD, LES BIENS  § 3,  48,  at 52-54 (1st  ed.  1926) (arguing  that the civil
law  does  not  formally  prohibit  creation  of new  forms  of  property  but  renders  such  creation
extremely rare through limits on in rein enforcement,  antifragmentation  devices, and requirements
of publicity).
9.  For example, in Roman  law the  servitude (servilus) was defined  as a modification  of full
ownership,  and  included  usufructs  (usus fructus). Servitudes  were  subject  to  limitations  and  a
presumption  against creating  new  types.  FRITZ  SCHULZ,  CLASSICAL ROMAN  LAW  336-37,  381-
88,  393-94  (1951);  FRITZ SCHULZ,  PRINCIPLES  OF ROMAN LAW 153-55  (1936);  ALAN WATSON,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN  THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC  180 (1968)  (" [E]ven in classical  law  a
right, to  be  accepted  as  a  servitude,  had  to  fall  within  a  recognized  type.");  see also A.M.
PRICHARD,  LEAGE'S  ROMAN PRIVATE LAW  157-60, 208-09  (3d  ed.  1961)  (noting limitations on
types of property rights and stating  that other rights were contractual). The later breakdown of the
classical  system  included  a  loosening  of  the  limitations  on  servitudes.  ERNST  LEVY,  WEST
ROMAN VULGAR  LAW:  THE LAW OF PROPERTY  55-59 (1951).The Yale Law Journal
about whether this critical  qualification to freedom of contract  is justifiable
in economic terms.1°
The  primary  candidate  for  an  economic  explanation  has  been  the
suggestion  that the numerus clausus is  a device for minimizing the  effects
of durable property interests on those dealing with assets in the future, 1 and
in  particular  the  effects  of  excessive  fragmentation  of  interests,  or  an
"anticommons."  2  On  this  view,  the  numerus clausus serves  to  prevent
situations in which too  many individuals  have  a veto right over the use  or
disposition of a resource. But whatever the merits of this anti-fragmentarian
view  for  other  property  doctrines,  it  does  not  fully  explain  the  numerus
clausus, which  is  aimed  at  limiting  types  of  rights,  not  the  number  of
rightholders.  As  we  show  below,  limiting  fragmentation  is  at  best  an
incidental  effect  of  the  numerus  clausus, and  does  not  appear  to  be  a
sufficiently  robust  explanation  to  account  for  the  universal  nature  of the
doctrine and its tenacious hold on postfeudal legal systems. 3
When one  turns to the snippets  of commentary on the numerus clausus
found in more  conventional Anglo-American  legal literature, one finds  that
the attitude  is  often one  of hostility.  Scholars  and judges  tend  to react  to
manifestations  of  the  numerus clausus as  if  it  were  nothing  more  than
outmoded formalism. For example, the idea that property  may exist only in
prescribed forms  is implicitly debunked by quoting Holmes's aphorism that
"it  is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV." 14 Taking this position one step further,
Critical  Legal  Studies  (CLS)  scholars  have portrayed  the doctrine of fixed
estates  as  perniciously  reinforcing  hierarchical  social  relations.  As  one
CLS-inspired  source  puts  it,  the  "formalistic,  box-like  structure"  of
10.  A  partial  exception  is  Rudden,  supra note  3,  which  touches  upon  several  possible
economic  justifications  for  the  doctrine,  including  the  third-party  information-cost  theory  we
develop at length in Part  Il of this Article. Id. at 254-56.  Rudden ultimately concludes,  however,
that the rationale for the doctrine remains a mystery. Id. at 261.
11.  This argument is made in its most general form in Carol  M. Rose,  What Government Can
Do for  Property (and Vice  Versa),  in  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  INTERRELATIONSHIPS  BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT  AND  PROPERTY 209,  214-15 (Nicholas Mercuro  & Warren  J.  Samuels eds.,  1999).
This concern  about  future parties  dealing  in assets  subject  to  idiosyncratic or fragmented  rights
also animates  the  vaguer  concerns  in traditional  doctrine  about  restraints  on  alienation  and  the
more recent  literature reflecting anti-fragmentarian  concerns. See infra Section IV.B.
12.  Michael  A. Heller,  The Boundaries of Private Property, 108  YALE  L.J.  1163,  1176-78
(1999).
13.  Infra Section  IV.B.
14.  E.g., CURTIS  J.  BERGER &  JOAN  C. WILLIAMS,  PROPERTY:  LAND  OWNERSHIP  AND  USE
213-14 (4th ed.  1997) (reproducing  a case quoting the aphorism in discussing the doctrine of fixed
estates);  DONAHUE  ET  AL.,  supra note  2,  at 459  (quoting  the  aphorism  in  notes discussing  the
doctrine).  The  aphorism  originally  appeared  in  Oliver Wendell  Holmes,  The  Path of the Law,
10 HARV.  L.  REV.  457,  469 (1897).  English  commentators  evince  similar attitudes. E.g.,  Susan
Bright,  Of Estates and Interests: A  Tale of Ownership and Property Rights, in LAND  LAW:
THEMES  AND  PERSPECTIVES  529,  546  (Susan  Bright  &  John  Dewar eds.,  1998)  (stating  that
English judges have "bolt[ed]  the door"  on existing categories of property and "[ilt  is about time
that the door was opened and new rights admitted on  a more principled basis").
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property  law,  that  is,  the  numerus clausus, reflects  a  "feudal  vision  of
property  relationships  designed  to  channel  (force?)  people  into  pre-set
social relationships." 15
A  related  source  of  antipathy  to  the  numerus clausus may  be  the
perception that it is a trap for the unwary. The menu  of recognized property
forms is relatively complex, and any attempt to venture  beyond simple sales
of goods  and short-term  leases  into the arcane  worlds  of future  interests,
easements  and  covenants,  or  intellectual  property requires  the  advice  of a
lawyer. When unsophisticated  or poorly advised  actors  enter these worlds,
they  may  find that courts force  the transaction  into one  of the  established
"boxes,"  with  the  result  that  the  actors'  intentions  are  frustrated.  By
contrast,  actors  who  are  sophisticated  or  well-advised  can  almost  always
manipulate  the menu  of options  so  as  to realize  their objectives. 6  In  this
sense,  the  numerus clausus discriminates  in favor of those  who  are  well-
endowed with legal resources  and against those who are poorly endowed. 7
A  third source of the  antagonism toward  the  numerus clausus may  be
the  lessons  supposedly  learned  from  the  reform  movement  in  landlord-
tenant  law.  This  reform  effort  has  often  proceeded  under  the  banner  of
discarding outmoded "property"  concepts in favor of the greater flexibility
and  attention  to  the  parties'  intentions  associated  with  "contract"
precepts. 8  By  extension,  other features  of property  law  that deviate  from
the norms of free contract may  fall under a cloud of suspicion. Here again,
standardization  of  forms  is  associated  with  the  ancien  rigime,  and
contractual norms are assumed to be more open, fair, and egalitarian.
15.  BERGER  & WILLIAMS,  supra note  14,  at 211.  The junior editor of  this casebook, Joan
Williams, has been influenced  by  CLS theory. See generally, e.g., Joan Williams,  The Rhetoric of
Property,  83 IOWA L. REv.  277  (1998).
Whatever  the  merits of such critiques of formalism  in other contexts, they  are ironic when
directed against the numerus clausus. Historically,  the doctrine is closely associated with efforts in
post-revolutionary  France  to  eliminate  the  proliferation  of fragmented  rights  characteristic  of
feudal regimes. CHINON, supra note 8, at 91-183; Henry Hansmann  & Ugo Mattei, The Functions
of Trust Law: A  Comparative  Legal and Economic Analysis, 73  N.Y.U. L. REv.  434, 442  (1998);
see also John Henry Merryman,  Ownership and Estate, 48  TUL. L. REv.  916,  938-43 (1974).  In
other  words,  the  doctrine  was  originally  embraced  (at  least  by  the  French)  because  it  would
undermine established hierarchies, not because it would reinforce them.
16.  E.g., Lawrence  W.  Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A  Proposal  for
Legislative  Action, 85 HARV.  L. REv.  729, 732 (1972).
17.  Cf  Duncan  Kennedy,  Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89  HARV.  L.
REv.  1685,  1699-1700  (1976)  (noting  the  argument  that formalism  in law  tends  to favor  those
with greater access to legal resources).
18.  See,  e.g.,  Javins  v.  First Nat'l  Realty  Corp.,  428 F.2d  1071,  1074-77  (D.C.  Cir. 1970);
Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207-08  (Vt. 1984).  The notion that these judicial reforms reflect
a contractual  model of leases is dubious, since the reforms are often based on the terms of housing
codes and  other statutes  and  are typically nonwaivable.  Mary  Ann  Glendon,  The Transformation
of American Landlord-Tenant  Law, 23  B.C. L. REv.  503,  504-05 (1982).  See generally Roger  A.
Cunningham,  The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability  in Residential Leases:
From  Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN.  3 (1979).
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These casual criticisms of the numerus clausus fail to confront  what to
us are the essential questions.  Before condemning  standardization of forms
and embracing  a regime of contractual  freedom  with  respect  to the  legal
dimensions of property,  one must first engage in a series of inquiries:  What
are the costs  and benefits of standardization  in defining property  rights? To
what extent should standardization of rights be supplied by the government
rather  than  relying  solely  on  owners'  incentives  to  conform  to  the most-
widely used  forms? If the government  plays  a role in  standardizing  rights,
what is the appropriate division of labor between  courts and legislatures  in
enforcing standardization  and in making the inevitable changes to the menu
of standard forms that must occur over time?
In  Part II of the Article, we  survey the common  law of property  in an
effort to ascertain the extent to which the numerus clausus is  a recognized
feature of that law. We find  that, in practice, courts  and  lawyers routinely
abide  by  the  principle, even  if they  are  unaware of its  existence.  Perhaps
because  it is  so little discussed  or recognized,  however,  modern  American
courts  sometimes waver when  faced with a direct challenge  to the numerus
clausus, and flirt with  the notion  that property  forms should be subject to
modification  by contract.
In Part III, we set forth a positive theory of the numerus clausus, and in
particular,  why  property  rights,  unlike  contract  rights,  are  restricted  to  a
limited  number  of  standardized  forms.  The  root  of  the  difference,  we
suggest,  stems from  the  in rem  nature  of property  rights:  When  property
rights  are  created,  third  parties  must  expend  time  and  resources  to
determine  the attributes  of these rights,  both to avoid violating them and to
acquire them from present holders. The existence of unusual property rights
increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. Those
creating  or  transferring  idiosyncratic  property  rights  cannot  always  be
expected  to take  these increases  in measurement  costs  fully  into  account,
making them  a  true externality.  Standardization  of property rights reduces
these measurement costs.
Although  the  numerus  clausus  represents  a  use  of  law  to  restrict
individual  choice,  in  actual  operation  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  private
ordering  and  freedom  of  contract.  Like  another  network,  language,  the
system of property  rights  contains  features  that allow the creation  of very
complex  composite  rights  out  of  a  limited  vocabulary  and  rules  of
combination.  As  in  the case of human  language,  because  so much  can  be
done functionally  with  simple building blocks,  the generative power of the
system  cannot  be  measured  by  counting  the  number  of  basic  building
blocks  allowed.  Accordingly,  the  amount  of  frustration  caused  by
standardizing  the building  blocks  is  far  less  than  would be  the  case if a
specially  tailored  basic  building  block  were  required  for every  purpose  to
which property  rights can be put.
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Part  IV  considers  and  rejects  several  potential  objections  to  our
.explanation.  These  include  the  claim  that  measurement  costs  can  be
reduced just  as  effectively  by  mandating  notice  of idiosyncratic  property
forms as by standardization;  that parties have  adequate incentives to seek to
conform  to  the  most-commonly  used  forms  without  legal  compulsion
because of network effects;  that  standardization  can be supplied by private
institutions rather  than by law;  that the numerus clausus is a response to a
concern  with  fragmentation  rather than  a device  for lowering  information
costs;  and  that  the  numerus  clausus  has  been  rendered  irrelevant  by
developments in contract law.
In  Part  V,  we  consider  how  the  numerus clausus functions  as  an
instrument  of  institutional  choice.  If  the  number  of property  forms  is
"closed,"  and cannot be expanded  either by the parties'  contract or through
judicial  interpretation,  then  reforms  to  the  system  of  property  rights
generally  must  occur  through  legislation  rather  than  through  judicial
entrepreneurship.  We  argue  that,  because  of  several  critical  attributes  of
legislative rulemaking, this feature  also  functions on balance to reduce  the
costs to  third parties  of measuring  the legal dimensions  of property rights.
Thus,  the  institutional-choice  implications  of the  doctrine  reinforce  the
basic information-cost rationale we identify.
H. THE NUMERUS CLA USUS IN THE COMMON LAW OF PROPERTY
To  what extent does  the common  law of property reflect  the numerus
clausus principle?  The question does  not admit  of an  easy answer  because
of an  odd disconnect in the law. On the one hand, courts and commentators
behave as if we have a property  system characterized by a  limited number
of forms not  subject  to  contractual  or judicial  modification.  On the  other
hand,  there  is  no  explicit  recognition  of  the  numerus  clausus, which
naturally renders  the  status of the doctrine somewhat  insecure. Indeed,  we
find  some  evidence  of  an  incipient  attitude  that  courts  should  simply
enforce  the  intentions  of  the  parties  and  abandon  any  insistence  that
property rights conform to a finite list of recognized forms.
A.  The Numerus Clausus as a Norm of Judicial  Self-Governance
Given  basic  differences  between  civil-law  systems  and  common-law
systems,  it  is perhaps  not surprising  that the numerus clausus is  expressly
recognized  in the former but not the latter. Civil-law jurisprudence rests on
the premise that the code is the exclusive source  of legal obligation.  Thus,
19.  HENRY M. HART,  JR. & ALBERT M.  SACKS,  THE  LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC  PROBLEMS IN
THE  MAKING AND  APPLICATION  OF LAW 749 (William  N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
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if the code  recognizes  certain  forms  of property, but  not others,  it  follows
logically  that  the  forms  enumerated  in  the  code  are  the  only  types  of
property  that the judiciary may enforce.2'  The parties may  not create  a new
type  of property  by  contract,  nor  may  the judiciary  on  its  own  authority
invent new property  rights, because this  would contradict  the code's  status
as  the exclusive  source of legal obligation. Thus,  the only  way to  subtract
from  or  add  to  the  list  of  legally  sanctioned  property  forms  is  for  the
legislature to amend the code.
The common law, of course, rejects  the assumption that enacted  law is
the  exclusive  source  of  legal  obligation.  Especially  in  private  law-
contracts,  torts,  and property-common-law  courts are  regarded as  having
inherent  power  to  define  basic  legal  principles  and  obligations.  The
Blackstonian justification  for  this judicial  authority  is  that  common-law
courts  enforce  principles  grounded  in  immemorial  custom.2  The  modem
justification  is  that  common-law  courts  exercise  inherent  policymaking
authority  with  respect  to  private  law,  subject  to  legislative  revision.2 2
Whatever the justification,  the common  law's  rejection of  the exclusivity
postulate of the civil law means that the numerus clausus cannot be derived
deductively  from  fundamental  postulates  about  the  legal  system.  In
common-law systems, there  is no inherent reason why all existing forms of
property  should  derive  from  an  act  of  the  legislature,  nor  is  there  any
inherent  reason  why  existing  forms  of property  should  not  be  subject  to
judicial revision and supplementation.
Yet  notwithstanding  the  absence  of  logical  compulsion  behind  the
numerus  clausus  in  common-law  systems,  it  is  reasonably  clear  that
common-law  courts behave toward property rights very much like civil-law
1994)  (stating  that  civil-law  codes  are  based  on "a  self-contained  body of statutory  provisions
which are to be taken as the exclusive source of law,  and  to which all judicial decisions  must be
referred");  JOHN HENRY  MERRYMAN,  THE  CIVIL  LAW  TRADITION:  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS  OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN  AMERICA 22-23  (2d ed.  1985) (stating  that the
separation  of powers  as  formulated  in civil-law  countries precludes the  doctrine  of stare decisis
and  judge-made  law  and  that in  the civil-law  tradition  "only  statutes enacted  by  the  legislative
power could be  law,"  supplemented  by administrative  regulations  and  custom);  ALAN  WATSON,
THE MAKING  OF THE CIVIL LAW  168  (1981)  (arguing that statutes, including  foremost the  code,
along with governmental  and  ministerial  decrees, are the only independent  source of law,  with a
possible subordinate  source of law in custom).
20.  In  civil-law  systems, the numerus clausus is often  said to be  an independent substantive
doctrine  or a principle  implicit  in the civil  code. Supra notes  6-9  and  accompanying  text.  In  at
least  one  civil-law country,  the  numerus clausus is  directly  incorporated  in  the  code.  Rudden,
supra note  3, at 243 (discussing the civil code of Argentina).
21.  1 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES  *69  ("[A judge is]  sworn to determine,  not
according to his own private judgment,  but according to the known laws  and customs of the land;
not  delegated  to  pronounce  a  new  law,  but  to  maintain  and  expound  the  old one.");  Albert  W.
Alschuler,  Rediscovering Blackstone,  145  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1, 37,  43  (1996)  (noting  that  the
declaratory theory  reflects a  strong  presumption against judicial  innovation,  and that Blackstone
"may  have viewed legislatures rather than courts as the principal  source of legal innovation").
22.  See,  e.g.,  MELVIN  ARON  EISENBERG,  THE NATURE  OF THE  COMMON  LAW  1-7  (1988);
RICHARD A.  POSNER,  THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 9-23 (1990).
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courts  do: They  treat previously-recognized  forms  of property  as  a closed
list  that  can be modified  only  by  the  legislature.  This  behavior cannot  be
attributed  to any  explicit or implicit command  of the legislature.  It is best
described as a norm of judicial  self-governance.  Jurisprudentially  speaking,
the numerus clausus functions  in  the  common law  much  like  a  canon  of
interpretation,  albeit a  canon  that applies  to common-law  decisionmaking
rather  than  statutory  or  constitutional  interpretation,23  or  like  a  strong
default rule in the interpretation of property rights.24
Before  reviewing  the  evidence  in  support  of  our  contention  that
common-law  courts  follow  the  numerus  clausus  as  a  norm  of  self-
governance, it is useful to consider an example of the principle in operation.
Landlord-tenant  law  includes  a  version  of the numerus clausus principle.
Leases are limited to four recognized  types:  the term of years, the periodic
tenancy,  the  tenancy  at  will,  and the  tenancy  at  sufferance.' 5 Suppose  a
landlord and tenant decide to enter into a lease that does not conform to any
of the four standard  types-a tenancy  "for  the duration  of the war"  being
the  classic  example.26  If  landlord-tenant  law  were  just  like  the  law  of
contract,  then  there would  be no  reason  not  to enforce  this  agreement  in
accordance with its terms;  that is, the tenancy would last until the war ends.
But  courts  typically  do  not  proceed  this  way.  Instead,  they  seek  to
determine  which  of the  four recognized  types  of leases  best fits what  the
parties  have  created.  Since a  term  of years  requires  a "definite  calendar
ending,"  27 and  wars  last for an  uncertain  length of time, most courts  have
concluded  that  a  tenancy  "for  the  duration  of the war"  must be  either a
periodic  tenancy  (if  the  lease  provides  for  payment  of rent  at  periodic
intervals)  or a tenancy  at will.28 The result of the pigeon-holing  exercise in
23.  On  the  importance  of substantive  canons  in  the  interpretation  of enacted  law,  see,  for
example,  WILLIAM  N.  ESKRIDGE,  JR.,  DYNAMIC  STATUTORY  INTERPRETATION  275-306 (1994);
and  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  AFTER  THE  RIGHTS  REVOLUTION:  RECONCEIVING  THE  REGULATORY
STATE  147-57 (1990).
24.  Default rules  in contract  law range  in strength according  to  how  explicit one must be to
contract around  the  default. Ian Ayres  & Robert  Gertner,  Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rides, 99 YALE L.J. 87,  119-25 (1989).
25.  E.g.,  2  POWELL,  supra  note  2,  §§  16.03-.06,  at  16-55  to  16-103;  ROBERT  S.
SCHOSHINSKI,  AMERICAN  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT  §§  2:1-:26,  at  30-83  (1980);
4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY  § 39.02(c), at 492 (David A. Thomas ed.,  1994).
26.  1  AMERICAN  LAW  OF  PROPERTY  §  3.14,  at  209-10  (A.  James  Casner  ed.,  1952);
2 POWELL, supra note 2,  § 16.03[4][b], at 16-68 to  16-69.
27.  2 POWELL, supra  note 2, § 16.03[4][b],  at 16-68.
28.  Nat'l Bellas  Hess v. Kalis,  191  F.2d 739  (8th  Cir.  1951); Stanmeyer v.  Davis, 53  N.E.2d
22  (111.  App. Ct. 1944); Lace v. Chandler,  1 All E.R. 305 (K.B.  1944).  But cf  Smith's Transfer &
Storage Co. v. Hawkins,  50  A.2d 267, 268 (D.C.  1946) (concluding  that a term of years  requires
only  that the lease  be certain  to end,  not  that it have  a definite calendar  ending,  and  thus that  a
tenancy  until  the  termination  of  "the  present  war"  was  a  term  of  years).  American Law  of
Property asserts  that  "the  tendency  has  been  to  uphold  such  leases  in  accordance  with  the
intention of the parties."  I AMERICAN  LAW  OF PROPERTY,  supra note  26, § 3.14, at  209-10. But
the cases  do not bear this out.  The  minority of courts that  have upheld  such  leases as  a term  of
years  have generally done so by changing  the  definition  of a term of years, e.g., Smith's TransferThe Yale Law Journal [Vol.  110:  1
this  example  is  thus  that  the  parties'  intentions  are  frustrated,  because
neither a periodic  tenancy  nor  a  tenancy  at  will  has  the  same  security  of
tenure  as  a  tenancy for the duration of the war presumably  would  have if
enforced according to its terms."
B.  The Common Law's Standardization  of Property
The  following  is  a brief summary  of the menu of property  forms that
exist today  in  American  common law.3" Although  we point out in passing
which forms are widely used and which ones are rarely encountered,  we do
not  attempt  to  provide  a  historical  account  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  the
different forms. The point  of the discussion  is to show that the  number  of
forms is fixed for most purposes, not to offer  a substantive account of how
we came to have the particular menu  of options  that exist today.1 We also
indicate,  in each  area, the general  attitude  of the courts  toward  claims  for
the recognition of novel forms of property.
1.  Estates in Land
The  common-law  system of estates  in land  is an  area  of property law
universally  recognized  to have  a  "formalistic,  box-like  structure."32 There
&  Storage Co.,  50 A.2d  267,  not  by declaring  that  the parties are  free  to  modify the  available
forms of leases by contract.
29.  As usual,  the clever conveyancer  can get around the problem, here  most likely by creating
a  term of years determinable.  Thus, for example, one  could create  a lease "for  fifty  years unless
the war ends sooner."  This is not exactly identical  to a lease "for  the  duration of the war,"  but in
most wars  it would  achieve  the  same  result.  2  POWELL,  supra note  2,  §  16.03[4][b],  at  16-68.
Commentators have predictably seized on  the ability to get around the common-law  rule by clever
conveyancing  as evidence  that the numerus clausus principle represents  a  "triumph  of form over
substance."  Id.; see also 1 AMERICAN  LAW  OF PROPERTY,  supra note 26, § 3.14, at 210. But this
is true only if the  measurement costs to  third parties of ascertaining  the  meaning of a  lease  "for
fifty years unless the war ends sooner"  are the  same as the costs of ascertaining the meaning of a
lease "for  the duration of the war."  As to this question, see infra text accompanying note  133.
30.  For overviews,  see, for example, THOMAS F. BERGIN  & PAUL G. HASKELL,  PREFACE TO
ESTATES IN  LAND  AND FUTURE  INTERESTS  19-80 (2d ed.  1984); JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN  W.
JOHNSON,  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  LAW  OF  PROPERTY  40-140  (3d  ed.  1989);  and  ROGER  A.
CUNNINGHAM  ET AL.,  THE LAW OF PROPERTY  26-504 (2d ed. 1993).
31.  If such  an  account  were  to  be developed,  it  would  show  that  legislation  has  played  a
larger role in the creation of the forms of property  than most common-law lawyers  might suppose.
For  example,  the  statute  Quia Emptores,  1290,  18  Edw.  (Eng.),  which  made  free  tenements
alienable,  played a critical role  in the development of the fee simple,  and the fee  tail was created
by  the statute  De Donis Conditionalibus, 1285,  13  Edw.,  ch. 1 (Eng.).  Admittedly,  however,  a
number of forms have an uncertain provenance  and probably reflect a large measure of customary
law. See,  e.g.,  Richard  Helmholz  &  Reinhard  Zimmermann,  Views  of Trust and Treuhand: An
Introduction,  in ITINERA  FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND  IN HISTORICAL  PERSPECTIVE  27,  41-
42 (Richard  Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann  eds.,  1998)  (noting the customary  and Roman-
law background  of trusts).
32.  Cf. BERGER  &  WILLIAMS,  supra note  14,  at  211  (characterizing  the  common-law
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are  five  general  types  of  present  possessory  interests:  the  fee  simple
absolute,  the  defeasible  fee  simple,  the  fee  tail,  the  life  estate,  and  the
lease.33 Some complications  are always acknowledged:  Defeasible fees and
leases  can  be further  subdivided into  subtypes,' 4 and  the  fee  tail  has been
abolished in nearly all jurisdictions  and is for practical  purposes defunct."
Each  of these  present  possessory  interests,  except  for the  fee  simple,  has
one or more  corresponding  types of future  interests:  reversions,  powers  of
termination,  remainders,  and  executory  interests,36  again  with  subtypes.
37
The  exact number  of estates  in  land varies  somewhat,  depending on how
the classifier  treats  the  subtypes.  But  at  bottom  there  is  no  disagreement
about  the identity of the forms  or their  defining  features.38  Moreover,  for
purposes  of everyday  legal practice,  the  only forms  that really  matter  are
the fee  simple  and the lease for a  term of years.39  All  other estates  in land
are rarely encountered  as legal interests.4°
In  practice,  courts  enforce  the  numerus  clausus  principle  strictly
(although  not  of course  by  name)  in  the context  of estates  in  land.  The
menu  of forms  is  regarded  as  complete  and not  subject to  additions.41 To
take  one example,  testators  have occasionally  left  property  to  a  surviving
spouse  as  a  life  estate,  but  with  the  power  to  convey  or  devise  a  fee
simple.4 2  The  intention  here  appears  to  be  to  create  a  kind  of  hybrid
between  a  life  estate  and  a  fee  simple-a  life  estate  if  the  spouse  dies
intestate  but a  fee  simple if the spouse  decides to sell or to make  a gift of
33.  1 POWELL, supra note  2,  §  12.01[2],  at  12-5  (enumerating  the categories  of freehold
estates  and the subcategories  of leases).
34.  The defeasible  fee is usually  subdivided into the  fee  simple determinable,  the fee simple
subject  to  condition  subsequent,  and  the  fee  simple  subject  to  an  executory  limitation.
CUNNINGHAM  ET AL.,  supra note  30, at 35-36;  1 POWELL, supra note 2, § 12.01[2],  at  12-5  &
n. 13. Leases  are usually subdivided  into the term  of years,  the periodic  lease, the tenancy  at will,
and  the tenancy at sufferance.  E.g., 2 POWELL, supra note  2, §§  16.03-.06, at 16-55 to 16-103.
35.  2  POWELL, supra note 2,  196, at 14-16 to 14-18. Even before the legislative movement
for repeal,  the fee tail was not  widely used  in the United States. Gregory  S.  Alexander,  Time and
Property in the American Republican Legal Culture,  66 N.Y.U. L. REV.  273, 295 (1991).
36.  CUNNINGHAM  ET AL., supra note 30, at 86.
37.  Remainders  can  be classified as indefeasibly  vested, contingent, vested  subject to  open,
and  vested  subject  to  complete  defeasance.  Id.  at  97.  Executory  interests  can  he  classified  as
shifting or springing. Id. at 107-12.
38.  Powers  of  appointment  are  sometimes  added  to  the  list  of  future  interests.  E.g.,
3 POWELL, supra note 2,  § 20.01 [2], at 20-6. But the Restatement and most commentators  classify
powers  of  appointment  as  representing  a  special  type  of power  to  complete  "the  terms  of  a
disposition  made by a transferor."  RESTATEMENT (SECOND)  OF PROPERTY  § 11.1 cmt. f (1986).
39.  Cf. CUNNINGHAM  ET  AL.,  supra note 30, at 28 (explaining  that the fee  simple absolute
and the estate for years are the only estates  that are commercially  salable).
40.  Life  estates  are  encountered,  but nearly  always today  as equitable  interests conveyed  in
trust. Id.
41.  Indeed,  the usual complaint is that there are too many recognized  types of future interests,
and  that  legislation  should  be  adopted  simplifying  the  existing  menu  of  options.  See,  e.g.,
Waggoner, supra note 16, at 752-56.
42.  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  PROPERTY:  DONATIVE  TRANSFERS  §  12.1  cmt.  b  (1984);
1 AMERICAN LAW  OF PROPERTY,  supra note 26, § 2.15, at 126-27.
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the  property  by  will.  No  court,  however,  has  recognized  such  a  hybrid
estate.  Courts  are  divided  as  to  the  proper  characterization  of  such  an
interest:  Some  construe  it  to  create  a  life  estate,43  others  to  create  a  fee
simple.'  But all courts recognize that the task is to squeeze the interest into
one  of  the  established  categories,  the  only  question  being  which
standardized  box  is  most  consistent  with  the  testator's  intentions  or  is
otherwise  "best"  in  terms  of policy  concerns  such  as  promoting  the free
alienability of property .
Although  the  menu  of  available  estates  in  land  is  fixed  from  the
perspective of the parties and the courts, this does not mean that property in
land  is  standardized  along  all  dimensions.  The  law  of course  permits  an
immense  amount  of  customization  in  the physical  attributes  of rights  in
land,  including  the  shape  and  size  of  the  parcel  and  the  types  of
improvements  on the land. And it is possible to cut short present possessory
interests  or  create  future  interests  upon  the  occurrence  of  specified
conditions  (such as  a condition  that a child reach  the age of twenty-one  or
that  a  surviving  spouse  remain  unmarried),  and  these  conditions  are  not
themselves  limited.46 Still, with respect to the  most basic  legal dimensions,
such  as duration,  powers  of alienation, rights  of inheritance,  and  so forth,
the  system  of estates  in  land  presents  the  picture  of highly  standardized
building blocks not subject to modification by contract or judicial decree.
2.  Concurrent  Interests
The system of estates  in land distinguishes  forms of property  based on
their  temporal  dimension.  Cutting  across  the  temporal  or  "horizontal"
dimension  is what might be  called the "vertical"  dimension-the different
43.  E.g.,  Smith  v.  Bell,  31  U.S.  (6  Pet.)  68  (1832);  St. Louis  Union  Trust Co.  v.  Morton,
468 S.W.2d  193,  198 (Mo.  1971).
44.  E.g.,  Sumner v. Borders, 98 S.W.2d  918,  919-20 (Ky.  1936); Fox v.  Snow, 76 A.2d  877,
877-78  (N.J.  1950)  (per  curiam). A  third possibility,  said to have  been suggested  by Holmes,  is
that the gift over in such cases  would be classified  as a  springing  executory  interest subject to a
power of appointment  by  the original  grantee.  HART & SACKS,  supra note  19,  at  590-91.  This
ingenious solution  probably  more closely  tracks the grantor's  intentions than does either the fee
simple or life estate construction. Note, however, that Holmes also described this solution in terms
of recognized  interests-executory  interests  and powers of appointment.  He did  not suggest that
the hybrid interest simply be enforced in accordance  with the grantor's  intentions.
45.  See, e.g., Bell, 31  U.S.  at 74-79  (construing the interest to be  a life estate  because  this is
most  consistent  with  the intentions  of  the  grantor);  Sumner, 98  S.W.2d  at  919 (construing  the
interest  to be  a  fee  simple  based  on  a  constructional  principle  favoring  fee  simples  in cases  of
doubt).
46.  1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST)  OF PROPERTY  § 23 cmt. d (1936)  (noting a variety of conditions
that can be imposed as special  limitations on a fee simple or life estate);  id. § 24  cmt. c  (noting a
variety  of conditions  that can be imposed  as conditions  subsequent on  a fee  simple  or a  term  of
years);  id. § 25 cmt. f (noting a variety  of conditions that can be imposed  as triggers  of executory
interests);  2 id. § 157 cmt. r (providing  illustrations of conditions  that can be  imposed as  triggers
of vested remainders  subject to complete  defeasance);  id. § 157 cmt. u (providing  illustrations  of
conditions  that can be imposed as triggers of contingent remainders).
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forms  of  concurrent  interests  in  property  among  multiple  parties.47
American  law  recognizes  five  basic  categories  of  concurrent  interests:48
tenancy  in  common;  joint  tenancy;  marital  property;49  trusts;  and
condominiums, cooperatives, and time-shares.
The numerus clausus principle  is  also  quite strong  in  the concurrent-
interest area.  There  have been  a number of modifications  in  the forms  of
concurrent  property  in  the  last  century.  But  these  changes  have  almost
always been the product of legislative reforms, not judicial rulings, and thus
are consistent with a rule of judicial self-governance treating existing forms
as  closed.  Changing  conceptions  of  women's  rights  have  given  rise  to  a
number of reforms of marital property  interests. For example, common-law
rights  of  dower  and  curtesy  have  been  abolished  in  almost  all
jurisdictions.5"  Tenancies  by  the  entirety,  another  form  of  concurrent
property right limited to married couples, have also been abolished in many
states.5  Usually  this  has been  done expressly  by statute,  although  in rare
instances,  courts have construed  legislative  silence as requiring abolition.5"
The  tenancy  in  partnership-another  common-law  form  of  concurrent
ownership-has  also  been  displaced  in  all  states  by  the  adoption  of  the
Uniform Partnership Act.53
In  terms  of creation  of new  concurrent  interests,  the  most  dramatic
development  has  been  the emergence  of  condominiums  and  time-shares.
These interests reflect  a combination of features of other types of property
interests. Individuals hold what amounts to a fee simple  in separate units of
a complex  or in a separate  unit for a defined period of time and concurrent
interests in common areas along  with other association  members;  relations
among  concurrent owners  are  controlled  by rules  and regulations  enforced
by  a  governing  body.'  In  theory,  it  might  be  possible  to  create  a
47.  As a rule, the forms of property based on duration (e.g., the fee simple or the lease) can be
combined with the forms based on multiple ownership  (e.g., tenancy in common). DUKEMINIER &
KRIER,  supra note 2, at 321 n.l.  Thus, one can hold a lease as a tenant in common or a possibility
of reverter as community property.
48.  5  POWELL,  supra note  2,  § 40.500,  at  40-3  (trust);  7  id.  §  49.01,  at  49-2  (nontrust
concurrent  interests).
49.  Marital  property  has  a number of subdivisions,  including  dower, curtesy,  common-law
marital property,  tenancies  by  the  entirety,  and community property.  See  3  THOMPSON ON  REAL
PROPERTY,  supra note 25,  § 21.01-.02, at 2-157  (curtesy and dower);  4 id. §  37.01,  at  267-68
(common law  and community property);  id. § 37.06(a),  at 290-96 (common-law marital property
including tenancy by the entirety).
50.  2  POWELL,  supra note  2, § 213,  at  15-121 to  15-127; see also infra notes  228-229  and
accompanying  text.
51.  7  POWELL, supra note 2, § 620[4],  at 52-3 to 52-12.
52.  E.g., Hannon  v. S. Pac. R.R.,  107 P. 335, 339 (Cal.  1909); In re Richardson's  Estate, 282
N.W. 585,  587 (Wis.  1938).
53.  7  POWELL,  supra note 2. § 608,  at 50-62.  Under the Uniform Act, "individual  partners
own  the  partnership  property  in  theory,  but  all  the  incidents  of  ownership  are  vested  in  the
partnership."  MELVIN  A.  EISENBERG,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  AGENCY  AND  PARTNERSHIP  64
(1987).
54.  CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 30, at  126.
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condominium by clever combination  of preexisting property forms.5  But in
practice, condominiums  did not emerge until the  1960s, when virtually  all
states  adopted  statutes  expressly  authorizing  the  creation  of
condominiums.56 Thus,  the  story of the emergence  of the condominium  is
also broadly consistent  with  the numerus clausus in that  this new form  of
property  was the product of legislative  change, rather than  private  contract
or judicial innovation.
3.  Nonpossessory Interests
Another general category of property rights  in land consists of interests
that  confer  only  limited  rights  of use  as  opposed  to  general  possession.
Here,  American  law  recognizes  four  basic  forms:  easements,  real-
covenants,  equitable  servitudes,  and  profits. 5 7  Easements  and  equitable
servitudes,  the  most  commonly  encountered  forms,  are  devices  for
permitting  multiple  uses  of  a  single  parcel  of  land  or  controlling
externalities  associated with particular land uses.
The  numerus  clausus  applies  in  a  somewhat  weakened  form  to
nonpossessory  property  rights.  This  area has witnessed  one major judicial
innovation  in the last  150  years:  the  emergence of the equitable  servitude.
In  English  common  law,  negative  easements  were  sharply  limited  in
number,  and  the  burden  of covenants  respecting  land  could  be  enforced
against  successors  only  in  the  landlord-tenant  context."  In  response  to
demand  for  a  more  flexible  instrument  that  would  allow  the  burden  of
55.  Id. at  126-29.  Residential  homeowners'  associations-the  key  institutional  mechanism
that  makes  the  condominium  possible-have  been  created  using  real  covenants  and  equitable
servitudes.  The  seminal  decision  is  Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n  v.  Emigrant Industrial
Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y.  1938).
56.  Curtis J. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation,  63 COLUM.  L.  REv.
987,  1001-03  (1963);  Henry Hansmann,  Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional
Efficiency,  Tax  Subsidies, and Tenure  Choice,  20  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  25,  61-63  (1991).  The
triggering  event for the enactment of these  laws appears  to have  been a  section of  the National
Housing Act of  1961,  which  makes  Federal  Housing Administration  (FHA)  mortgage  insurance
available for condominiums, provided they have the sanction of state  law. Hansmann, supra, at 62
n.83. The  state statutes  were based  on an FHA model act,  which closely  followed a  1958  Puerto
Rican statute.  ld.
57.  A variety of subdivisions  are possible. Easements  have been subdivided  into affirmative
and negative, 2  AMERICAN  LAW OF PROPERTY,  supra note 26,  §§ 8.5,  8.11,  8.12,  at 232,  236-37;
4  POWELL,  supra note  2,  § 34.02[2][c],  at 34-16 to  34-17;  7  THOMPSON  ON  REAL  PROPERTY,
supra note  25,  § 60.02[e],  and into  appurtenant and  in  gross,  2  AMERICAN  LAW  OF PROPERTY,
supra note  26, §§  8.6, 8.9,  at 233-36; 4 POWELL,  supra note  2, § 34.02[2][d],  at  34-17 to 34-22;
7 THOMPSON  ON  REAL  PROPERTY,  supra note  25,  §  60.02(f).  Real  covenants  and  equitable
servitudes  can  likewise  be  subdivided  into  affirmative  and  negative.  2  AMERICAN  LAW  OF
PROPERTY,  supra note 26,  §  9.35,  at 436-37;  9  POWELL,  supra note  2,  § 60.06[l],  at  60-95
(affirmative  and  negative  covenants);  id.  §  60.01[2),  at  60-5  (affirmative  and  negative  real
covenants); id. at 60-9 to 60-10 (affirmative and negative equitable servitudes).
58.  2  AMERICAN  LAW  OF  PROPERTY,  supra note  26,  § 9.1,  at  335-38;  9  POWELL,  supra
note  2, § 60.04[1], at 60-41.
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promises to run  in planned  residential  developments,  the English Court  of
Chancery,  in  Tulk  v.  Moxhay, 59  in  effect  created  a  new  interest-the
equitable  servitude.  This  was  pure judicial  entrepreneurship,  as  the  court
was well  aware,  since  it had to limit the holding  in Keppell v. Bailey,6 0 the
leading English case holding that courts lack authority to transform contract
rights into new forms of property rights.
Notwithstanding this significant breach of the numerus clausus, we still
see significant evidence of the  operation of the principle  in this area. The
innovation  wrought  by  the  Court  of  Chancery  was  quickly  limited,  as
subsequent  decisions held  that equity  would  enforce  promises  as property
only if the promise benefits an appurtenant interest in land, only if the party
to be bound had notice of the promise, and only if the promise "touches  and
concerns"  the  land.61  These  limitations  have  also  been  accepted  by
American  courts,  notwithstanding  persistent  criticism  from  the academic
community. 2
4.  Interests in Personal  Property
Personal  property  is  restricted  to fewer  available  forms  of ownership
than real property. A number of standard reference works state that personal
property  is subject  to the same elaborate  structure of forms that  applies  to
estates in land (including future  interests).63  Yet the case law  does not fully
support this broad proposition. It is reasonably well established that one can
59.  41 Eng. Rep.  1143 (Ch. 1848).
60.  39 Eng. Rep.  1042 (Ch. 1834).
61.  ROBERT  MEGARRY & H.W.R.  WADE, THE  LAW OF REAL  PROPERTY  772 (5th ed.  1984)
(citing decisions  restricting  enforcement  of benefit  to  appurtenant  land  owners);  id. at  779-80
(citing decisions holding that a purchaser  without notice is not bound); id. at 781  (citing decisions
adopting the "touch  and concern"  requirement).  For an  account emphasizing  the limitations  on
equitable servitudes in English law, see D.J. Hayton, Restrictive Covenants as Property  Interests,
87 LAW Q.  REV. 539 (1971).
62.  E.g.,  Susan  F.  French,  Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving  the  Ancient
Strands, 55  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  1261  (1982);  Uriel  Reichman,  Toward a  Unified Concept of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.  L. REV.  1179 (1982).
63.  E.g.,  CUNNINGHAM  ET  AL.,  supra note  30,  at 25.  The  Restatement (First) of Property
limits the definition of"estate"  to "an  interest in land,"  but adds that "[i]nterests  which are quite
analogous"  exist in  personal  property.  RESTATEMENT  (FIRST)  OF PROPERTY  § 9 cmt.  a  (1936).
According  to  Blackstone,  the  "antient  common  law"  prohibited  future  interests  in  personal
property,
because, being things transitory,  and by many accidents subject  to be lost, destroyed, or
otherwise  impaired,  and  the  exigencies  of trade  requiring  also  a  frequent  circulation
thereof, it would occasion perpetual  suits and quarrels, and put a stop to the freedom of
commerce, if such limitations in remainder  were generally tolerated and allowed.
2  WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES  *398.  But Blackstone  explained  that the  courts  had
eventually relented,  permitting bequests  of personal goods  and chattels  for life,  with a remainder
over to another. Id.
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create a life estate in personal property. 6 4 But there are few if any cases that
address  the  question  of whether  more  exotic  interests,  such  as  defeasible
fees and executory interests, can be created in personal property. The reality
is that virtually anyone  who wants to create complicated  future interests  in
personal  property, including of course  stocks, bonds,  and shares  in mutual
funds-the largest  source of wealth  in  today's society-does  so through a
trust.6 5 The trustee holds title to the personal  property in fee simple, and the
beneficiaries hold  life estates  and  remainders,  or  sometimes more  unusual
interests, described using the building blocks of the common-law  estates  in
land. In effect, the trust combines  a highly  simplified title in the underlying
assets  with  a significant  degree of flexibility  in designating  the  beneficial
uses of those assets.
In  other  respects  as  well,  the  available  forms  of  personal-property
ownership  are  more  limited  than  with  respect  to  real  property.  Statutes
authorizing  the creation  of condominiums  and  time-shares  are  limited  to
real property.66  And although the case law is rather thin, it also appears that
one  cannot  create  servitudes  in  personal  property.  This,  at  least,  is  the
position  adopted  by  the  English  Court  of  Chancery  in  the  nineteenth
century, 67 and  American  precedent  is  largely,  if not quite  exclusively,  in
accord. 68  In  any  event,  servitudes  on  personal  property  are  rarely
64.  See,  e.g.,  Gruen  v.  Gruen,  496  N.E.2d  869  (N.Y.  1986);  RESTATEMENT  (FIRST)  OF
PROPERTY  §  153(1) (1936);  4 WILLIAM J. BowE & DOUGLAS  H.  PARKER,  PAGE ON THE LAW  OF
WiELLS § 37.66 (1961);  SIMES & SMITH, supra note 2,  § 359, at 385-86.
65.  ROSCOE POUND,  AN INTRODUCTION  TO THE PHILOSOPHY  OF LAW 236 (1922)  ("Wealth,
in a commercial  age,  is  made  up largely  of promises.");  John  H.  Langbein,  The  Contractarian
Basis  of  the  Law  of  Trusts,  105  YALE  L.J. 625,  637-43  (1995)  [hereinafter  Langbein,
Contractarian  Basis]  (discussing  how  the  trust  has  shifted  from  a  conveyancing  device  for
freehold  land to a management  device for holding  financial assets); John H. Langbein, The Secret
Life  of the Trust: The  Trust as an Instrument of Commerce,  107  YALE  L.J.  165,  165,  177-78
(1997)  (documenting the  importance  of commercial trusts, which contain over 90% of the money
held in trusts). As  far back as can be traced, the  trust was always available  for personal as  well as
real  property.  Richard  Helmholz,  Trusts in  the  English Ecclesiastical Courts  1300-1640, in
ITINERA  FIDUCIAE:  TRUST AND  TREUHAND  IN  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,  supra note 31,  at  153,
160-62.
66.  Infra note 110.
67.  After some  initial waffling,  the English Court of Chancery held that equitable  servitudes
could not be imposed on chattels, for example  as vertical price restraints or vertical  restrictions on
the  use  or  resale  of  goods  after  the  first  sale.  Zechariah  Chafee,  Jr.,  Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels, 41  HARV. L.  REv. 945,  977-80 (1928).
68.  In the United  States,  the question of whether it is possible to create  servitudes on chattels
has  been debated  largely in terms  of the  antitrust laws. But in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.  373  (1911),  the  leading antitrust case on  vertical  price restraints, the
U.S. Supreme  Court appeared to endorse the same conclusion  reached by  the English  courts as  a
matter of property  law. Id. at 404-05 (quoting John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman,  153 F. 24, 39
(6th Cir.  1907)). This  appears to be the better view  today:  Equitable servitudes  (and  presumably
other  nonpossessory  property  rights)  apply  only  to  real  property.  Cf. Zechariah  Chafee,  Jr.,
The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69  HARV.  L.  REV.  1250
(1956) (commenting  on Pratte  v. Balatsos, 113  A.2d 492  (N.H.  1955), a decision  departing from
the general understanding).
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encountered in practice.69
5.  Intellectual Property
Finally,  common-law  systems  recognize  a  variety  of  intellectual
property interests. The main forms here are patents, copyrights, trademarks,
and trade secrets.  A number of jurisdictions  recognize additional  common-
law  intellectual  property  interests,  such  as  the  right  to  prevent
misappropriation of information and the right of publicity.
The  numerus  clausus  is  probably  at  its  weakest  in  the  area  of
intellectual  property.  To  be  sure,  there  is  considerable  stability  in  the
recognized  forms  of  intellectual  property,  and  federal  law  in  the  United
States  preempts  many  attempts  to  create  novel  forms  of  intellectual
property as a matter of state law.7 0 But there are some notable exceptions in
which judicial  creativity  in fashioning  new  intellectual-property  interests
has been sanctioned.
Most prominently,  in International  News Service v. Associated Press, 7'
the Supreme  Court  recognized  a right  to prevent  the  misappropriation  of
information  in news dispatches,  even  if the information  is not copyrighted
and is not a trade secret.72 The Court insisted it was not creating a property
right in news, but simply enjoining a form of unfair competition in the form
of appropriating  news  gathered  by  others.
73  But  both  Justice  Brandeis  in
dissent74 and Judge Learned Hand in a later decision in the Second Circuit"
saw the decision as a  mischievous encroachment  on the principle that only
Congress  may  create  new  forms  of  intellectual  property-in
other  words,  the numerus clausus. They  were  prescient:  The  doctrine  of
69.  Chafee,  supra note  67,  at  1013  (discussing  the  apparent  lack  of major  adverse  effects
from  the  lack  of  recognition  of  servitudes  on  chattels);  Chafee,  supra note  68,  at  1254-55
(discussing the continued rarity of servitudes on chattels outside of resale price maintenance).
70.  E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc.  v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.  141,  168 (1989)  (declaring
that a  state  statute  prohibiting  the  copying of  boat  hulls  is preempted);  Compco  Corp.  v.  Day-
Bright Lighting,  Inc., 376  U.S. 234,  238-39  (1964)  (declaring  that a state  unfair competition  law
preventing  the copying of industrial  designs is preempted);  Sears,  Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel  Co.,
376  U.S.  225, 232-33  (1964)  (same);  Wendt v.  Host Int'l, Inc.,  197  F.3d  1284,  1285-87 (9th Cir.
1999)  (Kozinski,  J., dissenting  from denial  of rehearing en  banc) (stating  that the Copyright  Act
should  preempt  broad  application  of a  state  right of publicity).  But cf  Goldstein  v.  California,
412 U.S.  546,  560  (1973)  (holding  that  a  state  statute  prohibiting  record  "piracy"  is  not
preempted by federal  copyright law). See generally  Paul Heald,  Federal  Intellectual Property  Law
and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV.  959 (1991)  (reviewing cases).
71.  248 U.S. 215 (1918).
72.  The  decision  had been anticipated  in earlier  cases  involving  retransmission  of "news."
See, e.g., Nat'l Tel. News  Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902).
73.  Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234-37, 240-41.
74.  Id.  at 262-67 (Brandeis, J.,  dissenting).
75.  Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
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misappropriation  of information has taken on a life of its own and continues
to be recognized as a common-law  right in many jurisdictions.76
Even  more  strikingly,  about  half  the  states  in  recent  years  have
recognized  a "right of publicity,"  which protects  the images and  voices  of
celebrities  from  commercial  exploitation  without  their  consent."  Slightly
more  than  half  of the  states  recognizing  the right  have  done  so  at  least
initially as  a matter of judicial lawmaking 7-which  is clearly incompatible
with the numerus clausus principle. The confusion engendered by the many
conflicts  among jurisdictions  over the  scope  of the right has  given rise  to
calls,  including  a  proposal  by the American  Bar Association,  for uniform
federal legislation ratifying this new form of intellectual property.79
C.  Judicial  Recognition of the Numerus Clausus
The  numerus  clausus  appears  to  function  as  a  deeply  entrenched
assumption  of the  common-law  system  of property  rights.  There  are  no
significant  examples  of judicial  abolition  of  existing  forms  of  property.
Moreover, courts in the modern era for the most part have declined to create
new  ones.  There  are  a  few  prominent  exceptions  to  this  latter
generalization,  such  as the judicial  creation  of the equitable  servitude  and
the  recognition  in  some  states  of  the  doctrines  of  misappropriation  of
information  and  the  right  of publicity.  But  these  exceptions  have  been
confined to  nonpossessory  property  rights  and intellectual-property  rights,
and often, as in the case  of the right of publicity, there  is great pressure  for
legislative  ratification  of judicial  innovations  when  they  do  occur.  Still,
recognition  of  the  concept  by  courts  and  commentators  is  remarkably
underdeveloped. At the level of doctrinal exposition, the numerus clausus is
almost-but not quite-invisible.
To the extent that there can be said to be a leading case, it is Johnson v.
Whiton. 80  Royal  Whiton  devised  certain land  "to  my granddaughter  Sarah
A. Whiton and her heirs on her father's side." 8  The limitation on descent to
76.  E.g., Bd. of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co.,  456 N.E.2d  84 (Ill.  1983);  see Douglas  G. Baird,
Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International  News Service  v. Associated
Press, 50 U. CHI.  L. REV.  411, 422 (1983).
77.  See generally  J.  THOMAS  MCCARTHY,  THE RIGHTS  OF PUBLICITY  AND  PRIVACY  (1999)
(thoroughly  examining the contours  of the  "right of publicity").
78.  The most recent tally indicates that seventeen states have recognized the right of publicity
by judicial decision. In  five of these states,  the right is now recognized  by statute.  In  addition, ten
states recognize the right solely as a  matter of statute rather than judicial decision.  Thus, the right
exists in some form in twenty-seven  states.  1 id., § 6.1 [B], at 6-6.
79.  See  Symposium,  Rights  of Publicity: An  In-Depth Analysis  of the  New  Legislative
Proposals  to Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209  (1998)  (panel discussion).
80.  34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893).
81.  Id. at 542.  The  will  provided  that one-third  of Royal's  estate was  devised to Sarah,  and
the land in question was part of the estate.
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the father's side of Sarah's family  was  inconsistent with the Massachusetts
law of intestate  succession,  which permitted  property  to descend from  one
line  of  the  family  to  another.  Of  course,  the  issue  in  the  case  was  not
intestate  succession,  that  is,  inheritance,  but the  construction  of  a  will.
Nevertheless,  the court construed the  provision of the will as  an attempt to
create a "new  kind of inheritance,"  that is, a new type of estate, which the
court  said could not be done. 2 Sarah  was held to have taken a fee  simple
absolute, thereby frustrating the evident intentions of Royal Whiton.
Johnson v.  Whiton has  all the makings  of a leading case.  The facts are
simple. The opinion for the court was  authored by Oliver Wendell  Holmes,
Jr., one of America's most celebrated jurists and an  authority on the history
of the common  law.83 The  opinion's reasoning,  as is typical of Holmes,  is
tightly  compressed,  yet  advanced  with  great  self-assurance.  It  is  hard,
however,  to  find  signs  that  Johnson  v.  Whiton  has  entered  into  the
American  legal  consciousness  (in  the  manner  of, say,  Pierson v.  Posts).
The  decision  is  not  widely  cited  in  later  cases.  It  makes  only  cameo
appearances  in  the leading treatises, and then is cited for propositions other
than the prohibition against judicial creation of new kinds of estates. 5
Perhaps a better measure  of the status of the numerus clausus as a legal
doctrine  is  the  way in  which courts  resolve  disputes  that arise testing  the
82.  Id.
83.  Holmes also  made reference  to the  doctrine of fixed estates in Norcross v. James, 2  N.E.
946, 949 (Mass.  1885),  and alluded to "the rule  that new and unusual burdens cannot  be imposed
on land"  in OLIVER  WENDELL HOLMES,  JR.,  THE COMMON LAW 407  (Boston, Little, Brown and
Co.  1923) (1881).
84.  3 Cai.  R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
85.  The  leading  treatise  that is still  kept up  to date  is  POWELL  ON REAL  PROPERTY,  supra
note  2,  which contains  sixteen  volumes. The index  does not refer to Johnson v.  Whiton. See also
6 AMERICAN  LAW OF PROPERTY,  supra note 26, § 26.100, at 544 n.3 (citing Johnson v.  Whiton in
a  discussion  of  restraints  on  alienation);  2  THOMPSON  ON  REAL  PROPERTY,  supra note  25,
§ 18.04,  at  487  n.147  (1994)  (citing  Johnson v.  Whiton  in  a discussion  of the  fee  tail);  3  id.
§ 23.03,  at 291 n.50 (citing Johnson v.  Whiton in a discussion of remainders).
The  treatment  of  the  decision  in  first-year  property  casebooks  is  especially  revealing.
Although  reproduced  as  a  principal  decision  in  two  casebooks  (both  co-authored  by  legal
historians),  BARLOW  BURKE  ET  AL.,  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  PROPERTY  LAW  221-23  (1999);
DONAHUE  ET AL.,  supra note 2,  at 457-58,  Johnson v.  Whiton receives  only passing  mention  in
other leading casebooks.  See BERGER  & WILLIAMS,  supra note  14, at 211 (noting the doctrine  but
not Johnson v.  Whiton); DUKEMINIER  & KRIER,  supra note  2, at 205  (referring  to Johnson v.
Whiton); JOSEPH  WILLIAM  SINGER,  PROPERTY  LAW:  RULES,  POLICIES,  AND  PRACTICES  561
(2d ed.  1997)  (same).  Most notably, neither the  decision,  nor the  principle for which  it stands,  is
mentioned  at all  in  most instructional  materials.  E.g.,  JON  W.  BRUCE  &  JAMES  W.  ELY,  JR.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN  PROPERTY LAW (4th ed.  1999)  (containing no references  in
the  index  to  Johnson v.  Whiton or  the  numerus clausus idea);  RICHARD  H.  CHUSED,  CASES,
MATERIALS  AND  PROBLEMS  IN PROPERTY  (1st  ed.  1998)  (same);  JOHN  E.  CRIBBET  ET  AL.,
PROPERTY:  CASES AND MATERIALS  (7th ed.  1996) (same); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL,
PROPERTY  LAW  AND  POLICY:  A  COMPARATIVE  INSTITUTIONAL  PERSPECTIVE  (1998)  (same);
J.  GORDON  HYLTON  ET  AL.,  PROPERTY  LAW  AND  THE  PUBLIC  INTEREST:  CASES  AND
MATERIALS  (1998)  (same); SANDRA  H.  JOHNSON ET AL.,  PROPERTY  LAW: CASES,  MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS  (2d ed. 1998)  (same);  SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,  CASES AND
MATERIALS  ON AMERICAN  PROPERTY  LAW (3d ed.  1999) (same).The Yale Law Journal
judicial  commitment  to the doctrine. Here  too,  the evidence  does not give
much reason to believe that American lawyers  are aware  of the doctrine  or
its centrality to the system of property  rights.
For  example,  one  issue  implicating  the  doctrine  that  has  arisen  in
several jurisdictions concerns  the proper construction  of an instrument  that
purports  to  grant a  lease of property  for the  life  of the tenant.  Under  the
system  of estates  in land,  there is no  such thing  as a "lease  for life."  One
can  create  a  life  estate.  And  one  can  create  a lease.  But  a lease  must  be
either a term of years, a periodic tenancy,  a tenancy at will, or  a tenancy at
sufferance.86  Thus,  courts  confronted  with  an  instrument  purporting  to
create  a "lease  for life"  have typically asked which common-law  box  best
matches  the  grantor's  intentions:  a  life  estate or  a  tenancy  at  will. 7  Yet
there is no evidence in these decisions that the courts are aware that they are
applying a foundational precept of property law, or that the assumption that
the  interest  must fit  into  one  of the  established  forms  reflects  the  same
general principle articulated in Johnson v.  Whiton.8 "
A more recent  New York  case89 confronting  the lease-for-life  problem
suggests that courts  in the future may  simply defer to the parties'  intention
to create  a  new  type of leasehold.  The  opinion  attacked  the  argument  in
favor  of  the  tenancy  at  will-the  harsh  application  of  the  numerus
clausus-as being  grounded  in  the  "antiquated  notion"  that  a  life estate
cannot  be  created  without  livery  of  seisin.9°  This  outcome  was  also
condemned as  "violat[ing]  the terms of the agreement  and frustrat[ing]  the
intent of the parties."
9 1
As to whether the court was willing to follow the intent of the parties to
the point of recognizing  a new type of estate-a lease for life-the decision
is  ambiguous.  Near  the  end  of  the  opinion,  the  court  characterized  the
interest  as  a  "life  tenancy  terminable  at  the will  of the  tenant,"  92  which
sounds like a life estate (which can always be disclaimed by the life tenant).
Thus, the result that the court ultimately reached may have been to hold that
86.  Supra note 25  and accompanying text.
87.  Compare Thompson  v. Baxter,  119 N.W.  797  (Minn.  1909)  (life estate), with Nitschke  v.
Doggett,  489  S.W.2d  335  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1972),  vacated on  other grounds, 498  S.w.2d  339
(Tex.  1973) (tenancy  at will).
88.  This lack  of awareness  is also reflected  in the best-selling casebook of Jesse  Dukeminier
and James Krier. In discussing  estates in land, the authors  note the doctrine of "standardization  of
estates"  and cite to Johnson v.  Whiton. DUKEMINIER & KRIER,  supra note 2, at 204-05. But when
they turn to landlord-tenant  law,  and reproduce  a case that presents  the  "lease  for life"  problem,
they  make no  mention  in  the notes  or the Teacher's  Manual  of the relevance  of the doctrine  of
standardization  of estates. Id. at 424-25 (notes following Garner  v. Gerrish,  473 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y.
1984));  JESSE DUKEMINIER  & JAMES E.  KRIER, TEACHER'S MANUAL:  PROPERTY  188-90 (4th ed.
1998) (summary and commentary on Garner  v. Gerrish).
89.  Garner, 473 N.E.2d  223.
90.  Id. at 224.
91.  Id.
92.  Id. at 225.
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the  instrument  created  a  life  estate,  which  would  be  consistent  with  the
numerus clausus. However,  the  court  also  noted  that  both  parties  agreed
that  the  instrument created  a lease,  and  it,  too,  spoke  of the  interest  as  a
lease.9 3 This characterization,  plus the court's condemnation  of "antiquated
notion[s]"  about  established  forms  of  property  and  its  insistence  on
resolving  the issue  in terms of the parties'  intent, could mean that the court
saw no problem with enforcing the instrument in accordance  with its terms,
as  a  "lease  for  life." 9 4 Read  this  way,  the decision  could  foreshadow  the
emergence  of a regime  in which property  rights are assimilated  to contract
rights.9 5
D.  Summary
In the final analysis, the idea that property interests may be created only
in  limited  numbers  of  standardized  forms  has  a  very  odd  status  in  the
common  law.  If one observes  what lawyers  and judges  do, it  is  clear  that
the  numerus clausus exerts  a  powerful  hold  on  the  system  of  property
rights. At the  core of the system-the system  of estates in land-there  has
been little deviation from the doctrine of fixed estates. The major departures
that do exist, such  as the creation of the equitable  servitude and the right of
publicity,  have  been relatively  few in number  and have been concentrated
in fringe  areas of property rights, such  as  nonpossessory interests  and non-
core intellectual  property.  Moreover, from the perspective  of the practicing
lawyer,  the entire  system presents  the  picture  of a fixed  menu of options
from  which deviations  will not be permitted.  The chances of persuading  a
court to create a new  type of property in any particular  case are too remote
to  be  taken  seriously.  In  this  respect,  property  law  has  always  been  and
continues  to be very different from contract law.
93.  Id. at 224.
94.  Id. at 224-25.
95.  Creeping "contractualization"  of property  is evident in other areas as well. See, e.g.,  Jezo
v.  Jezo,  127 N.W.2d 246  (Wis.  1964)  (holding that the presumption that joint tenants own  equal
shares  is  subject  to  rebuttal  by  evidence of contrary  intent).  The  new Restatement of Property
explicitly adopts a contractualized  view of servitudes:
One of the basic principles  underlying this Restatement is that the function of the law is
to ascertain  and  give  effect  to the  likely intentions  and legitimate  expectations  of the
parties  who  create  servitudes,  as  it  does  with  respect  to  other  contractual
arrangements....
The general  principles governing  servitude  interpretation  stated in § 4.1  adopt  the
model of interpretation used  in contract  law and  displace  the older  interpretive  model
used in  servitudes law  that emphasized  the free use of land, sometimes  at the  expense
of frustrating  intent.
RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF PROPERTY:  SERVITUDES  494 (2000)  (Introductory Note to Chapter 4);
see also id. §§  4.1-.13,  at 494-640 (setting  forth  an  interpretive  rule for  servitudes based  on  the
intent of the parties  and setting  up default  rules that  can be displaced  by  evidence of the parties'
intent).
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If one examines the official doctrine  and the reasoning of the few cases
that test the validity  of the  idea, however, the numerus clausus appears  to
have  penetrated  the consciousness  of common-law  lawyers  only  weakly.
Perhaps  the  best characterization  of the  status  of the numerus clausus in
American common law is that it is simply a fact about the way in which the
system of property  rights  operates.  The  fact  is  so  patent  and  obvious,  so
deeply  entrenched,  that  it is  rarely  commented  upon.  But because  it  is  so
rarely  commented  upon,  common-law  lawyers  have  little  to  say  in  its
defense when it is challenged.
Ill.  MEASUREMENT  COSTS,  FRUSTRATION  COSTS,  AND  THE
OPTIMAL STANDARDIZATION  OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
What  accounts  for the  widespread  adherence  to  the numerus clausus,
not only  in the common law but in postfeudal  legal systems throughout the
world? To the extent that an explanation can be found in the American  legal
literature,  it  focuses  on  a concern with undue restraints  on  alienation.96  In
Johnson v.  Whiton,  for  example,  Holmes  stated  that  the  conveyance  to
Sarah "and  her heirs on her father's side"  could not be construed as written
because  this  would  "put  it  out of the power of the owners to give  a  clear
title for generations."97 The restraint on alienation  presumably would occur
because  of fragmentation  of property  rights-the interest  would create  an
open-ended  class  of  potential  claimants  to  the  property.98  The  resulting
bargaining difficulties would have created  large transaction-cost  barriers to
any exchange of the property, creating an undue restraint on alienation.99
The  problem with this argument  is that the system of estates in land  is
sufficiently  flexible that  one can  nearly always  find  a way  to effectuate  a
complicated  conveyance.  Thus,  if Royal Whiton  had conveyed  "to  Sarah
for life, remainder  to her heirs on her father's side,"  the conveyance  would
96.  E.g.,  DONAHUE ET AL.,  supra note  2, at 449 (discussing the doctrine of fixed estates in a
section  entitled  "Estates  in  Land  and  the  Policy  Against  Undue  Restraints  on  Alienation");
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2,  at 204 ("Once the estates  system developed, judges decided
that standardization  of estates furthered  alienability  by facilitating  subsequent  transactions  in  the
same resources.");  SINGER,  supra note 85, at 560-61 (discussing  the doctrine in a section entitled
"Rules  Regulating Restrictions on Use or Ownership To Promote Marketability").
97.  Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542, 542 (Mass.  1893).
98.  The  interest created by  Royal  Whiton  was  of unclear import.  It might have meant  that
Sarah  had  a  fee  simple,  but if she  died  intestate, the  property  could  be  inherited  only  on  her
father's side.  Alternatively,  the interest might have operated  something  like a fee  tail, descending
from generation to generation  not to the issue of Sarah's body but to the heirs on her father's side.
Holmes seems  to  have assumed the latter construction.  See id. (analogizing  the  conveyance  to  a
fee tail).
99.  If one construes  the interest to be a modified fee tail, see supra note  98, and assumes  the
interests of  the  takers  in tail  cannot  be  defeated  by a conveyance  of the  interest by  those  who
presently  hold the property,  then, as  Holmes  noted, this  would  "put  it  out  of the  power of the
owners to  give a  clear  title for generations."  Johnson, 34  N.E. at 542. The  transaction  costs,  in
other words,  would be enormous.
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have accomplished  the grantor's apparent objectives, but in  a way that  did
not  create  a  "new  kind  of  inheritance."  00  This  alternative  conveyance,
however, would also  have  created  a large  web  of potential  claimants.  The
transaction-cost  barriers  to exchange,  and  hence the practical  restraint  on
alienation, would still be large.'  This suggests that the numerus clausus is
not  in  fact  a  very  effective  device  for  limiting  undue  restraints  on
alienation.
The  leading  English case affirming  what  we call the  numerus clausus
principle,  Keppell  v.  Bailey," °2  suggests  a  different  rationale.  Keppell
involved  the  conveyance  of  an  iron  works,  in  which  the  purchasers
covenanted  on  behalf  of themselves  and  their  successors  and  assigns  to
acquire all limestone required by the works from a particular quarry and to
ship  the  limestone  to  the  works  on  a  particular  railroad.  The  Court  of
Chancery  held  that  this  type  of  agreement,  although  enforceable  as  a
contract  between  the  original  parties,  did  not  fall  within  the  recognized
types of servitudes enforceable against  subsequent purchasers  as a property
right running with the  land. There was, however,  no suggestion in  the case
that  the  covenants  worked  an undue  restraint  on  alienation;"3  indeed,  the
works  had recently been conveyed from the original  purchasers to another
party.  Instead,  Lord  Chancellor  Brougham  stressed  the  more  systemic
consequences  of allowing such "fancies,"  as they have been called,"°  to be
enforced as property rights:
There  can  be  no  harm  to  allowing  the fullest  latitude  to  men  in
binding  themselves  and  their  representatives,  that  is,  their  assets
real  and  personal,  to  answer  in  damages  for  breach  of  their
obligations. This tends to no mischief, and is a reasonable liberty to
bestow;  but  great  detriment  would  arise  and  much  confusion  of
rights if parties  were allowed to invent new modes of holding and
enjoying  real  property,  and  to  impress  upon  their  lands  and
tenements  a  peculiar character,  which  should  follow them  into all
hands,  however remote.  Every close,  every  messuage,  might  thus
be held in several fashion;  and it would hardly  be possible to know
100.  Johnson, 34  N.E. at 542.
101.  If we assume  that the  conveyance  as  written  created  a kind  of fee  tail  in the heirs  on
Sarah's father's side, see supra note 98, then the class  of potential claimants  would not be known
until the  last of Sarah's  heirs  on  her father's  side  died  out.  This  "indefinite  failure  of issue"
construction would  create larger transaction costs than the proposed alternative.
102.  39 Eng. Rep.  1042 (Ch. 1834).
103.  The opinion  found that the covenants  were not infirm on perpetuity  grounds and did not
constitute  an impermissible  restraint of trade. Id. at 1046-47.
104.  The Lord Chancellor said that novel forms of property  cannot "be  devised and attached
to property at the  fancy or caprice of any owner."  Id. at  1049.  Later English  commentators  have
picked  up  on  this  and  have  referred  to  idiosyncratic  interests  not  recognized  by  the  law  as
"fancies."  Rudden, supra note 3,  at 240.
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what  rights  the  acquisition  of  any  parcel  conferred,  or  what
obligations it imposed.o5
In  modem  terminology,  the  Lord  Chancellor  thought  that  permitting
interests  like  the covenants  in Keppell to be established  as  property  rights
would create unacceptable  information costs to third parties. In this Part, we
develop  Lord Chancellor  Brougham's  germ  of an  insight  by  presenting  a
theory of the numerus clausus based on optimal standardization  of property
rights.' 06
A.  Measurement-Cost  Externalities
When individuals  encounter  property  rights, they  face  a  measurement
problem."7 In order to avoid  violating  another's  property rights, they must
ascertain  what  those  rights  are.  In  order  to  acquire  property  rights,  they
must measure  various attributes, ranging from the physical  boundaries  of a
parcel, to use rights,  to the attendant liabilities of the owner to others  (such
as adjacent owners). Whether the objective is to avoid liability or to acquire
rights,  an  individual  will  measure  the  property  rights  until  the  marginal
costs of additional measurement equal the marginal  benefits. When  seeking
to avoid  liability,  the actor  will seek  to minimize  the sum  of the costs  of
liability for violations  of rights  and the costs  of avoiding  those violations
through measurement. In the potential transfer situation, the individual  will
measure as long as the marginal  benefit in reduced error costs exceeds the
marginal cost of measurement.1
0 8
The  need for standardization  in property law  stems from an  externality
involving  measurement  costs:  Parties who  create  new property  rights  will
not  take into  account  the  full  magnitude  of the  measurement  costs  they
105.  Keppell, 39 Eng. Rep. at 1049.
106.  It is uncertain  when this hostility  toward the creation  of new forms of property entered
English  law.  The attitude  is present as early as  Chudleigh's Case, I Co. Rep.  113b, 76 Eng.  Rep.
261  (K.B.  1589-1595),  where  the  judges  of the  King's  Bench  construed  the  Statute  of  Uses
narrowly  so  as to make  every contingent remainder  a legal  estate in land (and hence  destructible
under  the  Rule  of  Destructibility  of  Contingent  Remainders).  Otherwise,  said  Chief  Judge
Popham, "no  purchaser would  be sure of his purchase  without an Act of Parliament."  1 Co. Rep.
at 139a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 322.
107.  Measurement  costs  are a  reflection  of information  costs, and  the  terms can  usually  be
used interchangeably  for our purposes. Measurement reduces uncertainty and is the  quantification
of information;  measurement,  being observable,  makes a  model easier  to operationalize.  Yoram
Barzel,  Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25  J.L.  &  ECON.  27,  28  & n.3
(1982).  On measurement  costs  in  general,  see,  for  example,  id.;  Roy  W.  Kenney  & Benjamin
Klein,  The  Economics of Block Booking, 26  J.L. &  ECON.  497  (1983);  and  Henry  E.  Smith,
Ambiguous Quality Changes  from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI.  L. REv.  647 (2000).
108.  For discussions  of  whether  the  buyer or  the  seller will  incur measurement  costs  and
devices to minimize them, see, for example, Barzel,  supra note 107; Victor P. Goldberg,  The Gold
Ring Problem, 47 U.  TORONTO L.J. 469 (1997),  and Kenney  & Klein, supra note  107, at 522-27.
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impose  on  strangers  to  the  title.  An  example  illustrates."9  Suppose  one
hundred  people own  watches. A  is the  sole owner  of a watch  and wants  to
transfer some  or all of the rights to use the watch to B. The law of personal
property  allows the sale of A's entire  interest in  the watch, or  the sale of a
life estate in the watch, or the sale of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common
in the watch.  But  suppose A  wants  to create  a  "time-share"  in the watch,
which would allow B  to use the watch  on Mondays  but  only on  Mondays
(with A  retaining  for now the rights to the watch  on all other days).  As  a
matter  of  contract  law, A  and  B  are  perfectly  free  to  enter  into  such  an
idiosyncratic  agreement.  But  A  and  B  are  not  permitted  by  the  law  of
personal  property  to  create  a property right in  the  use  of  the  watch  on
Mondays only and to transfer this property right from A to B." l"
Why  might  the law restrict the freedom of A  and B to create  such  an
unusual  property  right?  Suppose,  counterfactually,  that such  idiosyncratic
property  rights  are  permitted.  Word  spreads  that  someone  has  sold  a
Monday  right in a watch, but not which of the one hundred  owners did  so.
If A  now decides  to sell his watch, he will have to explain  that it does  not
include Monday  rights, and  this will reduce  the attractiveness of the watch
to potential  buyers. Presumably,  however, A will foresee this when he sells
the Monday rights, and  is willing to bear the cost of that action in the form
of a lower sales price. But consider what will happen now when  any of the
other ninety-nine  watch  owners  try  to  sell  their  watches.  Given  the
awareness  that  someone  has  created  a  Monday-only  right,  anyone  else
buying  a  watch  must  now  also investigate  whether  any  particular  watch
does  not  include  Monday  rights.  Thus,  by  allowing  even  one  person  to
create  an  idiosyncratic  property  right,  the  information  processing  costs  of
all persons who have existing or potential interests in this type of property
go up. This external cost on other market participants forms the basis of our
explanation of the numerus clausus.
At this point, it  is useful to distinguish three  classes of individuals who
might be affected by the decision to create  idiosyncratic property  rights, or
fancies,  as illustrated by Figure  1. First are the originating  parties,  who are
the  participants  to  the  transaction  creating  the  fancy;  this  is  A  and  B  in
Figure  1. Second are  the potential successors in interest to the asset that is
being  subjected  to  the fancy.  This  would  be  anyone  who  might purchase
A's reserved rights (after the transfer to B) as well as anyone who succeeds
to the interest acquired by B. Potential  successors  in interest are  shown  as
109.  A more complex hypothetical  involving  time shares  in watches can be  found in  Henry
Hansmann  & Reinier  Kraakman,  Unity  of Property  Rights  5-6  (Nov.  17,  1999)  (unpublished
manuscript, on  file  with  The  Yale  Law Journal), to which our argument about  information  costs
also applies. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
110.  Time shares are  a creation of statute, and the various  statutes appear  to limit time shares
to real estate. Ellen R. Peirce & Richard  A. Mann,  Time-Share Interests in Real Estate: A Critical
Evaluation of the Regulatory Environment, 59  NOTRE DAME L. REv. 9, 37-42 (1983).
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Cs  and Ds  in  Figure  1. Finally,  there  are  the other market participants,
people  who will  deal  in  or with  watches  other  than  the one over which A
and B have  transacted.  Other market  participants  include  those  selling and
acquiring  rights in other watches  such as E and F and  G and H in Figure  1.
They  also  include  all  who  must  avoid  violating  property  rights  in  all
watches, rights that are enforced against the world represented by I and J in
Figure  1.111 In the hypothetical example above, the other market participants
are the other ninety-nine  watch owners  and their successors in title,  as well
as anyone who potentially  might violate a property right in a watch.
FIGURE  1. THE CLASSES  OF AFFECTED PARTIES
I  J
E-  fancy E-------  F  !A  ,B  G --  H
N 1
C2   D2..
The  difference  between  other  possible  explanations  of  the  numerus
clausus and our information-cost  theory can be understood  in terms of this
three-way  classification.  Other  explanations  focus  on  the  effect  of novel
property  rights  on  the  originating  parties  and  potential  successors  in
interests-the  As,  Bs,  Cs,  and Ds  of the  world.  One  may  say  that  these
classes  of individuals  fall  within  the  "zone  of privity"  designated  by  the
box with  the  dotted line in  Figure  1. Our explanation,  in contrast,  focuses
on  the  effect of unusual  property  rights  on other market  participants-the
Es, Fs,  Gs, Hs, Is, and Js of  the  world--classes  of individuals  who  fall
outside  the zone of privity.  As  we argue, explanations  based on classes  of
individuals  within  the zone of privity  have difficulty  identifying  costs  that
are  not  impounded  into  the  price  facing  those  who  make  the  decision
whether to create the fancy in the first place. An explanation based on costs
incurred by classes of individuals outside  the zone of privity does not have
this difficulty.
111.  Thus, other market participants  include those  whose actual  dealings  with watches occur
by means other than  consensual transactions.
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Consider  first  the  originating  parties,  A  and  B.  Some  commentators
have  attempted  to argue that  the  creation  of novel  property  rights  can  be
seen  as  giving  rise  to  extemal  costs  further  down  the  road  for  these
originating  parties." 2  If A  has  sold  a  Monday  interest  in  the  watch  to B,
what  happens  if  B  turns  around  and  sells  the  right  to  D,?  D,  may  be
relatively inaccessible or may be unacceptable to A for a variety of possible
reasons.  The  sale from  B  to D1 of the Monday  right may  thus  lower  the
value  of  the  retained  interest  in A.  Alternatively,  after  the  sale  of  the
Monday interest to B, A might sell one of the remaining days to C, and this
may damage the value of B's interest. To avoid these sorts of problems, it is
argued,  the  law  simply  presumes  that A  would  ordinarily  want  to  block
future  sales  by  B, and  so for  simplicity's  sake just  disallows  the  original
creation  of  a  property  right  that  could  lead  to  such  a  transaction
altogether.'13
Yet  it  is  problematic  to  label  the  impact  of  the  B-to-D,  sale  of  the
Monday right an externality to A.  If A can  foresee the problem that B might
further transfer ownership of the interest in the watch,  then the cost of that
future  transaction  (discounted  by  its  probability)  should  figure  into  A's
decision to sell the  Monday interest to B in the first place. The risk of such
a  future  transaction  to  D,  should  be  capitalized  in  the  form  of  a  lower
market  value  of  A's  rights."'  Because  the  costs  associated  with  this
contingency  will be reflected in the price, there is no extemality toA.
Thus,  focusing  only  on  the  potential  detriment  to  the  two  original
parties to the transaction-A and B-makes it  hard to  see that there  is any
legitimate reason for the law to intervene  and prohibit the transaction.  The
decision  to  create  a  time-share  in  the  watch  may  turn  out  to  be  an
improvident  one.  But  the  law  generally  does  not  second-guess  mundane
mistakes  like an improvident  sale. With  some reluctance, the law may stop
an  owner  from burning  down  her  own house."'  But  she  can  presumably
destroy  a watch  she  owns.  And if she  can destroy  the watch,  there  would
seem to be  no reason  why A  cannot diminish  its value  by entering  into an
112.  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note  109, at 5-6.
113.  Id. at  6.  In theory, if B tries  to sell to D1, A might then try to buy out D1's  interest.  But
once  D,  has  acquired  the  Monday  right,  the  transfer  to  D,  may  be  hard  for  A  to  undo.
Alternatively, A  might contract in advance with B that A  has  a right to block such  sales. But this
would run up against the rule against restraints on alienation.
114.  In this hypothetical, the possibility  of the sale to D, should  lower the market value of the
rights A retains even if for some reason it did not lower  the market value of the rights hived off to
B.
115.  Eyerman  v. Mercantile  Trust Co., 524  S.W.2d  210  (Mo.  Ct.  App.  1975)  (declining  to
enforce  a  will  provision  directing  destruction  of  a  house).  Interestingly,  John  Austin  uses  the
opposite conclusion about this situation to illustrate his conception  of ownership. 3 JOHN AUSTIN,
LECTURES ON  JURISPRUDENCE,  1861-1863, at 6 (1863)  (" If  I  am the absolute owner of my house,
I may destroy it if I will. But I must not destroy  it in such  a manner as would amount to an injury
to any of my neighbors.").
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improvident  sharing  agreement  that  can  lead  to  ownership  of the  watch
being fragmented  among multiple and potentially antagonistic parties.
For similar reasons, the costs to potential successors in interest will also
be  mediated  through  the  price  mechanism  and  so  will  not  require  legal
intervention.  In the literature  on fragmentation,  it  is often  pointed out that
the  creation of novel interests can  be  difficult for later individuals  dealing
with  the asset,  such  as  C2 and D,  to figure  out or to  undo. Even  interests
that  do  not  lead  to  fragmentation  per  se  can  be difficult  for  those  in  the
distant future  to understand  and take  into  account, and this  is  a reason  to
adopt some degree  of standardization  in property rights." 6 But these  costs
are  not  externalities  to  such  decisions.  If  a  fancy  lowers  the  price  that a
future  purchaser  will pay for an  interest in  the watch  over  which A  and  B
are  transacting,  the  difficulties  facing  future  Ds who  might purchase  any
interest in that watch-or who might lend to the owner of the watch  while
taking  a security  interest in  the watch-will  lead to a  lower price  than  D,
might pay for an unrestricted  watch." 7  This lower price will be reflected  in
a lower market value  the  instant that  the fancy creating  such difficulties  is
created. Because  the difficulties  to the potential successors  in interest  (the
Ds) are reflected  in costs  facing A  (and B) now, there  is no externality and
no need to intervene.
Again,  limited  foresight  might  prevent  A  or  B  from  making  a
completely  accurate forecast of the costs to those who deal with the asset in
the future."'  This does not, however, furnish a basis for taking the decision
116.  This  argument  based  on  the  effects  on  potential  successors  in interest  has  been  made
most clearly in Rose, supra note  11,  at 214-15. See infra Section IV.B.
117.  Baird  and Jackson  discuss  the  information  costs  to potential  creditors  involved  with a
particular  asset, who  would in  our classification  be  counted  as  potential  successors  in  interest.
Douglas Baird  & Thomas Jackson,  Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13  J.
LEGAL  STUD.  299, 307-09  (1984).  As  with the costs to  successors in tide,  the costs  to potential
successors  in interest should be  reflected in a lower price  to the creating parties,  thus presenting
no externality.  But as  with successors  in title,  systems  like recording  are  likely  to be more  cost-
effective  than the numerus clausus for the informational problems that remain. See id. at  303-07.
118.  The intertemporal  aspect of property interests also raises the much-discussed question of
intergenerational  equity. See, e.g.,  BRUCE ACKERMAN,  SOCIAL  JUSTICE IN  THE  LIBERAL  STATE
107-38,  168-227  (1980)  (discussing justice over time);  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY  OF JUSTICE 284-
93  (1971)  (discussing justice between  generations);  LEWIS  M.  SIMES,  PUBLIC  POLICY AND  THE
DEAD  HAND  32-38  (1955)  (discussing dead-hand  control); Richard  Epstein, Justice Across the
Generations,  67 TEx.  L. REv.  1465  (1989)  (discussing  the problem of intergenerational  equity);
Adam J.  Hirsch &  William  K.S. Wang,  A  Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68  IND.  L.J.  1
(1992)  (discussing  the  structure  of  the  problem  of intergenerational  control);  Jeffrey  E.  Stake,
Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REv.  705 (1990)  (same).
Even if property law  might be used to change  the discount rate of present owners  of property,  we
still would want  the discount  rate to be  the same  with respect to the different  components of the
endowment  left for  future generations.  See Stephen  F. Williams, Running Out: The  Problem of
Exhaustible Resources, 7  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  165,  186  (1978)  (listing components  of  the legacy  to
future  generations  and  pointing  out that traditional  economic  analysis  concludes  that  "[flor  any
given  level of sacrifice that people  are willing  to make, society  should  adjust the composition of
the  endowment  so that  the  marginal  values  of each  component  of  the endowment  are  equal").
Whatever one might say about the usefulness of doctrines  such as the Rule Against Perpetuities  in
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out of the hands of the  original transactors,  unless  officials  are  in  a  better
position  to  estimate  these  costs  than  are  the originating  parties,  who  are
closest to the transaction and who face the costs most directly." 9  Generally
speaking, this is not likely.
Further,  there  are  less  drastic  ways  to  deal  with  improvident
arrangements that cause excessive costs for parties and potential  successors
in interest than mandating the standardization  of rights through the numerus
clausus principle. 2 0  For example, the law could adopt a default rule against
time-shares in personal  property  with the opportunity to opt out.  In such  a
case, whether B could sell some of his interest to D, would be governed by
rules  of contract  interpretation,  and  property  rights  would  arise  (or  not)
accordingly.  No  doubt  this  strictly  contractarian  approach  would  be
cumbersome.  One  would  have  to  worry  about  whether D,  the  potential
purchaser of B's interest, knew  whether A had contracted around the default
rule prohibiting such  interests.  Thus, some requirement  of notice might be
necessary.  But  from  a contractarian  point of view,  the  problems  of notice
and complexity of property  rights can be  solved through default rules.  The
last thing one would expect would be an outright  ban on types  of property
rights.
There  is,  however,  a  much  more  straightforward  problem  of
externalities  associated with the creation of idiosyncratic property  rights as
illustrated in the watch hypothetical. These are the effects on  the third class
of  individuals  identified  above  outside  the  zone  of  privity-the  other
market  participants.  When A  creates  the Monday  right, this  can  raise  the
information costs  of third parties.  If the law  allows A  to create  a Monday
interest,  individuals  wishing  to  buy  watches  or  bailees  asked  to  repair
watches  will  have  to  consider  the  possibility  that  any  given  watch  is  a
Monday-only  watch (or a watch  for any other proper subset of days of the
week)  rather than  a full-week watch.  While  A and B might  be expected to
take  into  account  the  market-value-lowering  effect  of  undesirable
idiosyncratic  rights  when  third  parties  like  C or  D consider  purchasing
property  in this  watch,  they  will not  take  into  account  the more  general
effect  on processing costs created  by the existence of such rights when F is
considering  a purchase of rights in E's watch, or I  and J are  worried about
violating property rights.'
this regard,  the numerus clausus seems like a  very blunt and ineffective  instrument for achieving
intergenerational  equity. Standardizing  the basic  building  blocks of property  will probably  have
little effect on the discount rate or on the  amount of an asset left for future generations.
119.  For more discussion, see infra note 189 and accompanying  text.
120.  Rose  discusses some of these methods  of dealing  with improvident  rights by recording
acts or through adjustment ex post. Rose, supra note  11,  at 213-15.  For more discussion, see infra
note  190 and accompanying text.
121.  The externality here is an informational one. Other  informational  externalities that have
received  increasing attention  in economics  include  the possible effect of speculation  in reducing
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A and B may have subjective  reasons for creating property  rights based
on days of the  week. But, the  possible existence  of such rights will  cause
information  costs  for others-such  as E, F, G,  H, I, and J-to rise. Those
considering  whether to purchase  property  rights in watches will have more
to investigate:  They will have to assure themselves that  they are getting  all
the days  of the  week that they  want. Furthermore, they  will have to worry
about dimensions of division  and elaboration  that perhaps  no  one has  yet
thought of, making the acquisition  of any watch more  uncertain  as well  as
riskier. 122 With an indefinite  set of types of rights, these costs will be higher
than  where  parties,  especially  unsophisticated  ones,  are  restricted  to  the
limited menu  the  law  allows.  Furthermore,  because  property  rights  are  in
rem, all those  who might violate  property  rights,  accidentally  or not,  must
know what  they  are  supposed  to  respect.'23  An indefinite  set  of types  of
rights  will raise the  cost  of preventing  violations  through  investigation  of
rights.
To  return  to  our  hypothetical  world  of  one-hundred  watch  owners,
suppose the value  of creating  the  Monday-only  right to A is  $10,  but  the
existence of this idiosyncrasy increases processing  costs by $1 for all watch
owners.  The  net  benefit  to A is  $9,  but  the  social  cost  is  $90.  As  this
example  suggests,  idiosyncratic  property  rights  create  a  common-pool
problem.'24 The marginal benefits  of the  idiosyncrasy  are fully  internalized
the informativeness  of prices,  Jeremy C.  Stein, Informational Externalities  and Welfare-Reducing
Speculation, 95  J. POL.  ECON.  1123  (1987),  and  the  circumstances  under  which  socially  costly
bait and switch  will be attractive to sellers, Edward P. Lazear, Bait and  Switch,  103 J. POL.  ECON.
813  (1995).  The informational  externality we identify  is not a pecuniary externality.  A  pecuniary
externality is one mediated  by the  price system  and cannot  lead to  inefficiency.  For example, if
consumers in Chicago love raspberries, this  might raise the price for consumers  in New York, but
the disutility of the New Yorkers  is not a technological externality  but a pecuniary  one. See, e.g.,
ANDREAS  A.  PAPANDREOU,  EXTERNALITY  AND  INSTITUTIONS  18-21  (1994);  Frank  H.  Knight,
Some Fallacies  in the Interpretation  of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON.  582 (1924).  In our example, by
contrast, the confusion caused by  idiosyncratic rights is not fully reflected in price but is rather the
effect  of  using  an  open-access  resource  like  a  congested  road.  Infra  notes  124-125  and
accompanying  text.
122.  According  to Knight's well-known  distinction,  risk is randomness  that is quantifiable  in
terms of a probability  distribution,  and uncertainty  is randomness that is not. FRANK  H. KNIGHT,
RISK,  UNCERTAINTY  AND  PROFIT (1921).  Insurance  may be  used to shift the risk of not receiving
a property  interest with  the anticipated  market value. But in a world in which  owners are free  to
create  previously  unknown  customized  property  rights,  third  parties  would  presumably  face  not
just risk but uncertainty. The uncertainty of such a regime might not be insurable.
123.  In  Hohfeld's terms,  in rem rights are multital  rather than paucital.  WESLEY  NEWCOMB
HOHFELD,  Fundamental  Legal  Conceptions  as  Applied  in  Judicial  Reasoning  11,  in
FUNDAMENTAL  LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED  IN JUDICIAL  REASONING  AND  OTHER LEGAL
ESSAYS 65, 71-86 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed.,  1923).
124.  The  problems  of a  common-pool  resource  were  first  studied  by Jens  Warming,  Om
"Grundrente" af Fiskegrunde, 49 NATIONALOKONOMISK  TIDSSKRIFr 495  (1911),  translated in
Peder Andersen,  "On Rent of Fishing  Grounds": A  Translation  of Jens Warming's 1911 Article,
with  an  Introduction,  15  HiST.  POL.  ECON.  391  (1983);  Jens  Warming,  Aalegaardsretten,
69 NATIONAL0KONOMISK  TIDSSKRIFT  151  (1931).  The analysis was independently  discovered by
H. Scott Gordon,  The Economic Theory of a Common-Property  Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
EcON.  124 (1954),  and extended  by Steven  N.S.  Cheung,  The Structure of a Contract and the
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to the owner of the property right, but the owner bears only a fraction of the
general measurement costs thereby created. Overall,  the creation of external
costs  associated  with  this  common-pool  problem  is  likely  to  proceed
beyond  the  optimal  level.'2  The  problem  cannot  be  resolved  by  side
payments  from  the  remaining  ninety-nine  to  A, because  the  transaction
costs  are  virtually  certain  to  be  prohibitive.  Consequently,  since  an
individual's  interest  in  creating  the  nonstandard  right-the  extra  benefit
from  using  it  rather  than  the  next  best  alternative-is  less  than  the
additional  measurement  costs  imposed  on  the  other  market  participants,
there  is  a  rationale  for  the  law  to  prohibit  the  creation  of  this  kind  of
idiosyncratic right.
One way to control the external costs of measurement to third parties is
through  compulsory  standardization  of  property  rights. 26  Standardization
reduces the costs  of measuring  the attributes  of such rights. 127 Limiting the
number  of basic  property  forms  allows  a market  participant  or a potential
violator  to limit his or her inquiry to whether  the interest does or does  not
have the features  of the forms  on the  menu. Fancies not  on the closed  list
need not be considered because they will not be enforced.  When it comes to
the basic  legal dimensions  of property,  limiting  the number of forms  thus
makes the determination of their nature less costly. The "good"  in question
here might  be considered  to be the prevention  of error in ascertaining  the
attributes  of  property  rights.  Standardization  means  less  measurement  is
required  to achieve a given amount of error prevention.  Alternatively,  one
Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 66-67 (1970).  A wider audience for the
analysis was gained by Garrett Hardin, The  Tragedy of  the Commons,  162 SCi.  1243  (1968).
125.  The  problem here  in fact  may  be  worse than  that of the  prototypical  common  pool  in
which one of n participants  bears only  lln of the costs  of his  or her actions.  The  choice  of the
degree  of idiosyncrasy  in any given transaction  may not be a continuous  one. This can  mean  that
in  the  system  of property  rights,  some  rightholders  and transactors  will  not  be  concerned  with
small differences  in idiosyncrasy and marketability at the margin.
126.  We  consider the  failure  of other  methods  of controlling  the  costs  of measuring  basic
property rights in Section IV.A infra.
127.  This  effect  of  standardization-however  the  standard  is  achieved-is  familiar  from
many  areas,  including  manufacturing,  see  Charles  P.  Kindleberger,  Standards  as  Public,
Collective and Private Goods,  36  KYKLos  377,  378,  384  (1983)  (stating  that standardization  in
manufacturing  has the twin benefits of facilitating economies of scale and  of reducing transaction
costs by,  inter  alia, reducing  the need  for monitoring);  health  care information,  see  William  M.
Sage, Regulating  Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care,  99 COLUM.
L. Rnv.  1701,  1741-42 (1999)  (stating that standardization  carries with  it many benefits, including
the  reduction  of "data  collection  and  processing  costs");  and  securities  design,  see  FRANKLIN
ALLEN & DOUGLAS  GALE,  FINANCIAL INNOVATION  AND  RISK SHARING  123,  311-12, 333 (1994)
(interpreting  results of studies  as  reflecting  a  discount for unfamiliar  securities).  See  also Alan
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information  in Markets for Contract Terms:  The Examples
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L.  REV.  1387,  1401-29 (1983)  (showing that, just as
with price  diversity  where  consumers  prefer  one  price,  the  variety of contract  terms  can affect
consumer  search costs).
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can say  that standardization  increases the productivity of any  given level of
measurement efforts.
128
One would expect  standardization  to have the most value in connection
with  the dimensions of property rights  that are  least visible, and  hence the
most  difficult for ordinary  observers to  measure.  The tangible attributes of
property,  such  as  its  size,  shape,  color,  or  texture,  are  typically  readily
observable  and hence can be  relatively  easily measured  by third parties. In
the watch  example,  the watch  can be  a  Timex or  a Rolex  and can  be any
size  or  color,  and  so  forth.  These  physical  attributes,  and  of  course  the
price, are relatively easy for third  parties to process  using their senses,  and
thus  there  is  less  to  be  gained  from  standardizing  them.'29  The  legal
dimensions  of  property  are  less  visible  and  less  easy  to  comprehend,
especially  when  they  deviate  from  the  most  familiar  forms  such  as  the
undivided  fee  simple.'30 Thus, one would expect  the effort  to  lower third-
party  information  costs  through  standardization  to  focus  on  the  legal
dimension of ownership. 3'
128.  Of course,  standardization  of ownership forms  is not the  only device  used by  the law to
reduce information  costs  to third parties about  property rights. See Carol  M. Rose, Possession as
the  Origin of  Property, 52  U.  CHI.  L.  REv.  73,  88  (1985)  (noting  that  the  standards  for
determining  possession  are  based  on  "a  specific  vocabulary  within  a  structure  of  symbols
approved and understood by a commercial  people").
129.  For a discussion of how the  configuration  of  boundaries can  serve  to  make  attributes
harder to process and thereby deter strategic  behavior, see Henry  E. Smith, Semicommon Property
Rights and Scattering  in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.  131,  147-48,  161-64 (2000).
130.  Conditions that cut short  a possessory  interest or trigger the  creation of a future  interest,
see  supra notes  36-37  and  accompanying  text,  are  one  instance  in  which  the  law  permits
significant  variation  in  an  attribute  of  property  rights  that  is  not  visible.  These  conditions,
however,  are  nearly  always  expressed  in  "lay  language,"  describing  an  attribute  such  as  age
("when  she  reaches  twenty-one"),  marital  status  ("so  long  as  he  does  not  remarry"),  or  uses
("provided  it  is  used  for  school  purposes").  It  may  be  that  such  conditions  are  more
understandable  to  nonlegally  trained  market  participants  than  are  the  legal  dimensions  of  the
different  building  blocks  of  property  themselves  (e.g.,  fee  simple,  contingent  remainder,
easement).  In  any event, these sorts  of conditions  are today  almost  always found  in trusts,  where
they  serve  as  guides  to  the  trustee  in  distributing  the  fruits  of  the  trust  among  different
beneficiaries. Other market  participants deal only with the underlying  trust assets,  which are held
by the trustee  in fee simple.  The widespread  use of trusts, in other words,  has made  possible the
continued  use  of  nonstandardized  conditions,  without  at  the  same  time  imposing  large
measurement costs on other market participants.
131.  It  might be  thought  that  courts  and  other  officials  (such  as  tax  authorities)  would  be
among  the third parties whose  information costs need lowering.  This is  a consideration,  but the
question  remains  why  standardization  in  property  law  is  different  from  the  defaults  used  in
contract law.  As for taxing authorities,  the numerus clausus might ease processing, but, to  a great
extent,  tax-specific  concepts  of  ownership  may  need  to  be  devised  anyway.  See  Noel  B.
Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization:  A  "Revolutionary" Approach
to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REv.  725, 727  (1992)  (noting the absence of a comprehensive  definition
of ownership under the tax code,  arguing that the search for a  single taxable owner is  misguided,
and  proposing  to determine  ownership  based  on  financial  interest  just  as  Section  1286  of the
Internal Revenue Code treats a bond and its coupons as separate pieces of property).The Numerus Clausus Principle
B.  Frustration  Costs and the Language of Property  Rights
If  the  only  concern  were  in  reducing  third-party  measurement  costs,
then  there  should  be  only  one  mandatory  package  of  property  rights,
presumably  a  simple  usufruct  or  an  undivided  fee  simple.  But
standardization  imposes  its own costs. Mandatory  rules  sometimes prevent
the  parties  from  achieving  a  legitimate  goal  cost-effectively.  Enforcing
standardization  can therefore frustrate the parties'  intentions.
Although the numerus clausus sometimes  frustrates parties'  objectives,
often those objectives  can be  realized by  a more  complex  combination  of
the standardized  building blocks  of property. 3  For example,  sophisticated
parties with good legal  advice can create  the equivalent of a lease "for  the
duration of the war"  by entering into a long-term  lease determinable  if the
war ends.'33 The fact that  the numerus clausus is in this sense "avoidable"
does  not mean  that it  is trivial:  Even if the  standardization  effected by the
numerus clausus principle does not absolutely bar the parties from realizing
their ends, this standardization comes at a price.'34 The effect is roughly that
of price discrimination:  Parties  willing to  pay a great deal  for an  objective
can  achieve  it  by  incurring  higher  planning  and  implementation  costs.'35
Furthermore, the design and implementation  costs imposed  by the numerus
clausus function  as  a sort of "pollution  tax"  that should deter parties from
insisting  on  overusing  hard-to-process  property  forms,  thereby  placing
higher processing burdens  on market participants  and especially courts.
The  ability  of  the  system  of property  rights  to  limit  the  degree  of
frustration  that  comes  from  standardization  can  be  grasped  by  comparing
that system to another metaphorical  network: language.'36 The inventory of
property  rights can be analogized  to the lexicon of a language, and the rules
for combining property  rights are like a language's grammar. In the case of
both  property  law  and  language,  there  is  a  potentially  infinite  range  of
things one can do with the limited vocabulary and rules available.
132.  Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
133.  Supra note 29.
134.  In  the  context  of  corporate  law,  Bernard  Black  argues  that  rules  that  appear  to  be
mandatory  can  be  trivial  for four  reasons, one  of them  being  the rule's  avoidability.  Bernard  S.
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A  Political  and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw.  U.  L. REv.  542,
544  (1990).  However,  the greater  the  transaction costs of contracting  around  a  rule,  the  more it
will  fall  toward  the  mandatory  end  of the  spectrum  from  weak  defaults  to  strong  defaults  to
mandatory rules. See supra note 24.
135.  Furthermore,  as Black notes, one should expect triviality  in areas  of law in which most
parties are sophisticated. Black, supra note  134, at 546. We argue that the numerus clausus causes
property  law  to  vary  in  avoidability  (one  of  Black's  senses  of  triviality)  according  to  the
sophistication of the parties.  Furthermore,  corporate  law  is an  area in  which the participants  are
typically concerned with  liquidity,  and where liquidity is a primary  concern,  there is an incentive
to conform even to nonmandatory  standards. Infra notes  167-169 and accompanying text.
136.  Cf ROBERT G.  NATELSON,  MODERN LAW  OF DEEDS TO  REAL PROPERTY  §  2.1,  at  12-
13  (1992)  (analogizing estates in land to systems of measurement and  the alphabet).
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In  both  language  'and property,  standardizing  the building  blocks  will
cause  some  frustration  of purposes,  but  the  analogy  to  language  suggests
why  this  may  be  tolerable.  If  there  were  only  one  form  of  tailor-made
property  right  for  each  objective  people  might  have,  then  limiting  such
rights  would  have  a  severe  effect  on  the  objectives  people  could  pursue
with the law's aid. But if building blocks can be combined  in many ways to
serve objectives  that cannot be  served  with the building  blocks  themselves,
then  the  degree  of  frustration  depends  on  how  well  and  how  easily  the
building  blocks  can  be combined  to  serve  those  objectives.  That  is,  it  is
important to know the generative power of the system of property rights.
In  this respect,  the  set  of outputs  of the property  system is potentially
infinite for reasons  analogous  to those that capture the infinity of sentences
of  a  language.  The  set  of  property  rights  bundles  is  potentially  infinite
because,  like  some  of  the  rules  of  language,  some  rules  for  forming
property  rights  are  recursive: These rules  can  feed  into themselves.137 For
example,  a fee simple can be physically divided and divided yet again, or a
lessee  can  create  a  sublease  and  the  sublessee  a  (sub)sublease,  etc.  Also
leading to an infinity of outputs  are rules that permit multiple owners; 1 3 8  for
example,  a  fee  simple  can be divided  into  tenancies  in common  with  any
number  of  concurrent  owners  or  a  single  lease  can  be  executed  with
multiple lessees. 39 And the rules permitting physical  and temporal  division
can be combined  with the rules  permitting multiple ownership. Thus, again
as  with  language,  relatively  simple  systems  can  potentially  have  great
generative capacity  or expressive  power."  If so,  then the limitations  on the
137.  The output of a recursive rule contains  a constituent  of the same category  as the  input to
the  rule.  Among  the  linguistic phenomena  that  call  for a model  including  a recursive  rule  is  the
complement  clause  beginning  with  "that":  "Pat  said/believed  that  Chris  is  sick,"  "Leslie
said/believed  that Pat said/believed that Chris is sick,"  etc. A  sentence can consist of "that"  plus
another  sentence  (which can in turn consist of "that"  plus another  sentence, etc.). See, e.g., IVAN
A. SAG & THOMAS  WASOW,  SYNTACTIC THEORY:  A FORMAL  INTRODUCTION 36, 259  (1999).
138.  An analogous  linguistic example  would be the "and  on"  phenomenon.  "Some  sentences
go on  and on"  is a sentence in English, as is "Some  sentences go  on and on and on,"  as is "Some
sentences  go on and on and on and on."  For a good discussion of this source of infinity in syntax,
see id. at 27-29. This is not the same as recursion,  as reflected in the flat structure of the "and  on"
phenomenon;  recursion, in contrast, creates a "nested"  tree  structure. The property  analogy would
be  to contrast  the  simple horizontal  division  of an  interest  into  subinterests  with  the  successive
divisions of subinterests creating more than one level.
139.  As  argued  in  Section  IV.H  infra,  the  law  does  not  intervene  in  any  strong  anti-
fragmentarian  way  here,  but  this  is  not  relevant  to  the  present  point,  which  concerns  the
"expressive power"  of the  property system.
140.  In  syntax,  generative  capacity  or power  is measured  by  the  set of outputs  that a  given
type of system can produce. E.g., JOHN  E. HOPCROFr & JEFFREY D. ULLMAN,  INTRODUCTION TO
AUTOMATA THEORY,  LANGUAGES,  AND COMPUTATION 217-32 (1979);  BARBARA H. PARTEE  ET
AL.,  MATHEMATICAL  METHODS  IN LINGUISTICS  451-53,  561-63  (1990).  See  generally THE
FORMAL COMPLEXITY  OF NATURAL  LANGUAGE  (Walter J.  Savitch  et al.  eds.,  1987).  Expressive
power  refers  to  the  range  of  meanings  that  can  be  expressed  in  a  given  language  (however
cumbersomely). Claims that certain languages cannot express particular notions  have turned out to
be false.  For a famous  example,  see EKKEHART MALOTKI,  HOPI TIME:  A  LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
OF THE TEMPORAL CONCEPTS  IN THE HOPI LANGUAGE (1983),  which refutes  claims  by Benjamin
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vocabulary  of property rights may not lead to as much frustration of parties'
objectives as one might first think.
Quite  complex  structures-of  property  rights  or  sentences-can  be
constructed  from  a  limited  number  of  standard  building  blocks.
Importantly,  these complexes  are easier to process  for the very reason that
they are built with the standard building blocks. In language, sentences  that
obey  grammatical  constraints  are  likely  to  be  easier  to  parse  than  are
ungrammatical  sentences, 4'  something  that  Chomsky  pointed  out  at  the
dawn  of  his  research  program  on  generative  grammar.'42  Similarly,  in
property,  a  complex  of  property  rights  built  from  a  small  number  of
standard building  blocks  is  likely  to  be easier  for  third  parties  to  process
than functionally equivalent complex  property rights for which third parties
must figure out the nature of the building blocks.'43
As is generally true of analogies, likening  the system of property rights
to human  language  only  gets  us  so far.  The  two  networks  resemble  each
other  on  the frustration  cost  side  of the  ledger:  The  generative  power  of
each leads to great flexibility. Much can be done with a limited vocabulary.
On  the  measurement  cost  side  of  the  inquiry,  however,  the  system  of
property  looks like language only in certain  specialized  contexts. Everyday
language is a flexible standard: It is permissible and often beneficial  to coin
new words,  and this  does  not usually  lead  to  a degree  of confusion costs
Whorf that the Hopi  language lacks  any  means of expressing  time.  Cf GEOFFREY  K.  PULLUM,
THE GREAT  ESKIMO  VOCABULARY  HOAX:  AND  OTHER  IRREVERENT  ESSAYS  ON  THE  STUDY OF
LANGUAGE  159-71  (1991)  (debunking  claims  regarding  a  large  number  of  Eskimo  words  for
snow).
141.  Linguists  continue  to  debate  about  what  factors  other than  nongrammaticality  tend  to
impede  or  promote  processing.  CARSON  T.  SCHOTZE,  THE  EMPIRICAL  BASE  OF  LINGUISTICS:
GRAMMATICALITY  JUDGMENTS  AND LINGUISTIC METHODOLOGY  31-32, 160-64  (1996).
142.  Interestingly, Chomsky's  famous example  demonstrating  that syntactic  or grammatical
well-formedness  is  distinct  from  semantic  intelligibility-" Colorless  green  ideas  sleep
furiously"-was  introduced  in  a  discussion  that  also  pointed  out  some  correlation  between
grammaticality (syntactic  well-formedness)  and ease of processing.  The famous example is easier
to  remember and  to produce  with natural  intonation than  are permutations  like  "Furiously  sleep
ideas green colorless."  NOAM CHOMSKY,  SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES  15-16 (1957).
143.  Thus, it is not necessarily  correct that creating  a tenancy for the duration of the  war in a
way  that  satisfies  the  numerus  clausus-a  term  of  years  determinable-conveys  no  more
information  to third parties than  would enforcing a tenancy  "for  the  duration  of the war"  directly
as a matter of the intentions of the parties. To a sophisticated  lawyer reviewing the instruments,  a
lease for a term of, say, ten years, determinable  on the end of the war, has a more certain meaning
than does a  lease "for  the duration of the  war."  The former clearly lasts for a full ten  years if the
war lasts that long, and it clearly terminates earlier if the  war ends before the ten years are up.  The
latter has no established  meaning.  Some courts  have  construed  such  an interest to  be  a term  of
years, some a periodic lease, and some a tenancy at will. Supra note 28.  Nor is the problem  solved
by dropping  the  numerus clausus and saying  that all leases  will  be enforced  in  accordance  with
the intentions of the parties. There still may be great uncertainties  about when the  war ends.  Does
it end  when  an armistice  is  declared,  or when  demobilization  occurs,  or when  a  peace treaty  is
signed?  These  conundrums  affect  both  alternatives,  but  in  the  case  of  the  term  of  years
determinable, we at least know  that the  lease continues until the debate over when the war ends is
resolved. If we enforce  a lease for the duration of the war according  to its terms,  the status of the
tenant while the parties debate the meaning of "the  end of the war"  is more uncertain.The Yale Law Journal
that requires  standardization  by  a  central  authority.144 The  grammar  of a
language  is  more  standardized,  but  again  this  generally  occurs
spontaneously.  Standardizing  property  and  language  may  not  create
massive  frustration  costs  because  of each  system's  generative  power,  but
the source of the standardization is different in the two networks. We return
to the question of the source of standards in Section IV.C.
C.  Optimal Standardization  and the Numerus Clausus
We  are now in a position to see how  the numerus clausus functions  to
promote the optimal standardization  of property  rights. From  a social point
of view,  the objective  should be to minimize  the sum of measurement  (and
error) costs, frustration costs, and administrative  costs. In other words,  what
we  want  is  not  maximal  standardization-or  no  standardization-but
optimal  standardization.  Fortunately,  standardization  comes  in  degrees.
There is a spectrum of possible approaches  to property  rights, ranging from
total freedom of customization  on the one hand  to complete  regimentation
on  the  other.  Neither  of  these  endpoints  on  the  spectrum  is  likely  to
minimize social  costs. Extreme  standardization would frustrate  many of the
purposes to which property rights are put. On the other hand, total freedom
to customize  rights  would  create  large third-party  measurement  and error
costs  and  high  administrative  costs.  Attention  should focus  on the middle
range of the spectrum.  Starting from a position  of complete regimentation,
permitting  additional  forms  of  property  rights  should  reduce  frustration
costs by more than it increases measurement and error costs to third parties
and  administrative  costs.  Conversely,  if  one  starts  from  a  position  of
complete  customization  of rights,  increasing  the degree  of standardization
should lower measurement and error costs and administrative  costs by more
than the attendant frustration costs will rise.
Consider a simple model of the choice of the number of property forms,
illustrated  in  Figure  2.  Along  the x-axis  is  the variable p, the number  of
forms of property, and along the y-axis is the measure of marginal  changes
to societal wealth.
144.  Infra notes  171-173 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 2. OPTIMAL NUMBER OF PROPERTY FORMS
Number of Forms
MP = marginal cost of measuring (delineating and processing) property rights
FP = marginal benefit in reducing frnstration of parties'  objectives
The  number  of  forms  of  property  is  subject  to  a  tradeoff  between
measurement  and error  costs on  the one hand and frustration  costs  on  the
other.  As  the  number  of  property  forms  (p)  increases,  error  costs  and
measurement costs also increase. 145 Moreover, in this model we assume that
the  simplest  and most  widely  applicable  property  rights  will  be  adopted
first; thus the fee simple is represented in the smallest set of property forms
(to the left on the x-axis in Figure 2). Marginal  error and measurement costs
therefore  increase  with  the  number  of  forms.  The  curve  labeled  M,
represents  the  marginal  costs  of setting  up  and  processing  property  rights.
As p increases,  the marginal  costs of measurement  increase (M  is  positive
and  increasing  as  p  increases),  reflecting  the  increased  costs  of
measurement  and  error  associated  with  more-and  more  specialized  and
complicated-property  forms."  The number of forms may range from 0 to
145.  The  choice  bears  some  resemblance  to  the  choice  of the  number  of commons.  See
Barry C. Field, The Evolution of  Property Rights, 42 KYKLoS  319, 321-22, 328-29 (1989).
146.  For the  more complicated  property  forms,  marginal processing  costs are higher because
of  complexity.  To  the  extent  that  these  property  forms  are  less  widely  applicable  than  ones
"earlier"  on the x-axis,  there are fewer  instances of the  property  form over which  to spread any
fixed costs in setting up and learning to process the property form.
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Q, which is defined as the number of property forms that would emerge in a
regime  of total  customization.  The  other  curve,  labeled  Fp, is  a  marginal
benefit  curve;  it represents  the  marginal  savings  in  frustration  costs  from
changes in p. As p increases,  the  marginal frustration  costs saved  decrease
(FP is positive and decreasing  as p increases),  because as we move from the
fee  simple to more specialized  forms,  the addition of each  form  saves  less
in frustration  costs. Thus, movements toward more forms of property  yield
(increasingly  smaller)  benefits  in terms  of reduced  frustration  costs  from
efforts to  achieve goals  that the  menu of property  forms does  not directly
allow.
The  numerus clausus principle  can  be  seen  from  this perspective  as  a
device  that  moves  the  system  of property  rights  in  the  direction  of the
optimal  level  of  standardization,  that  is,  p,.147  By  creating  a  strong
presumption  against judicial  recognition  of new  forms  of property  rights,
the numerus clausus imposes  a brake on efforts by parties to proliferate new
forms of property rights.  On  the other  hand, by grandfathering  in existing
forms  of property,  and  permitting  legislative  creation  of  new  forms,  the
numerus  clausus permits  some  positive  level  of  diversification  in  the
recognized  forms of property. We  do not argue that any particular  number
of property  forms  is  in  fact  optimal.  Nor  do  we  argue  that  the  forms
currently  recognized  by  the  common  law  are  ideal  and  beyond
improvement.  We do submit, however,  that  the  numerus clausus strikes  a
rough  balance  between  the  extremes  of  complete  regimentation  and
complete freedom of customization,  and thus leads  to a  system of property
rights that is closer to being optimal than that which would be produced by
either of the extreme positions.
D.  Information Costs and the Dynamics of Property
Finally, our explanation of the numerus clausus generates some  general
predictions  about the way in which property regimes will change over time:
As  the costs  of standardization  to the parties  and the government  shift, we
expect the optimal degree of standardization  to rise or fall. Consider the rise
of registers of interests in real property, that is,  recording  acts.  This device
lowers  the  costs  of  notice;  it  is  an  alternative  method  of  lowering
information costs.
1 48
147.  Rudden acknowledges the possible  role of standardization  in reducing information costs,
but he does not draw out its implications. He concludes that there is no economic justification for
the  numerus  clausus,  and  in  particular,  he  thinks  that  the  possibility  of  contracting  for
idiosyncratic  rights makes  standardization  through the numerus clausus irrelevant. Rudden,  supra
note 3, at 253-54. That is, he appears to assume the correctness of the irrelevance  objection, which
we criticize in Section IV.C infra.
148.  In  nineteenth-century  England,  those  arguing  for  reform  in  the  law  of property  saw
limitation  of the  types  of property  interests  and  compulsory  registration  of titles  as  alternative
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FIGURE 3. CHANGE IN OPTIMAL NUMBER OF PROPERTY FORMS
$  MP
Mp
Fp  Fp'
0  P*p'.  Q
Number of Forms
M,  = marginal costs of measuring property rights  without registration
MI,  = marginal costs of measuring property  rights with registration
FP  = F'=  marginal benefit in reducing frustration  of parties'  objectives
The  effects  of  adopting  a  system  of  registration  are  illustrated
graphically  in Figure 3 above. The effect of cheaper information is to shift
the  marginal  costs  of  property  forms  in  terms  of processing  inward;  M
shifts downward to a position more like that of MI' in Figure 3, and thus the
optimal  number  of  property  forms  increases,  from  p*  to  p'*.  As  the
methods to simplify conveyancing  that might be used  together. See, e.g., SECOND REPORT MADE
TO His MAJESTY  BY  THE COMMISSIONERS  APPOINTED TO INQUIRE  INTO THE LAW  OF ENGLAND
RESPECTING  REAL  PROPERTY  4-21  (n.p.  1830) (describing  the  insecurity  of  title  and  costs  of
investigating,  noting  the  need for a  uniform  system,  and advocating  a general  registry for  real
property);  THIRD  REPORT  MADE  TO  HIS  MAJESTY  BY  THE  COMMISSIONERS  APPOINTED  TO
INQUIRE  INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND  RESPECTING REAL  PROPERTY 4-20 (n.p.  1832)  (noting  the
inconvenience  and  costs  of nonuniform  and  complex  systems  of estates  across  England);  W.S.
HOLDSWORTH,  AN  HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  LAND  LAW  315-18  (1927)  (discussing
the necessary emergence of legislation to fill obvious  gaps); JOHN  STUART  MILL, PRINCIPLES  OF
POLITICAL  ECONOMY  884 (J.M. Robson ed., Univ. of Toronto Press 1965)  (1848)  (criticizing  the
law  of  real  property  for  its  uncertainty,  complexity,  lack  of  registry,  consequent  expensive
formalities,  and  costly  legal  proceedings);  FREDERICK  POLLOCK,  THE  LAND  LAWS  171-74
(London,  MacMillan  1896)  (describing  the  cost and  trouble  of investigating  title  in  nineteenth-
century  England,  noting  that  registering  and  simplifying  property  law  were  main  solutions
advocated,  and describing  reforms);  see also C.E. Thomhill,  How To Simplify  Our Titles, 5  L.Q.
REv.  11  (1889)  (documenting  the argument in England between  those who wished to reduce costs
of investigating  title by simplification of estates  and those  who advocated  notice  through  a land
register, and taking the  former position).The Yale Law Journal
marginal  costs of defining property forms shift inward,  the optimal point of
standardization  shifts  to  less  standardization.  Similarly,  in  the  case  of
security  interests,  the  provision  of  notice  through  filing  allowed  the
loosening of the earlier quite  strict  limits on the types  of security  interests
permitted. ' 49
Likewise,  the  more  recent  move  toward  increased  use  of  contract
principles  in  areas  like  electronic  commerce  fits  in  well  with  the
information-cost  theory of the numerus clausus. Notice  is arguably easier to
furnish (if not  to process)  when,  for example,  rights  to digital  content  are
being  transferred,  and  notice  of  restrictions  and  other  features  of  rights
transferred  are  technologically  not  difficult to  provide.5'  Also  fitting  this
pattern  are  recent  criticisms  of  negotiability  as  being  superseded  by
technology.'  Negotiability  imposes  very  strict  formality  requirements
precisely  in  order  to  reduce  the  need  to  measure  the  reliability  of  an
instrument.  But when technology furnishes  alternative  means of promoting
reliance (including lowering  the need to measure risk), there is less need for
the  standardization  provided  for  by  the  requirements  of  negotiability.  In
general,  to  the  extent  that  technological  change  allows  cheaper  notice  of
relevant interests, the need for standardization  by the law will be somewhat
diminished. Just as the rise of land registers  allowed  some loosening of the
numerus clausus, so  too technology  that  lowers  information  costs  can  be
expected to weaken the numerus clausus further.
IV.  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
We  anticipate  a  variety  of  objections  to  our  optimal  standardization
theory of the numerus clausus, which  we collect under three  headings. The
first  we  call  "libertarian"  objections,  because  they  share  the  common
theme  that government-mandated  standardization  is  not necessary in order
to  reduce  third-party  measurement  costs.  The  second  we  call  the
"antifragmentation"  objection, because it posits that the numerus clausus is
designed not to reduce third-party information  costs but rather to restrict the
fragmentation  of ownership.  The third  we call the  "irrelevance"  objection;
basically, it posits that virtually anything one can do with property  can also
149.  E.g.,  Robert Charles Clark, Abstract Rights Versus Paper  Rights Under Article 9 of the
Uniform  Commercial Code, 84  YALE  L.J.  445,  476-78  (1975);  Henry  Hansmann  &  Reinier
Kraakman,  The Essential Role of Organizational  Law,  110  YALE  L.J. (forthcoming  Dec.  2000)
(manuscript at  18,  on file with The Yale Law Journal).
150.  E.g.,  Robert  P.  Merges,  The  End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in  the
"Newtonian" World of  On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.  115,  120-29 (1997).
151.  E.g.,  Ronald  J.  Mann,  Searching for Negotiability in  Payment and  Credit Systems,
44 UCLA  L.  REV.  951  (1997);  Symposium  on  Negotiability in  an  Electronic Environment,
31  IDAHO  L.  REV.  679  (1995);  Jane  Kaufman  Winn,  Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable
Instruments and Digital  Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REV. 739,  742 (1998).
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be  done  by  contract,  thus  rendering  the  standardizing  features  of  the
numerus clausus otiose.  We argue  that none  of these various  arguments  is
ultimately persuasive.
A.  Libertarian  Objections
The  argument  that  government-mandated  standardization  of  property
forms, that  is, the numerus clausus, is not necessary  comes  in three forms.
The  first  posits  that  the  government  need  not  standardize  because  third-
party  informational  needs  can  be  supplied just as  effectively  by  requiring
notice  of idiosyncratic  property  forms. The  second,  which  draws upon  the
burgeoning literature  on network effects,  argues  that government-mandated
standardization  is unnecessary  because standardization would occur without
government guidance.  The third is  that standardization  can  be supplied  by
private  organizations  and  associations  rather  than  the  government.  We
address in turn each of these variations on the libertarian theme.
1.  Notice Cures All
An  emphasis  on  freedom  of contract  is  characteristic  of a  critique  of
certain  manifestations  of the  numerus clausus offered by  libertarians.  Not
surprisingly,  libertarians  see  the  standardization  of  property  rights  as
standing  in  the  way  of  parties'  exercise  of  contractual  freedom.  The
libertarian  argument  has  been made most forcefully  by Richard  Epstein  in
his call to abolish the existing restrictions on servitudes.'52  In his view, legal
intervention  is needed  only  to  provide  notice  by recordation  of privately
created interests.  As long as such interests are  recorded, they may  take any
form the parties choose.
For Epstein,  the  function  of recordation  is  to  identify  to  prospective
purchasers  the  individual  with  whom  one  has  to deal  in  order  to  acquire
title.'53 Because  land is permanent  and immobile, recording can give  notice
to  prospective  purchasers  not just of the  physical  dimensions  of  land  but
also  of  the  legal  dimensions,  such  as  complex  forms  of  servitudes  and
future  interests. 1 54  While  prospective  purchasers  must  search  for  such
information,  the search is channeled  into the records and the result is  more
152.  Richard  A. Epstein,  Notice and Freedom of Contract in the  Law of Servitudes, 55  S.
CAL.  L. REv.  1353 (1982)  [hereinafter Epstein, Servitudes]; see also Alfred  F. Conard, Easement
Novelties, 30 CAL. L. REv.  125,  131-33 (1942)  (arguing that the enforcement of easements should
not be objectionable  on grounds of novelty  as long as there  is notice). Epstein has also advanced a
version  of the argument in urging  abolition of restrictions  on the creation of future interests,  such
as  the Rule Against  Perpetuities.  Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future:  The  Temporal Dimension
in the Law of Property,  64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705-07  (1986).
153.  Epstein, Servitudes, supra note  152, at 1355.
154.  Id.
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certain than was true under the common-law  rules that the recording system
displaced.  Moreover, Epstein recognizes  the  crucial point that  the costs  of
creating  novel  property  rights  will  be capitalized  into the  present  market
value of the property.'55 If A creates undesirable  restrictions or interests that
will be  difficult  to remove,  then  the  market  value  of A's  property  drops
today by the discounted  amount that future buyers would spend to remove
these items or would demand to be paid to live with them. Thus, the costs to
future purchasers of the right are internalized to the right's creator.
Aside from requiring notice, Epstein argues, the only role of courts, just
as  in contract law,  is  to  interpret  the parties'  intent and  to  supply default
terms  when  evidence  of intent  is lacking. 56 The  whole  point  of property
law,  he  argues,  is  to establish  a  sphere  in  which  individuals'  choices  are
respected  (and facilitated  through  enforcement)  rather  than  overruled  by
collective preferences.'  As  long  as  actors do not infringe  upon  the rights
of third  parties,  there  is  no principled  basis  for  disrespecting  choices  in
servitude law any more than in property or contract law more generally.
What  this  critique  overlooks  is  that  the  adoption  of  idiosyncratic
property  rights  has  an  impact  not  only  on  the  originating  parties  and
potential  successors  in  interest,  but  also  on  other  market  participants.
Idiosyncratic  rights  create  a  common-pool  problem,  which  does impose
external costs on third parties. Making  the running of a fancy depend solely
on  the  original  parties'  intent  and  on  notice-even  recorded  notice-to
subsequent parties acquiring  property  assumes that notice is the most cost-
effective  method  to minimize  third-party  information  costs.  But  notice  of
idiosyncratic  property  rights  is  costly  to  process,  and,  although  land
registers  furnish  notice  at  far  lower  cost  than  would  a  doctrine  of
constructive  notice,  even  they  can  require  lengthy  and  error-prone
searches.'58
A  comparison  with  the  costs  of  processing  contracts  highlights  the
processing  problem.  Even the terms of a bilateral  contract are not  costless
to process.  This is  one reason  why parties  may  leave clauses  in a  contract
simple:  A  simple  clause  requires  less  inspection  for  hidden  traps  (or
investments  by the writer  of the  clauses  in precommitting  not to  write  in
155.  Id. at 1360.
156.  Id. at 1357.
157.  Id. at 1358.
158.  The  nineteenth-century  English commentators  cited  supra note  148  were  aware of this
point. That processing  costs can be higher or lower depending on how notice  is presented emerges
also from the  few studies on the relative costs of recording  versus Torrens systems. See Joseph  T.
Janczyk,  An Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for Transferring Real Property, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD.  213  (1977);  see also Joseph T. Janczyk,  Land Title Systems, Scale of Operations,
and Operating  and Conversion Costs, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.  569  (1979);  cf. Baird  & Jackson,  supra
note  117, at 308  & n.25  (noting that filing comes closer to conclusively establishing  title under the
Torrens system than under other systems).
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traps).'59 These  processing costs  are  all the higher  in  the more  impersonal
context of land  registers, and especially where  transactors  do not deal with
all  the  market  participants.  The  very  existence  of  idiosyncratic,  hard-to-
process property  rights makes information  about property rights  in general
harder  to  process.  Third  parties  incur  heavier  measurement  costs  in
processing  "notice"  when  the  universe  of  property  rights  includes
idiosyncratic  servitudes or other "fancies"  than when these are prohibited.
Moreover,  these  costs  are  true  externalities  of any given  transaction.  The
costs to third parties  who do not deal even indirectly with the creator of the
unusual  servitude are not capitalized into the price of the creator's property,
and hence the creator cannot be expected to take these costs  into account. 6°
In  particular,  the  higher  measurement  costs  for  parties  considering  other
parcels are not reflected in a lower price for the parcel of the creator of such
rights.
Of  course,  if  parties  had  complete  freedom  to  customize  property
rights, they would undoubtedly  find it advantageous  to conform somewhat
to market-generated  coordination points. Nevertheless,  because not all costs
of nonstandard  rights  would be  internalized  to them,  we  would  expect  to
find some individuals exercising their freedom in a way that would lead to a
suboptimal level of standardization.' 6'
2.  Standardization  and  Network Effects
A  second  possible  reason  why  mandatory  standardization  may  be
unnecessary is that standardization  will occur spontaneously. The argument
might draw upon the growing  literature  on "network  effects"  or "network
externalities."  Although somewhat difficult to define, network effects  arise
when  a consumer's  value of a good depends  on the number of other users;
the interdependence of consumer valuations leads to a network that is literal
(as  in  the case of the telephone  system) or metaphorical  (as  in  the case  of
language). 6' Consumers benefit from the larger network  made possible  by
the  participation  of  others  or,  equivalently,  suffer  a  cost  from  others'
159.  Eric  Rasmusen,  A  Model  of  Negotiation,  Not  Bargaining  1-2,  8-21  (May  1,  1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file  with The  Yale Law Journal).
160.  This of course includes  parties  who are  not prospective  purchasers  but who  may  incur
losses due to a violation of the terms  of the servitude.
161.  In contexts in which  marketability is  a primary  concern for transactors, we would expect
the desire to conform to standards to be at its greatest. Infra note 167  and accompanying text.
162.  Furthermore, the decision  whether to consume  a good  may have a positive  or negative
network effect:  It is positive if the  choice to consume increases the  value of that type  of good to
other consumers  (for example,  by  the  ability  to communicate  or interact  at  low cost),  and  it  is
negative if it reduces the value to others (for example, through overcrowding).  E.g., Joseph Farrell
& Garth  Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16  RAND J.  ECON.  70,  70-71
(1985);  Michael  L. Katz & Carl  Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 Am. ECON. REv. 424,426-27 (1985).
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nonparticipation.'63 To the extent that this effect is not mediated through the
market, it is an externality to  a consumer deciding whether  to participate in
the  network.' 6  Network  theory  has  been  applied  to  issues  arguably
analogous  to  the  numerus clausus,  such  as  the  choice  of  contract  terms,
particularly  choice  of business form,6'  although  it  is unclear  whether  such
effects are important.
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The  conventional  approach  to  network  externalities  focuses  on  the
learning  and network benefits  of using forms that others have used and will
be  using.  Particularly  where  transactors  are  trying  to  enhance  the
marketability  of the  property  they  create,  there  will be  a  strong desire  to
conform to emerging standards.' 6 7 Thus,  it may be argued, there is no need
for  the  government  to  impose  limits  on  the  available  menu  of  property
forms; those  packaging  property  would  select standardized  forms  anyway,
because  of  the  benefits  of  participating  in  a  network.  Government
163.  Where  there  are network effects,  the increasing  returns to scale stem from  demand-side
factors-consumers  derive  more  value  from  a  larger  network-rather  than  from  the  familiar
increasing  returns  that  stem from  decreases in  average  costs  of production  (on  the  supply  side)
over a  stated period of time.  STAN J.  LIEBOWrrz  & STEPHEN E.  MARGOLIS,  WINNERS,  LOSERS,
& MICROSOFT:  COMPETITION  AND ANTITRUST IN  HIGH TECHNOLOGY  90-104 (1999).
164.  Terminology  varies greatly by  author. Liebowitz  and Margolis  argue  for distinguishing
"network  effects"  from  "network  externalities"  on  the  basis  of whether  suboptimal  conditions
result:  Network  effects  obtain  in  markets  in  which  there  are  increasing  returns  to  scale,  and
network externalities exist only where  increasing returns  lead to  suboptimality.  S.J. Liebowitz  &
Stephen  E.  Margolis,  Network  Externality: An  Uncommon  Tragedy, J.  ECON.  PERSP.,  Spring
1994, at  133,  135.  For a discussion of the  difficulties  with defining  externality in terms  of a  cost
not mediated  by  the  price mechanism,  see  PAPANDREOU,  supra note  121,  at 49-54. The question
relevant to the design of legal institutions is whether the cost that might be termed an externality is
remediable  by  legal  rules  or  not,  according  to  one's  chosen  criteria  for  justifying  legal
intervention.
165.  E.g.,  Marcel  Kahan  & Michael  Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing  Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347  (1996);  Marcel
Kahan  & Michael  Klausner, Standardization  and Innovation in  Corporate Contracting (or "The
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83  VA.  L.  REV.  713  (1997);  Michael  Klausner,  Corporations,
Corporate  Law, and  Networks of Contracts,  81  VA. L. REv.  757 (1995).
166.  For skepticism on this score,  see, for example,  Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis
in  Trade  Usages for International Sales, 39  VA.  J.  INT'L  L. 707,  721-40  (1999);  Clayton  P.
Gillette,  Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78  B.U. L. REv.  813,  814-15,  822-43  (1998),  which
argues that adjudication and legislation may be less susceptible to lock-in effects than are informal
norms; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REv.  479, 562-86 (1998);  and Larry  E. Ribstein  & Bruce  H. Kobayashi, The Fable of the
B.A.'s:  Network  Externalities  and  the  Choice  of Business  Form  (May  4,  1999)  (unpublished
manuscript, on  file with The  Yale Law Journal). Indeed, the notion of network externality runs the
danger  of losing  its usefulness  through  overbreadth  and controversy  over some of the  canonical
examples.  See,  e.g.,  S.J.  Liebowitz  &  Stephen  E. Margolis,  The Fable of the Keys,  33  J.L.  &
ECON.  1 (1990);  Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note  164,  at 135-44.
167.  E.g., ALLEN  &  GALE, supra note  127,  at  309-14 (discussing  the  benefits  to  a firm  of
offering  standard  forms of securities);  Hansmann & Mattei,  supra note  15,  at  468-69;  Claire A.
Hill, Securitization:  A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH.  U. L.Q.  1061,  1090-94 (1996)
(demonstrating  how some  firms  benefit  by  reducing  information  costs  associated  with the  firm
through securitization);  see also, e.g.,  Henry T. Greely,  Contracts as Commodities: The Influence
of Secondary Purchasers on  the  Form  of  Contracts, 42  VAND.  L.  REv.  133,  134  (1989)
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intervention to  assure  standardization  of forms at best  is redundant,  and at
worst  interferes  with  the  evolution  of  the  optimal  number  and  type  of
forms.
This argument misses the point about the nature  of the problem that the
numerus  clausus  is  designed  to  overcome.  Government-imposed
standardization  here is not designed to assure that large numbers of owners
participate  in  a  network  and,  hence,  provide  external  benefits  for  other
participants.  Rather,  standardization  is  imposed  to  control  a  negative
externality  created  by  the  prospect  that  a  few  persons  will  deviate  from
popular forms. Thus,  the numerus clausus is aimed at what might be called
a special kind of network confusion effect based  on problems of processing
information, rather than on the size of the network of participants.
One can have a powerful network effect pushing nearly  all participants
toward  standard forms  and still suffer  from a network confusion effect  that
raises  the  information-processing  costs  to  all  the  participants  in  the
network.  The one out of one hundred  who adopts  a nonstandard  form for
property rights can increase the costs of processing the rights of ninety-nine
others.  It  is  not just  that  the  ninety-nine  do  not  benefit  from  one  more
addition  to their  "network"  of  standardized  property  rights.  Rather,  it  is
that  the  ninety-nine  are  worse  off because  of the  possibility of  the one-
hundredth  idiosyncratic right  than they  would be if that right  could  not be
created  at  all.  This  is  not  a  matter  of increasing  the  value  of rights  with
more users, but of preventing confusion to users who already exist.
We  readily  concede  that  property  owners  for  whom  marketability  is
critical  at  the  margin  will  standardize  without  government  intervention.
Where  actors are  very  interested in liquidity, economists predict a high  (if
not  excessive)  degree  of standardization. 1 68 It  is  this  sort  of  situation  on
which recent commentators have focused their attention and which fits most
comfortably  within  the  conventional  view  of  networks.  Thus,  a  public
corporation  designing securities to be traded  on the market  will respond  to
the network benefits  of standardization  and  will opt for standards  without
being forced  to  do  so. In  such cases, the  numerus clausus, to the  extent it
plays  a  role,  serves  to  identify  coordination  points  and  to  start  a
convention. 69
168.  For  example,  securities'  prices  will  be  discounted  to  reflect  the  cost  of  acquiring
additional  information  if the security includes uncertain features. See, e.g.,  ALLEN & GALE, supra
note  127,  at  123,  311-13  (discussing and citing literature).  For a skeptical treatment of arguments
that network effects lead to an inefficient  lock-in to standards,  see supra note  166.
169.  Thus,  in  corporate  law,  there  seems  to  be  a  role  for  government  standardization  to
provide forms, just as the  government prescribes which side of the road to drive on.  But once the
coordination point  attains salience  through government fiat, almost everyone is happy to abide by
the regularity. See, e.g., DAvtD K. LEWIS,  CONVENTION:  A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY  78-79 (1969)
(defining  "convention");  H.  Peyton  Young,  The Economics of Convention,  J.  ECON.  PERSP.,
Spring  1996,  at  105,  105-06  (same).  This role  in establishing  coordination  points  is consistent
with  what  Black  terms  triviality  in  corporate  law.  Black, supra note  134,  at  544 (discussing
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In  other  circumstances,  however,  there  is  an  implicit recognition  that
the private benefits of doing  the conventional  thing  do not  always  control
individual  decisionmaking. For example, there will be situations  involving
families  and  small  enterprises  in  which  idiosyncrasies  in  property  rights
may  be  valued  more  than  the  fraction  of  common-pool  increase  in
information  costs.  For a  given  owner,  the  desire  to accomplish  a  certain
goal  (for  example,  keeping  property  within  a  close-knit  group)  can
outweigh  concerns  for  future  marketability.  It  is  in  these  sorts  of
circumstances  that the numerus clausus does play  a role.
The  distinction we have drawn between  ordinary network externalities
and  network  confusion  effects  carries  over  into  other  networks  besides
property  rights.  Consider  weights,  measures,  and  money.  A  company  that
begins  using kilograms as a unit of measurement  may lose the advantage  of
network effects  in  the U.S.  market, where most participants  adopt English
units  of measurement.  But  a  company  that  begins  using  a  nonstandard
weight called a "pound,"  but actually equal to  1.2 pounds, will produce far
more  measurement  costs  for  third  parties;  adoption  of  the  purely
idiosyncratic  unit of measurement  will  generate  confusion.  Money  works
similarly,  and it is noteworthy that defacing currency  is sometimes  a crime
while  destroying  it  altogether  is  not:170  Defacing  currency  causes
measurement costs to rise, but destroying it does not.
The  analogy  to language, discussed above  in  Section III.B,  also  sheds
some light on  the question  of when  standardization  needs  to be  provided
centrally.  Because of standard network  effects,  government  intervention is
not required to give language a high degree of standardization:  People want
to  make  themselves  understood.' 7'  Relatedly,  language  in most  everyday
contexts  is  treated  as  a  flexible  (as  opposed  to  a  fixed)  standard:  Newly
coined words can be freely tolerated in order to express new meanings. 72 In
this respect, the numerus clausus is closer to a fixed  standard like weights
and measures,  where individual  innovation is too costly to tolerate. Even in
market-mimicking  rules). In the  numerus clausus, we argue,  there is  a greater  need to  police the
standard.
170.  This is the case in England and  Wales. Bernard Rudden, Things as Things and Things as
Wealth, in PROPERTY  PROBLEMS:  FROM  GENES  TO PENSION  FUNDS  146,  155 n.14  (J.W.  Harris
ed.,  1997). Similarly, it  is illegal to deface  currency  in the United States.  18  U.S.C.  § 333  (1994)
(" Whoever mutilates,  cuts, defaces,  disfigures, or perforates, or unites or cements together or does
any  other thing  to any  bank  bill,  draft,  note, or other evidence  of debt ...  with  intent to  render
such  bank bill, draft, note or other evidence  of debt unfit to be reissued,  shall be fined  under this
title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.")
171.  The  well-known  efforts of the  French government  to  standardize  the  French  language
are  aimed less at ensuring mutual comprehension  than  at serving other political goals.
172.  LIEBOwIrZ  &  MARGOLIS,  supra note  163,  at  87-89;  see  also  Lawrence  Lessig,
The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards  and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY  TECH.
L.J.  759  (1999)  (distinguishing  "coordinating"  and  "regulating"  standards  and  noting that  the
former can  be imposed  top-down  or emerge  bottom-up,  but  the  latter usually  are  imposed  top-
down).
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the  case  of  language,  however,  there  are  certain  contexts  in  which
governments do intervene  to eliminate potential costs that could arise if one
or more  participants  did  not participate  in  a common  language.  Thus,  the
law mandates  one standard language or use of a shared  language in certain
contexts  where impediments to communication  can be especially  costly, as
in  airplane  cockpits or  aboard  oil  tankers.
173  These  are  circumstances  in
which  use  of  an  idiosyncratic  language  by  a  single  participant  can
cause  significant  confusion  in  communication,  with  the  costs  of
miscommunication  being potentially very high.
3.  Privately Supplied Standardization
A  third objection to government  standardization  is that the problem  of
third-party  measurement  costs  can  be  handled  by  private  entities.  The
provision of standards may seem like a public good, but this does not mean
that  it  must  be  supplied  by  the  government.  If  private  parties  can
appropriate  the benefit of the standards, they can be supplied privately.  For
example,  brand names  or warranties  might  be used to  vouch for the legal
dimensions of property rights, or private certification systems might arise to
assure parties that property rights conform to certain standards. 74
173.  For a discussion of this issue in airline  safety and an  argument that ambiguity still leads
to disaster,  see  STEVEN  CUSHING,  FATAL  WORDS:  COMMUNICATION  CLASHES  AND  AIRcRAFT
CRASHES  1-48,  89-110 (1994).  On  oil tankers,  see  33 U.S.C.  § 1228(a)(7)  (1994),  which  states,
"No  vessel ...  shall  operate  in  the  navigable  waters  of  the  United  States  ....  if  such
vessel ...  while underway,  does  not  have  at least  one  licensed  deck  officer  on  the  navigation
bridge  who is capable of clearly understanding  English.";  and  compare  United States v.  Locke,
120  S.  Ct.  1135,  1138  (2000),  which  holds  that  a  state  statute  imposing  an  English-language
proficiency  requirement  on  an  entire  tanker  crew  was  preempted  by  the  more  limited  federal
statute.
174.  On  standard-setting  organizations  in general,  see  Charles  J.  Goetz  & Robert  E.  Scott,
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions  Between  Express and Implied
Contract Terms, 73  CAL. L.  REV.  261,  303-04  (1985).  On  the  much-discussed  role  of standard-
setting  organizations  in  electronic commerce,  see, for  example,  Mark  A. Lemley, Standardizing
Government Standard-Setting Policy  for Electronic Commerce,  14 BERKELEY  TECH.  L.J.  745,
752-53  (1999),  which discusses  the  role of standard-setting  organizations  on  e-commerce  in the
presence of members'  intellectual property  rights in standards; Jane  Kaufman  Winn, Clash of the
Titans:  Regulating the  Competition Between  Established and Emerging  Electronic Payment
Systems,  14  BERKELEY  TECH.  L.J.  675,  707  (1999),  which  enumerates  standards-setting
organizations  in  the  Internet  commerce  area;  and  Internet  Eng'g  Task  Force,  Overview  of the
IETF, at  http://www.ietf.org/overview.htm  (last  visited  Feb.  24,  2000).  Standard-setting
organizations  have traditionally been regarded  with suspicion in  antitrust law, where the adoption
of a  standard  violates  Section  1 of the  Sherman  Antitrust  Act  if a court  finds  it  to  have  been
adopted  to disadvantage  a competitor. See,  e.g.,  Allied  Tube  & Conduit  Corp.  v.  Indian  Head,
Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500  (1988);  Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs,  Inc. v. Hydrolevel  Corp.,  456 U.S.
556, 571-72  (1982);  see also Radiant Burners,  Inc. v.  Peoples  Gas  Light & Coke  Co.,  364 U.S.
656  (1961)  (leaving  open  the  possible  illegality  of a standard-setting  organization's  refusal  to
grant a seal of approval to a plaintiff's apparently safe  and efficient burner).The Yale Law Journal [Vol.  110:  1
In  many  contexts,  particularly  where  purchasers  are  concerned  with
liquidity,  we  do see  private  standards  emerge. 75  But  there  are  theoretical
and empirical  reasons to doubt that private ordering will do better than  legal
constraints  in  standardizing  the basic building  blocks of property  rights.'76
First, outside of contexts  such  as the design of securities  in which liquidity
is  paramount,  the  benefits  from  standardizing  the  building  blocks  of
property  are  likely  to  be  small  for  any  given  owner  and  very  diffuse.
Second,  a system of private  provision of standardization  in property  would
probably  require  heavy  legal  intervention  to make  it  feasible.'77  Someone
would need to protect the value of the marks attached to property and police
infringement, leading to a regime like trademark law. Third, for many types
of property, the association of a mark with the property would probably not
be worth the cost: Consider that, other than real estate and automobiles,  few
items of property  can be registered  today.'  Thus,  the hypothetical  regime
would  have  none  of the  features-high  concentrated  value  of  assets,  a
close-knit  group,  and  a  convenient  method  of marking-that  have  made
private  provision of marks  feasible.'
79  Fourth, identifying  to which  private
system a right belongs would entail processing costs of its own.
The  question  would  be  whether  private  provision  of  standardization
would lead to enough benefits in terms of flexibility  to be worth the cost of
175.  See supra note 167 and accompanying  text.
176.  See  R.H.  COASE,  THE  FIRM,  THE  MARKET,  AND  THE  LAW  10  (1988)  ("When  the
physical facilities  [of markets]  are scattered  and  owned  by  a  vast  number  of people  with very
different  interests,  as  is  the  case  with  retailing  and  wholesaling,  the  establishment  and
administration  of a private legal system would be  very  difficult. Those operating  in these markets
have to depend, therefore,  on the  legal system of the State."  (footnote omitted)).
177.  Take  the  example  of  lighthouses,  the  classic  public  good.  Though  they  have  been
provided  by  private  entities  as  well  as  by  the  government,  see  R.H.  Coase,  The Lighthouse in
Economics,  17  J.L.  &  ECON.  357  (1974),  all  known  examples  of private  lighthouses  have
involved at a minimum government enforcement of monopoly charters and fixing of rates, as well
as government  enforcement of property and contract rights. See David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons
of the Lighthouse: "Government" or "Private" Provision of Goods, 22 J.  LEGAL  STUD. 47,  56
(1993).
178.  Baird  &  Jackson,  supra  note  117,  at  303-04  (tioting  that  "[fliling  systems  are
not...  equally suited  to all  kinds of property,"  and that filing systems are better  than possessory
systems  when the property  is not transferred often,  when it is valuable, when shared ownership  is
important,  when  physical  use  is key,  or when  the  right is abstract  and  unembodied;  immobility
and permanence  are also conducive to filing).
179.  Cf.  ROBERT  C.  ELLICKSON,  ORDER  WITHOUT  LAW:  How  NEIGHBORS  SETTrLE
DISPUTES  177-82  (1991)  (documenting  deviations  between  the  law  on the  books  and  informal
norms enforced  by  neighbors  in  close-knit  communities);  Terry  L.  Anderson  &  P.J.  Hill,  The
Evolution of Property Rights: A  Study of the American  West,  18 J.L. & ECON.  163,  173  (1975)
(suggesting that the branding  of livestock was  initially introduced  informally  and was  only  later
recognized  by  legislation).  In  one  well-studied  example,  mining  camps  in  the  Gold  Rush,  it
appears  that private  provision  of property  rights  was feasible  but left  so  much  to be desired  that
government aid was eventually sought. GARY D. LIBECAP,  CONTRACTING  FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
37-47 (1989)  (documenting how  the insecurity of privately provided property  rights among early
Nevada  miners  led  miners  to seek  the  involvement  of government  in  securing  rights);  JOHN  R.
UMBECK,  A THEORY OF PROPERTY  RIGHTS WITH  APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA  GOLD RUSH
36, 85, 91-94, 99-103,  119,  126-27 (1981).The Numerus Clausus Principle
the remaining  confusion  and the legal intervention  needed  to support  it.18°
If,  as  we  argue,  the  frustration  costs  from  a  fairly  severe  degree  of
standardization  through  the  numerus clausus are  not that  large,18'  there  is
little reason to think  that private standards  will be more cost-effective  than
those  supplied  by the government.  Moreover,  if one  set  of basic  building
blocks will do for most purposes, government provision of such a system is
likely  to  be characterized  by  significant economies  of  scale and  scope.' 2
Setting up the system of property rights involves proportionately large fixed
costs compared to the marginal  administrative  cost of extending the rights'
application  to  more  individuals,  making  jurisdiction-wide  application
attractive. The  state as the  enforcer of property rights  also probably enjoys
an  advantage  in  delineating  the  basic  forms  of property  rights:  From  the
point  of  view  of  the  supplier,  enforcing  and  defining  basic  forms  of
property  rights are likely to be complementary  activities.
Finally,  indirect  empirical  evidence  points  to  the  superiority  of  the
numerus clausus as a standardization  device. Throughout  history and across
numerous  legal systems,  the provision  of standards  for the basic  building
blocks  of the property  system has  been  largely  a government  affair.  The
fact that the numerus clausus is so widespread and enduring, is so pervasive
within  each  system,  and  is  otherwise  quite puzzling  from  a  contractarian
point  of  view,  suggests  that  it  has  inherent  advantages  for  solving  the
standardization  problem that are not easily replicated by private ordering.
B.  The Antifragmentation Objection
It has  become common to regard property law as  serving  a function  of
policing  against  excessive  fragmentation.I 8 3  This  view  has  recently  been
180.  In terms of Figures 2 and 3, the number of forms (p)  probably correlates with how likely
private provision of forms will be. Because they  provide the  largest marginal benefit  at the lowest
marginal cost, simple rights with wide  application  will be  chosen  first (to the left in the figures)
and  then  more  complex,  less-widely  used  forms  (toward  the  right  in  the  figures).  With  the
simplest and  most-widely  used forms,  the  innovation  and  flexibility  of private  provision  is  less
likely to provide a large (or any) advantage over government supply of forms.
181.  See supra Section  II.B,  in  which we discuss the  features  of the property system and of
natural language that allow  the achievement of complexity with simple  forms.
182.  Cf. Alan  Schwartz, Proposals  for Products Liability Reform: A  Theoretical Synthesis,
97  YALE L.J. 353,  389  (1988)  (mentioning  economies  of scale  that give  administrative agencies
an advantage  over courts and juries in devising good safety regulations).
183.  E.g.,  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW  559-60  (5th  ed.  1998)
(stating that  a rule forbidding  restraints on alienation "reduces  transaction costs, because  restraints
on alienation,  like rights of first refusal,  create in effect divided ownership, thereby increasing  the
number of parties  whose  agreement must be obtained  before  property  can be transferred");  see,
e.g.,  Heller,  supra note  12;  Clifford  G.  Holdemess,  A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14  J.
LEGAL  STUD.  321  (1985);  Frank I. Michelman,  Ethics, Economics, and the Law  of Property,  in
NOMOS  XXIV:  ETHICS,  ECONOMICS,  AND  THE LAW  3,  15  (1982);  Reichman,  supra note 62,  at
1233; Rudden,  supra note  3, at 259; Stake, supra note  118,  at 718-20; Stewart E.  Sterk, Freedom
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elaborated  by Michael  Heller,  who has  coined the term "anticommons"  to
describe  the  potential  problem.18 The  basic  point  is  that  if ownership  of
resources  becomes  excessively  fragmented,  it  will  become  difficult  or
impossible  to  reach  the  unanimous  consent  among  all  stakeholders
necessary  to  put the property  to productive  uses.  We  have  already  noted
that Holmes, in Johnson v.  Whiton, appeared  to view the numerus clausus
as a  doctrine designed  to prevent undue  restraints  on alienation-a  theory
that  implicitly  rests  on  concern  about  fragmentation.85  Heller  has  also
recently  cited  the numerus clausus as  an example  of a property  principle
that  works  to  minimize  fragmentation,  thus  making  the  antifragmentation
argument explicit.
86
Viewed  as an antifragmentation  regime,  however, the numerus clausus
has a very curious quality; namely, it prohibits some kinds of fragmentation
but  is  highly  tolerant  of others.  Parties  are  allowed  even  in  the  area  of
personal  property to fragment  their  interests: With  respect to a  watch, one
can  have  an  unlimited  number  of  co-owners  with  present  possessory
interests  (whether  or  not exercised).8 7  Thus, when  it comes to division  of
the watch  among co-owners,  the law does not prevent  an anticommons  but
rather  leaves  it  up  to parties  to  choose  the  degree  of fragmentation  they
wish, and to bear  the  costs of any  mistakes they  might make.  Even  more
fragmentation  is  allowed  in  real  property.  Indeed,  from  an
antifragmentation  or anticommons  point of view, the  size of parcels or the
number of co-owners generate  the most pressing problems,  and yet the law
does  not directly  limit this type  of fragmentation.  Instead,  it places  a limit
on the  number  of types of interests rather  than  on the number  of interest
holders.
Not  only  does  the numerus clausus tolerate  much  fragmentation,  the
principle's  operation  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  less  fragmentation.  For
example,  the law construes  a "lease  for  life"  to be either a life  estate  or a
tenancy  at  will.'  But  neither  outcome  reduces  the  number  of  holders.
Many  applications  of  the  numerus  clausus  do  not  result  in  fewer
rightholders, making  the  doctrine difficult to view  as an  antifragmentation
device.
from Freedom of Contract:  The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions,  70  IOWA L. REV.  615,
619-20, 624-34 (1985).
184.  Heller, supra note  12; Michael A.  Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition  from Marx to Markets, 11l  HARv. L. REv. 621  (1998).
185.  See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
186.  Heller, supra note  12, at  1176-78.
187.  Supra  Subsection  11.B.4  (noting  that  concurrent  interests  in  personal  property  are
permitted).
188.  Supra notes  87-92  and  accompanying  text.  As  previously  noted,  the  invocation of the
numerus clausus in Johnson v.  Whiton did not  necessarily  reduce  fragmentation,  because Royal
Whiton  could  have  chosen  a permissible  form  for the  conveyance  that would have  produced  a
significant number of dispersed interest holders.  Supra notes 100-101  and accompanying  text.
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Moreover,  the  problem  of  fragmentation  is  addressed  much  more
directly through other legal  doctrines  besides the numerus clausus. Even if
a public  remedy for "excessive"  fragmentation  of property  rights (caused
by, say,  individuals'  limited  foresight) were  not worse  than  the disease,8 9
the action for partition,  adverse  possession,  the Rule Against Perpetuities,
recording acts, doctrines of changed conditions,  the government's power of
eminent  domain,  and  the  like  appear  to  be  much  more  direct  and  cost-
effective methods  of preventing  excess fragmentation  of property  rights."9
Compared  to  these  devices,  the  numerus clausus does  relatively  little  to
limit excessive fragmentation.
Simply pointing  out that  a rule has the effect of limiting  fragmentation
to  some  degree  is  not enough  to provide  a  persuasive  explanation  for  its
existence.  A  doctrine  that aims  at  standardizing  property  rights  rules  out
many kinds of rights, and some of these are characterized  by fragmentation,
in  the  sense  of  divided  ownership.  But  the  anticommons  or  anti-
fragmentarian  view  cannot  explain  why  the law  leaves  the  fragmentation
decision to  parties  in  many  cases,  uses  mild  devices  to  limit  interests  in
others, and imposes strong standardization in yet other cases.
Our  focus  on  the  information  costs  incurred  by  other  market
participants  is  distinct  from  the concern  with  excessive  fragmentation  of
property  rights,  and,  we  believe,  provides  a  better  explanation  for  the
persistence  of  standardization  of property  forms.  Viewing  the  numerus
clausus as a standardization  device  allows  us to explain why  it mandates a
limited  number  of legal  forms,  which  are  harder  to process  than physical
189.  Cognitive  biases  lead  to  errors  that  are  sometimes  said  to  be  inconsistent  with
rationality;  controversy  has  centered  on  whether  the  cognitive  biases  claimed  in  behavioral
decision theory (BDT) really do violate  probability  theory  and whether the heuristics that lead  to
cognitive  biases  are  explanatory.  Compare  Daniel  Kahneman  &  Amos  Tversky,  On  the
Psychology of Prediction, in  JUDGMENT  UNDER  UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS  AND  BIASES  48
(Daniel  Kahneman  et  al.  eds.,  1982)  (overweighting  of recent  data in  making  judgments  and
forecasts),  Lee  Ross  &  Craig  A.  Anderson,  Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On  the
Origins  and Maintenance  of Erroneous  Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,
supra, at  129  (optimism  bias),  and Daniel  Kahneman  &  Amos  Tversky,  On  the  Reality of
Cognitive Illusions: A Reply  to Gigerenzer's Critique, 103  PSYCHOL.  REV.  582  (1996)  (arguing
that  conditions  leading  to  cognitive  error  are  being  identified),  with  Jonathan  L.  Cohen,  Can
Human Irrationality  Be Experimentally Demonstrated?,  4 BEHAV.  & BRAIN  SCI.  317, 317  (1981)
(disputing  that BDT experiments establish that subjects commit fallacies),  Gerd Gigerenzer, How
To  Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear:  Beyond  "Heuristics and Biases,"  2  EUR.  REV.  SOC.
PSYCHOL.  83,  86-101  (1991)  (arguing  that phenomena  attributed to cognitive  bias in BDT do not
actually  violate  probability  theory),  and  Gerd  Gigerenzer,  On  Narrow Norms  and  Vague
Heuristics:  A  Reply to Kahneman and Tversky,  103  PSYCHOL.  REV.  592, 592-95  (1996)  (arguing
that some heuristics  have  little  explanatory  power).  But  to be  inefficient  in  a  sense  relevant  to
policy,  there  must be  an ex  ante or ex post method  that  improves  outcomes  more than it incurs
costs (including the costs of officials'  own cognitive  biases). See LIEBOWITZ  & MARGOLIS,  supra
note  163,  at 49-56  (describing different  degrees of path  dependence  and  arguing  that a  lack  of
cost-effective avoidance  mechanisms will make an inefficiency illusory).
190.  We leave  it  open  which  of these  doctrines  is  better  at  dealing with  improvidence  or
excessively fragmented rights. Our only point is that these doctrines  would address  such problems
more directly and at less cost than would the numerus clausus principle.
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attributes,  and so  are  more  in  need  of standardization.'9'  A concern  with
types of interests  is just what  we expect  if we view the  numerus clausus as
addressed  to  information  costs:  Proliferation  of types  of  property  rights
leads to third-party  information costs and suboptimal standardization.
C.  The Irrelevance  Objection
A  final  potential  objection  to our  theory  is that  although  the numerus
clausus is a feature of traditional  forms of property  such  as estates  in land,
it  is  for  practical  purposes  irrelevant  in  the  modern  world,  given  the
emergence of new forms of organizational  ownership  based  on contract. 192
Contract,  the  objection  would  run,  has  in  effect  superseded  property.
Contract  rights are  now  generally  freely  assignable,  giving  such  rights the
kind  of  transferability  traditionally  associated  with  property.  Moreover,
most  resources  today  are  controlled  by  legal  entities  organized  around  a
nexus  of  contracts,  such  as  trusts,  partnerships,  and  corporations.  Using
contracts, contract assignments,  and these organizational forms,  individuals
can hold resources  in any form they wish, rendering the traditional boxes of
property a quaint anachronism.
We  do  not  dispute  the  importance  of  assignable  contracts  and  of
organizational  forms  of  ownership,  and  we  readily  concede  that  these
developments  have  greatly  enhanced  the flexibility  with  which  resources
can be  deployed. 1 93 But  as we  see  it, these developments  do not supersede
the standardization associated with basic property  forms, nor do they render
the numerus clausus irrelevant.  Rather,  modern  organizational  forms build
up from  and  are  dependent  on  the foundation  established  by the  numerus
clausus.
First, consider assignable contracts. Contract rights today can generally
be assigned, subject to limitations that protect the original parties. 94 And in
many  transactional  settings,  complex  assignment  clauses  might  be  an
acceptable  substitute  for  property  rights.  With  respect  to  servitudes,  for
example,  if  a real  estate  developer  wants  to  assure  that  all  houses  in  a
subdivision  are painted  beige,  one can  imagine doing  this either with  real
covenants  incorporated  into  the  deeds  (the  property  solution),  or  by
executing  contracts  with  the  original  purchasers  that  mandate  that  the
contract  be assigned to all  subsequent purchasers  (and that all  assignments
contain  mandatory  assignment  clauses,  in  infinite  regress).  But  property
191.  Supra note  130 and accompanying text.
192.  Rudden, supra note 3, at 253-54, appears  to subscribe to this objection. Supra note  147.
193.  See supra notes 134-135,  161,  167-169, and accompanying text.
194.  Eg.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  CONTRACTS  §§  317-18,  324,  331,  334,  340-42
(1981);  4  ARTHUR  LINTON  CORBIN,  CORBIN  ON  CONTRACTS  §  874-91  (1951  &  Supp.  1999);
E. ALLAN  FARNSWORTH,  CONTRACTS  §§  11.4-.5 (3d ed.  1999).
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rights are  in rem-they serve not only  to bind successors  in interest but the
whole world. One can perhaps  use contracts to bind successors in interest to
paint  a house beige, but it is  not practical  to use contracts to  bind the whole
world  not  to  commit  trespasses  or  nuisances  on  the  property.195  In  rem
rights provide protection  against in personam harms, but it  is not practical
to  create  an  in rem right  by  bundling together  myriad  in personam  rights
that  have  been  individually  negotiated  with  every  potential  wrongdoer. 96
Thus,  in  many  contexts  transaction  costs  will  prevent  contracts  from
serving as an effective substitute for property rights.
Moreover,  contract  assignment  builds  on  the most  basic  standardized
unit of ownership established by property  law. By  and large, only one type
of  assignment  is  permitted:  The  assignee  steps  into  the  shoes  of  the
assignor."'  In effect, only  "full  ownership"  of the right can be  assigned  if
the assignment is to be treated  as resulting in an enforceable  interest in  the
assignee."'  Complex  estates in  contract rights-such  as future  interests-
do not  seem to exist. As between  the parties  themselves,  little is  frustrated
by  limiting  assignments  to  a  fee  simple-like  estate;  by  contrast,
standardizing  the contract rights themselves  might lower information  costs
a little but would entail high frustration costs. The parties can usually  serve
their  objectives  by  tailoring  the  contract  itself,  or  entering  into  a  new
contract. But for others  processing both  the original contract  rights and  the
higher-order  rights (rights  over rights,  etc.),  it is  helpful to know that only
the terms of the agreement  need to  be processed  and that another  layer of
such complexity  can be safely ignored. Thus, contract rights themselves  can
be tailored just as a house can be custom-built,  but the way of owning it is
highly simplified to reduce information costs to third parties.
195.  Cf. Thomas  W.  Merrill,  Trespass, Nuisance and the  Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  13  (1985)  (predicting  that "mechanical"  entitlement  determination
costs will be used  to provide clear signals to  potential trespassers about  the existence of property
rights).
196.  For a related  philosophical  discussion emphasizing  the  differential knowledge required
of those  who  are bound by in rem as opposed  to in personam  rights,  see J.E.  PENNER,  THE IDEA
OF PROPERTY  IN  LAW 23-31 (1997).
197.  See, e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF CONTRACTS  §  340 (1981);  4  CORBIN,  supra note
194,  § 891; FARNSWORTH,  supra note  194, § 11.3.
198.  The common law  originally  did not  allow  assignment of contractual  rights  without the
consent of both of the original parties, but equity adopted  the modem approach of giving effect  to
present assignments as proprietary  interests and contingent  assignments as contractual  rights. See
sources  cited supra note  197; see also Law of Property  Act,  1925,  15  &  16 Geo. 5, ch.  20, § 136
(Eng.)  (requiring a whole chose in action or debt in order for assignment to be absolute); Walter &
Sullivan  Ltd. v.  J.  Murphy &  Sons Ltd.  [1955]  2  Q.13.  584 (Eng.  C.A.)  (distinguishing between
absolute  assignments  and assignments  by way  of charge  only); J.G. STARKE,  ASSIGNMENTS  OF
CHOSES  IN  ACTION  IN AUSTRALIA  6-7,  10-50  (1972)  (discussing  common-law,  equitable,  and
statutory  approaches);  Thomas  W.  Albrecht  & Sarah  J.  Smith,  Corporate Loan Securitization:
Selected Legal and Regulatory Issues, 8 DUKE  J. COMP.  & INT'L L. 411,  433 & nn.90-93  (1998)
(summarizing  the  pertinent  English  common-law  and  statutory  history).  Indeed,  in  contingent
assignments, an  assignment can  lead to contractual rights  over proprietary  rights in a contractual
right.
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That contract law falls on the less-standardized end of the spectrum can
be  captured  in  the  simple  model  we  used  above.  Recall  that,  when  we
modeled  the  number  of property  forms  as  a  tradeoff  between  definition
costs  and savings  in frustration  costs,  we noted  that property  systems  start
with the  simplest and most-widely  used  forms and add  more complex  and
specialized forms as the number of allowed forms increases.  Now consider
contractual  forms.  Here  too  we  can  arrange  the  forms  along  a  spectrum
from most to least-widely  used, but here, limiting the forms is likely to lead
to  greater  marginal  frustration  costs  than  in  the case  of property  forms.'99
This  can  be  illustrated  as  in  Figure  4.  (We  assume  for  expositional
simplicity  that the marginal  costs  of measuring property  rights, M , equals
the  marginal  costs  of  measuring  contract  rights,  M;  this  assumption  is
unlikely  to  change  the  analysis  because,  if  anything,  M  is  likely  to  be
lower.)
FIGURE 4. OPTIMAL NUMBER OF FORMS
$MP=  Me
TP
0  p*  c*  Q
Number of Forms
MP  = marginal cost of measuring  property rights
MC = marginal cost of measuring  contract rights
FP = marginal benefit of property forms  in reducing frustration of objectives
FC = marginal benefit of contract forms in reducing frustration of objectives
199.  Our claim is that  a hypothetical numerus clausus-like limited set of ways of contracting
(making  enforceable  agreements)  would  be  unlikely  to  function  like  the  building  blocks  of
property  in  being  easy  to  combine  and  so  accomplish  a  wide  range  of objectives.  That  is,
standardizing  the  dimensions  along  which  contracts  can  vary  would  have  an  effect  like
standardizing  the  dimensions  of property-such  as  physical  dimensions  and  legal  conditions-
that are currently  not standardized. See supra note 46.
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Because  the  addition  of  allowable  contract  forms  saves  more  in
frustration costs than  does the addition of more property forms, the FC curve
lies above  the F  curve, with  the result that the optimal  number of allowed
contract forms is  greater  than the  optimal  number of property  forms. That
is, contract should be (and is) less standardized than is property law.
Organizational  forms  like  trusts  are  also  dependent  on  the  building
blocks of the common law.  Legal  title to trust property  is typically held in
fee simple, while the equitable interests of the beneficiaries  are described in
terms  of the common-law  estates  in land.2"  This  permits  resources  to be
managed for the benefit of one or  more beneficiaries  with far lower third-
party information costs than would otherwise be the case. The corpus  of the
trust  can  be  bought  and  sold,  invested  and  reinvested,  leased  and
mortgaged, in the sound discretion of the trustee as  if the property  were an
undivided  fee  simple.  The  complexities  of  dividing  the  fruits  of  these
efforts  among  different generations  and  classes  need not trouble  the  third
parties  who  deal  with  the trustee  in  the management  of  the trust corpus.
Dividing  the  fruits  is  a  concern  only  of the  settlor,  the  trustee,  and  the
beneficiaries.  And  to  the  extent  that  courts,  creditors,  and  others  must
measure  the different beneficial  interests, the fact that they  are described in
the vocabulary of common-law estates in land reduces  the information costs
associated with this exercise.
We  also suspect,  although  the point  takes us beyond  the  scope  of this
Article, that a close look at various contractual and contract-based solutions
to  the control  of resources  would reveal  that  contract  law takes on  a more
standardized,  that  is,  more  numerus clausus-like quality,  the  more  third
parties enter into  the  picture. Consider  the problem of the faithless  bailee
who transfers  property  to a  third-party  purchaser  for  value.  The  Uniform
Commercial  Code  (U.C.C.)  adopts  a  standardized  rule  in  this  situation,
allowing  those  who  purchase  entrusted  goods  in  the  ordinary  course  of
business to obtain good title if they  lack knowledge  of the bailor's superior
claim of  title.2"'  Analogous  points  can  be  made  about  security  interests.
Security interests are created by contract, but they bind third parties without
notice  only  if  strict  filing  or  recording  requirements  are  met.2 02  And  a
similar  story  can  be  told  about  organizational  forms  of  ownership,  like
trusts. As between  the grantor,  the trustee,  and the beneficiaries,  all  rights
200.  PAUL G. HASKELL,  PREFACE TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 2-3 (1975).
201.  U.C.C.  §  2-403(1)  to  (2)  (1998).  The  general  problem  is  considered  in  Richard  A.
Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract  as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16  J.  LEGAL
STUD.  1, 10-15 (1987);  and Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-
Faith  Purchaser,  16 J. LEGAL  STUD. 43, 59-60 (1987).
202.  U.C.C. § 9-307  (1997).
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and  duties could be replicated  by contract."3 But as Henry  Hansmann  and
Ugo Mattei  have pointed  out, trust law  performs a unique  function,  which
cannot  be  replicated  by  contract,  in  reorganizing  the  "rights  and
responsibilities between the three principal  parties and third parties,  such as
creditors,  with  whom the  principals  deal."  "  The fact  that the trust draws
upon the building blocks  of common-law  property also serves  to lower the
costs to strangers of avoiding violations of the rights involved. 5
That  contractual  institutions  turn  to  standardized  terms  when  third
parties enter  the picture  suggests  that the  story  of optimal  standardization
we  outlined in  Part III  operates  not  only where  traditional  property  rights
are  involved,  but  also  with  respect  to  institutions  grounded  in  contract.
Thus,  even  in  a  hypothetical  world  in  which  property  rights  had  been
rendered  irrelevant  by  contract rights, the  resulting  contract-based  regime
would  contain  features  that  mirror,  at  least  to  a  significant  degree,  the
optimal  standardization  that the numerus clausus promotes  with  respect to
property.
V. THE NUMER US CLA USUS AND INSTITUTIONAL  CHOICE
The numerus clausus also has important implications for the division  of
authority  between  courts  and  legislatures  with  respect  to  changes  in  the
structure of property rights. By limiting courts  to enforcing the status quo in
terms  of  recognized  property  interests,  the  numerus  clausus makes  the
courts  an inhospitable  forum for modifying  existing  forms  of property  or
creating new ones. Consequently,  parties who wish to secure changes in the
pattern  of  available  property  rights  must  look  elsewhere-most
prominently,  to the legislature.  In  this part, we  argue  that the  institutional-
choice  dimension  of the  numerus clausus is  closely  related  to  the  basic
functional explanation for standardization of property rights set forth in Part
III: For  a variety of reasons, legislated  changes  in property forms produce
information  to  third parties at  less  cost  than judicially  mandated  changes.
Standing  alone,  this  consideration  does  not  establish  that  legislated  rule
change  is superior  to judicial  rule  change.  But  it  helps  explain  why  the
numerus clausus-understood  in  this context  to  mean  a  significant degree
203.  See Langbein,  Contractarian  Basis, supra note 65,  at 650 (discussing the default  nature
of trust law in  which "[tlhe  rules of trust law  apply only when the  trust instrument does not supply
contrary terms"  (citing RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  §  164(a) (1959))).
204.  Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 15,  at 472.
205.  The standardization  in each of the examples  in this paragraph  reduces the  costs of notice
to third parties about the identity  and the assets of the party with  whom  the third party is dealing.
This is different  from the standardization  of property forms  required by the numerus clausus. Our
point  is that  the underlying  information-cost  economics  driving  each  type of standardization  is
similar.
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of judicial  conservatism  regarding  innovation  in  the  system  of  property
rights-is a universal feature of modem legal systems.
A.  The Numerus Clausus and the Source of Legal Change
The  strength  of  judicial  adherence  to  the  numerus  clausus  helps
determine which institution in society will effect  changes in the structure of
property  rights.  The numerus clausus requires  courts to  respect  the  status
quo with respect to the menu  of available property rights. Thus, the stronger
the judicial  fidelity  to  the  numerus clausus, the  greater  the  necessity  of
turning  to  other  sources  to  secure  modifications  in  property  rights.  In
theory,  one  option  is  to  turn  to  private  ordering.  For  reasons  previously
recited,  however,  this  option  is  unlikely  to be  useful  in  most  contexts.  If
private  institutions  cannot  certify  the  standardization  of  basic  property
interests," 6 it is unlikely that they can be used to eliminate existing forms or
introduce new ones. The only plausible alternative to the courts as agents of
legal reform in this context is the legislature.
The  institutional-choice  function  of the  numerus clausus can  be  seen
most  starkly  in  the  civil-law  countries,  where  the  principle  is  expressly
recognized  to be a central  tenet of the code  and is  enforced quite  strictly.2"7
One  consequence  has  been  that  some  of  the  forms  of  property  that
common-law  lawyers take for granted do not exist, at least in general form,
in the civil law. The most dramatic example is the trust."8 Trusts have been
viewed  by  civil-law  courts  as  a novel  type of  property  outside  the  list  of
forms  recognized  by  the  code.  Consequently,  trusts  are  not  permitted  as
such.  The result, not  surprisingly,  is that the civilians  have been  forced  to
rely  on  a  variety  of  substitutes  for  the  trust,  most  of  them  specifically
authorized by legislation.2"
In England,  where the numerus clausus is not recognized  by name but
where  the  courts  exhibit a  general  conservatism  analogous  to  that  which
characterizes  civil-law  courts,210  the  "unwritten"  rule  of  the  numerus
clausus  has  had  a  similar  effect.  Notwithstanding  Tulk  v.  Moxhay,"
English courts  have  generally  declined to create  new  property  forms.  The
result, predictably, has been that nearly all changes in the forms of property
206.  Supra Subsection IV.A.3.
207.  Supra notes  6-9 and accompanying  text.
208.  See Hansmann  & Mattei,  supra note  15,  at 440-45;  Vera Bolgr,  Comment, Why  No
Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 AM.  J. COMP. L. 204 (1953).
209.  Hansmann & Mattei,  supra note  15, at 442-44; Pierre Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for
Trusts, 36 YALE L.J. 1126 (1927).
210.  P.S.  ATIYAH  & ROBERT  S.  SUMMERS,  FORM  AND  SUBSTANCE  IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW:  A  COMPARATIVE  STUDY  OF  LEGAL  REASONING,  LEGAL  THEORY,  AND  LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS  88-93,  118-27,  134-41,  411-15  (1987);  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  LAW  AND  LEGAL
THEORY  IN  ENGLAND  AND AMERICA 20-37  (1996).
211.  41 Eng. Rep.  1143  (Ch.  1848); see also supra note  59 and accompanying  text.
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interests  have been  achieved through parliamentary  action.  As Holdsworth
observed:  "[T]he  Legislature  has had a larger share in shaping  the land law
than it has had in  shaping any other branch of private law."  12 For example,
there is  no judicially crafted action  for misappropriation  of information or
judicially developed right of publicity in U.K. law.213
Although the U.S. courts are  far more  adventuresome  than either civil-
law  courts  or  English  courts,  the  de  facto  recognition  of  the  numerus
clausus has also had a significant  impact in channeling  reform of property
rights to legislatures  in this country.  A  number of examples are  canvassed
in Part  II.  The abolition of the fee tail,  dower and curtesy,  the tenancy  by
the entirety, and the tenancy  in partnership have been  accomplished  in  this
country by legislation,  not by courts. And the creation of new interests  such
as  condominiums  and  time-shares  has  also  been  accomplished  through
legislative action rather than judicial  rulings. The fact  that it is  possible to
cite counterexamples  in the U.S.  context,  such  as the  development  of the
action for misappropriation of information and the right of publicity, simply
attests  to  the reality that the numerus clausus is  a  weaker doctrine  in U.S.
courts, both in terms of express judicial recognition and in terms of judicial
behavior. Because  the  doctrine  is weaker,  predictably  it  acts  more weakly
as  an  institutional  choice  mechanism  in  the  United  States  than  in  other
countries  where the doctrine  is stronger.
B.  The Consequences of  Making Legislatures the Agents of Change
Traditional  law-and-economics  scholars  may  regard  the  institutional-
choice dimension  of the numerus clausus as unfortunate.  One of the tenets
of early  law-and-economics  literature  was that common-law  rules are  more
likely  to be  efficient  than  are  legislated  rules. 214  A  central  reason  for  this
assumption is that legislatures  were regarded as being dominated by interest
groups with  narrow  distributional  objectives,  whereas  common-law  courts
were  regarded  as  being  immune  from  this type  of distortion. 2  Scholars
who  continue  to  share  these  assumptions  may  regard  as  pernicious  a
doctrine  that freezes  further development  of property  forms  by courts  and
212.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note  148,  at 325.
213.  JON HOLYOAK & PAUL TORREMANS,  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY LAW  339-72,  381-411
(1995)  (describing  common-law  doctrines  recognized  by  English  courts  as  supplementing
statutory intellectual  property  rights, not mentioning either misappropriation  of information or the
right of publicity).
214.  For  citation  to  the  relevant  authorities  and  critical  discussion,  see  DONALD  A.
WrrTMAN,  THE  MYTH  OF  DEMOCRATIC  FAILURE:  WHY  POLITICAL  INSTITUTIONS  ARE
EFFICIENT 116  (1995);  Frank B.  Cross,  The Judiciary  and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS  L.J.  355,
358-60 (1999);  and Eric A.  Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144  U.  PA.  L. REv.
1697 (1996).
215.  Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial  Review?,
101 YALEL.J.  31  (1991).
[Vol.  I110: 1The Numerus Clausus  Principle
allocates all legal change to the legislature. The numerus clausus from this
perspective  would  appear  to  consign  questions  about  the  design  of the
property-rights  system  to  the  institution  least  likely  to  be  motivated  by
concerns  with economic efficiency.
Yet  if  we  put  aside  for  the  moment  concerns  about  the  possible
distortions  of the  legislative process associated with interest-group activity,
there  are  a  number of features  of legislative  decisionmaking  that  make  it
relatively more  attractive than common-law  decisionmaking  as  a basis  for
modifying or creating categories of property rights. 216  These features can be
summarized under the  headings of clarity, universality,  comprehensiveness,
stability, prospectivity,  and implicit  compensation. 2 17 Significantly,  each  of
these  features  also bears  on  the  explanation  for  the  numerus clausus we
develop in Part HI-that it is designed to reduce the costs to third parties  of
identifying  the  legal  dimensions  of  property  rights.  Because  of  these
features  of  legislated  change,  it  is  possible  that  the  advantages  of  the
numerus  clausus  as  a  rule  of  institutional  choice  may  offset  or  even
outweigh  the  detriments  traditionally"  associated  with  legislative
decisionmaking.
1.  Clarity
Legislated  rule  changes  are  more  apt  to be  identified  as  such  by  the
community than are common-law  rule changes. This is largely a function of
the  form  in  which  new  rules  appear.  Legislated  rules  are  set  forth  in  a
canonical  text  which  is  easy  to  identify  and  usually  terse.  Common-law
rules, by contrast, often  evolve  incrementally  through  a series of decisions
over time. Moreover, they must be teased out of court opinions, which often
contain numerous qualifications, alternative holdings,  dicta, concurring  and
dissenting  opinions,  and  so  forth. 218  Thus,  informational  intermediaries,
such as  lawyers,  realtors, lenders,  title  insurers,  and  trade  associations,  are
apt to grasp and disseminate information  about a rule change more quickly
and confidently when the change comes about through legislation.
216.  For a different  view  of the  relative  merits  of judicial  and  legislative  modifications  of
property forms, see  Anthony Scott, Property Rights and Property  Wrongs, 16 CAN.  J. ECON.  555
(1983).  Scott  notes  the  standardized  nature  of  property  rights  in  the  course  of discussing  the
relative  merits  of litigation  and  legislation  as  vehicles  for  the  evolution  of property  rights.  He
reaches  no  firm  conclusions  about  which  institution is  to be  preferred,  although  he  identifies  a
number of variables that are relevant in making the comparison, Id.
217.  Cf  NEIL  K.  KOMESAR,  IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS  IN LAW,
ECONOMICS,  AND PUBLIC POLICY  (1994)  (presenting a theory  of comparative  institutional  choice
centered on  bias and expertise).
218.  3 JOHN  AUSTIN, LECTURES  ON  JURISPRUDENCE  50,  52-53, 649 (London,  John  Murray
2d ed.  1863); cf David  L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Administrative Policy, 78  HARV.  L.  REv.  921,  941  (1965)  (noting  that  when  rules  have
developed through adjudication,  "even  experienced practitioners may be hard put to state the rule
accurately").
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This feature of legislated rule change has, of course, a direct bearing on
the function  of providing information  to other market participants  about the
dimensions  of property  rights. To the  extent that  legislated rules  are  more
visible than decisional rules, they  will come to the attention of other market
participants more quickly and at lower cost than will decisional rules. Thus,
the  institutional-choice  dimension  of  the  numerus clausus reinforces  the
basic  function of the principle:  to  reduce information costs to other market
participants.
2.  Universality
Legislated  rules  are almost  by  definition universal  in their  application
throughout the jurisdiction.  A change wrought  by  the  legislature  therefore
has an unambiguous domain. A new rule legislated by the Congress  applies
throughout  the  United  States;  a  new  rule  adopted  by  a  state  legislature
applies throughout  the state.  Judge-made rules,  in contrast,  often  have  an
ambiguous  domain. Decisions by intermediate  courts of appeal are binding
in only  one district in a given political jurisdiction, and may or may not be
followed  by  courts  in other districts.  In  addition,  decisional  rules  may  be
limited  by  their  terms  to  certain  categories  of  parties  or  certain  factual
situations,  with  clarification  of the  scope of the rule left to  be resolved by
future  decisions.  Thus,  the  implementation  of  a  new  rule  by  judicial
decision is likely to occur in a piecemeal fashion.
The  lack  of  universality  associated  with  common-law  rules  also
increases  the costs to other market participants  of ascertaining  the rule and
comprehending  the  meaning  of  the  rule  for  their  circumstances.  This  is
particularly  true  in  the  case  of  entities  that  do  business  in  different
jurisdictions  or in different  locations within jurisdictions.  Presumably,  this
is  a main  reason  why  intellectual  property  rights  in  the  United  States  are
typically governed  by  federal rather  than  state  law:2"9 Intellectual  property
rights are distributed in many different  states, making a uniform federal rule
easier to comprehend  and enforce.  This feature  of legislated rules dovetails
with the basic purpose of the numerus clausus.
3.  Comprehensiveness
Any creation  of a new  form of property  raises  a number of questions:
What is  the range  of interests  encompassed  by  the form?  Is  there  a  time
limit on rights that  come within  the terms  of the form?  Who is eligible  to
hold  one  of the  interests  covered  by  the  form?  What  is  the  remedy  for
violation  of a  right  protected  by the form?  When  does  the  change  in  the
219.  See supra note 70.
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form  take  effect?  Similarly,  any  abolition  of  a  form  of  property  raises
multiple  questions:  When  does  the  abolition  take  effect?  Are  existing
holders  to be  grandfathered  in  or given  other  types  of transitional  relief?
What, if anything,  will be  used in replacement of the  deleted form? Courts
are  at  a  great  disadvantage  in  addressing  these  multiple  issues
comprehensively. 22 0  Courts are limited to deciding  specific issues presented
by adverse parties in the discrete cases that come before them. It might take
years  or  even  decades  to  flesh  out  all  the  dimensions  of  a  particular
modification  or  creation  of  a  form  of  property  through  common-law
adjudication.  In  contrast, legislatures  can  and do typically address all these
issues comprehensively  in a single piece of legislation.
The greater comprehensiveness  of legislated  rules is also relevant to the
information  costs  associated  with rules  and  rule  change.  It  is  cheaper  to
gather  the  needed  information  about  all  the  dimensions  of  a  rule  if it  is
assembled  in  a single  place and at  a single time than if it is  scattered  over
multiple authorities that date from different points in time.
4.  Stability
Legislative  adoption  of  property  forms  and  legislated  changes  in
property forms are also more likely to be stable than are common-law rules.
The  principle  reason  for  this  is  that  "legislative  production  [is]  an
extremely  expensive  form  of  production. 22'  It  is  almost  certainly  more
expensive  in the typical  case to procure a legislated change  in rules than  it
is to finance litigation designed to achieve a modification in legal rules.22  If
the legislature  is the only  forum  for procuring  changes  in  rules,  the  very
expense  of  securing  such  changes  tightly  rations  the  amount  of  reform.
Fewer reforms translates into greater stability in the dimensions of property
rights.
A second reason why legislated rules are likely to be more stable relates
again  to the fact that judicial rules  typically emerge  piecemeal  over  time.
The  composition  of the judiciary  is likely  to change  from  one decision  to
the next, especially if the court operates through panels  of judges who are a
subset of the full  court and are selected  at random.  Thus, the policy views
of the  judges  may  shift  between  the  first  decision  indicating  that a  rule
change  is  appropriate  to  subsequent  decisions  filling  out the  details.  The
220.  This  was  essentially  Justice  Brandeis's  argument for  allowing  legislatures  to develop
new  forms of intellectual  property  rights.  Int'l  News  Scrv.  v.  Assoc.  Press, 248  U.S.  215,  263
(1918)  (Brandeis, J.,  dissenting).
221.  Isaac  Ehrlich  &  Richard  A.  Posner, An  Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3  J.
LEGAL  STUD. 257, 267  (1974).
222.  Thomas  W. Merrill,  Does Public Choice  Theory Justify Judicial  Activism  After All?,
21  HARV. J.L. & PUB.  POL'Y 219, 227 (1997).
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result. may  be  that the  rule  ends  up looking  different  than observers  may
have anticipated  at first.
It is easy to see how the stability of property reforms also relates  to the
theme  of reducing  information  costs  to  other  market  participants.  A  rule
that has been around  a long time and is relatively unchanging  is more likely
to be  understood because  actors  and the  informational  intermediaries  who
advise  them  are  more  apt to have  encountered  the  rule  in  the  past and  to
have made some previous investment in comprehending the rule.
5.  Prospectivity
Another advantage of legislated changes in property forms-one that in
this  case  is  less  directly  relevant  to  information  costs-is  that  legislated
changes  nearly  always operate  prospectively. 23 Legislative  abolition  of an
existing  form or creation of a new one  applies  only  going forward.  Hence
legislated changes can be tailored so as to minimize the disruptive effect to
established  reliance  interests. Judicial  changes  in  rules,  by  contrast,  apply
retroactively to the parties  in the case and to  all others who  have interests
implicated by the rule not reduced to a final judgment. 4 This is likely to be
highly  disruptive  to  existing  stakeholders.  For example,  if  the legislature
abolishes  dower  rights, it can  do so  only with respect to future widows, or
only with respect  to parties who have  not yet married.  A judicial  abolition
would  presumably  affect  widows  currently  relying  on  life  income  from
dower estates.225
The  greater  prospectivity  of legislated  changes  in  property  rights  is
relevant  primarily  to  the  level of "demoralization  costs"  associated  with
legal  change. 26  But  it  is  not  entirely  irrelevant  to  our  story  about
information  costs.  If legal  change  can  occur in  a  way  that  imposes  high
223.  See  generally DANIEL  E.  TROY,  RETROACTIVE  LEGISLATION  (1998)  (discussing
traditional  objections  to  legislative  retroactivity  and  the  presumption  in  favor  of prospective
operation  of statutes);  Jill  E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium  Approach,
110 HARV.  L. REV.  1056, 1063-66 (1997)  (discussing judicial hostility to retroactive legislation).
224.  James  B. Beam Distilling Co. v.  Georgia,  513 U.S.  106 (1995);  Harper v.  Va. Dep't of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
225.  Abolition  of dower  and curtesy by  the legislature  did in fact  give rise  to constitutional
challenges,  with  mixed results.  Compare Randall  v.  Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.)  137,  148 (1874)
(upholding the prospective abolition of the dower rights of a married woman on the ground  that it
was a "mere  expectancy  or possibility"  during  the husband's life),  with Class  v. Strack, 96 A. 405
(N.J. Ch.  1915)  (holding that a legislature  was not  free to abolish  the  dower rights of a  married
woman whose husband was  still living).
226.  See  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments  on  the Ethical
Foundations of  "Just Compensation" Law,  80  HARV.  L.  REV.  1165,  1214  (1967)  (defining
demoralization  costs as the losses  that  flow to  losers  and their sympathizers  from the  realization
that no compensation  will be offered  for  deliberate government  action  that  reduces  the  value  of
property).  See  generally William  A.  Fischel  &  Perry  Shapiro,  Takings,  Insurance,  and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17  J. LEGAL
STUD. 269 (1988)  (evaluating the meaning and  significance of demoralization costs).
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demoralization  costs on those who hold established  forms of property, then
other  market  participants  may  want  to  expend  resources  not  only
identifying  the  existing  dimensions  of  property  rights,  but  also  the
possibilities for future  changes in those dimensions.  In this fashion, a legal
regime with a higher  incidence of retroactive  changes  in property  forms-
and hence a higher incidence of demoralization costs-also is a regime that
imposes higher information-gathering costs on other market participants.
6.  Implicit Compensation
Finally, legislated  change in property forms  has the advantage  that the
legislature can devise various  means for affording implicit compensation  to
those  adversely  affected  by  the  change.27  Courts  are  at  a  much  greater
disadvantage  in  this  regard,  since  courts  will  often  not  have  the  losers
before them and  in any event are  endowed with  a limited set of options in
devising  remedies.  A  classic  illustration  of  the  ability  of  legislatures  to
afford  implicit  compensation  is  provided  by  the  abolition  of  dower  and
curtesy rights. Dower was a widow's right to a life estate in one-third of the
real  property  held  by  her  husband,  curtesy  the  widower's  right  to  a  life
estate in all  real property  held  by  his wife.228 Typically,  when these rights
were  eliminated,  the  legislature  simultaneously  adopted  a  forced  spousal
share  statute,  which  generally  afforded  the  surviving  spouse  of  either
gender  the right to  take in  fee  simple their  share of the deceased  spouse's
estate. 29  Thus,  the  forced  spousal  share  statutes  left prospective  widows
and  widowers  better  off than  they  were  with  dower  and  curtesy rights.  If
courts  were to abolish dower and curtesy  rights, they  would be at  a much
greater disadvantage  in devising a  remedy analogous  to the  forced spousal
share statutes to provide implicit compensation for the legal change.
The  greater capacity  of legislatures  to provide  implicit  compensation,
like the ability of legislatures  to make legal change prospective,  is relevant
primarily  to  the  demoralization  costs  associated  with  legal  change.  The
ability  to provide  compensation  allows  the legislature  further to  minimize
demoralization  costs  that  come  from  change  in a way  that  courts  cannot.
Again,  however,  insofar  as  legislatures  are  in  a  better  position  to  reduce
227.  Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,  99 HARV. L. REV.  509, 582-
92 (1986)  (discussing  a variety of legislative compensation  mechanisms, including  phase-ins and
grandfathering).  On  the  concept of implied  compensation,  see  RICHARD  A.  EPSTEIN,  TAKINGS:
PRIVATE  PROPERTY  AND THE  POWER  OF EMINENT  DOMAIN  195-215  (1985),  which  discusses
"implicit  in-kind compensation"  as a defense to an otherwise valid takings claim.
228.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
229.  June Carbone  & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:  Feminist  Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform,  65  TuL.  L.  REV.  953,  970  (1991);  see  also LAWRENCE  M.
FRIEDMAN,  A  HISTORY OF AMERICAN  LAW 375-76 (1973);  MARYLYNN SALMON,  WOMEN  AND
THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA  141-84 (1986).
2000]The Yale Law Journal
demoralization  costs,  they  are  also  in  a position  indirectly  to  reduce  the
need  for  other  market  participants  to  invest  resources  in  acquiring
information about  the likelihood  of future change  in the menu of property
rights.
C.  Legislated Rule Changes: The Final Balance
Even if we are correct that legislatures enjoy some inherent  advantages
over courts  in changing  property rights  in ways that lower the information
costs to other market participants, it is necessary  to weigh these advantages
against the disadvantages  of legislative rulemaking. These include the costs
of  legislative  inertia,2 30  especially  in  the  face  of problems  that  have  low
visibility  and  highly  dispersed  costs  and  benefits.  They  also  include  the
dangers emphasized in the literature on public choice, such  as interest group
domination,  cycling among  independent options,  path  dependency,  and the
like."'  The balance of merits and demerits between common-law  courts and
legislatures  obviously  entails  a complex judgment  as to which  no definite
answer can be offered. We would, however,  offer several observations  that
suggest  that  the  demerits  of  the  legislative  process  emphasized  by
supporters of common-law  courts may not loom  as large  in the context  of
reforming property regimes  as elsewhere.
First, the demerit of legislative inertia is  in  many  respects just the flip
side of the merit of stability inherent in limiting change to legislative action.
Stability  and  change  represent  well-known  tradeoffs  in  any legal  system,
and a system that scores high on stability is likely  for that very reason  to be
slow  to  change.  Thus,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  property-law  scholars
frequently complain about legislative inattention to needed reforms,  such as
simplifying the system of future  interests  or streamlining the requirements
for establishing  covenants  or servitudes  running  with  the land.232  Overall,
however,  the  legislative  record  is  not  that  bad. Forms  of  ownership  that
seriously interfere  with the free circulation of property or otherwise  outlive
their usefulness, such  as the fee tail, dower and curtesy, and the tenancy  in
partnership,  have  been  abolished  in  nearly  all  states. 233  And  where  a
significant  demand  for  a  new  form  of property  has  emerged,  as  with the
condominium  and  the time-share,  legislation  establishing  these forms  has
230.  Cf  GUIDO  CALABRESI,  A  COMMON  LAW  FOR  THE  AGE  OF  STATUTES  1-7  (1991)
(discussing the general  problems of legislative inertia).
231.  Cf.  KOMESAR,  supra note 217, at 138-42 (emphasizing  the need to compare the  superior
expertise  of legislatures against  the greater risk of bias  in decisionmaking).  See generally DANIEL
A. FARBER &  PHILIP P. FRICKEY,  LAW AND  PUBLIC CHOICE:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION  (1991)
(providing  an overview of public choice  theory);  DENNIS C.  MUELLER,  PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989)
(same).
232.  See, e.g., French, supra note 62; Waggoner, supra note  16.
233.  See supra notes 35,  50-53 and accompanying text.
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often  spread very rapidly. 2'  The  legislative  record  is far  from perfect. But
the areas of inertia  may be more the product  of a lack of consensus  about
the  proper  path  reform  should  take  than  of  any  inherent  inability  of
legislatures to respond to demands for changes in property systems.
Second,  the  creation  of  new  forms  of  property  may  offer  fewer
inducements  to interest-group  rent-seeking  than is  the case in other  areas,
such  as  the  revision  of  tax  codes  or  the  expenditure  of  public  monies.
Adding  a  new  type  of  property  to  the  existing  options  changes  the
opportunities for the creation of private wealth, but often does not in and of
itself create or distribute wealth. For example, if the legislature enacts a law
that makes it possible to build  and sell condominiums,  this does not mean
that any condominiums  will actually  get built and sold. Condominiums  will
be built and sold  only if private  capital  is  diverted  to these purposes,  and
that capital  typically  will  not be supplied by the legislature. Adding  to the
corpus of property forms is thus an unlikely  strategy for any group eager to
engage in redistribution of wealth. It is likely  to appeal only to those groups
who are prepared to invest significant resources  in productive activities and
who seek legislative change  in order to maximize the return  they are likely
to receive on that investment. In other words, a desire to add to the menu of
property rights is likely to be motivated by a desire to expand the size of the
pie, rather than to cut the slices in different ways.
Third, abolishing or modifying existing forms of property as a means of
redistributing  wealth is sharply  constrained by constitutional  protections of
property  rights.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  a  majority  coalition  in  a  state
legislature  wants  to  abolish  long-term  leases  of  single-family  residential
housing in order to provide more opportunities  for fee  simple ownership of
single-family  homes.235  It  is  clear  that  any  attempt  to  do  this  without
compensating  the  owners  of  the  reversions  under  the  long-term  leases
would  be uncoristitutional.  If compensation  must  be  paid,  this  constrains
attempts  to  use  the  legislature  for  such  objectives.  If the  source  of  the
compensation  is to come  from  the beneficiaries  of the transfer,  then  such
attempts  are  constrained  even  further. 236  In  effect,  the  compensation
requirement  substantially  neutralizes  any  distributional  gains  from  the
abolition  of  particular  forms  of  property.  Abolition  is  thus  likely  to  be
234.  See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
235.  Cf  Haw.  Hous.  Auth.  v.  Midkiff,  467  U.S.  229  (1984)  (involving  a  constitutional
challenge  to  a  statute  permitting  the  state  to condemn  a landlord's  reversion  under  a  long-term
residential lease  and sell it to the lessee).
236.  This appears  to be the practice in many  instances  where the power of eminent domain  is
delegated  to permit A-to-B type transfers.  See, e.g.,  id. at 234 (reporting that under a state statute
condemning  a  landlord's  reversion  and  transferring  it  to  the  lessee,  "funds  to  satisfy  the
condemnation  awards  have  been  supplied  entirely  by  lessees");  see also Thomas  W.  Merrill,
The Economics of Public Use, 72  CORNELL  L. REv.  61,  85-88  (1986)  (discussing the secondary
rent-seeking  that  can  come  about  from  A-to-B  transfers  made  possible  by  condemnation  of
property).
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pursued  only in cases where the social  gains from the abolition  exceed  the
losses to the incumbent owners.
Finally, to the extent that distributional  forces continue to play  a role in
efforts  to create  new forms of property,  it is not clear that  these forces  will
operate with more virulence  in legislative than in judicial forums. Consider,
for example, the efforts  in the United States over the last twenty-five years
to gain recognition  for a right of publicity.  The  moving force behind these
efforts  has  been  celebrities  and  their  agents,  the  Elvis  Presley  Estate,
headquartered  in  Memphis, Tennessee,  being  a  notable  example. 37  These
entities  have  fought  for  the  exclusive  right  to  license  the  image  of the
celebrity  on  coffee  mugs  and  T-shirts,  in  television  commercials,  and  so
forth. It is interesting to note that the courts of Tennessee have  been among
those  judicially  recognizing  such  a  right.238  One  can  readily  portray  the
process by which  the Tennessee  courts have  reached  this  result  as one  in
which  compact  and  well-organized  private  interests  (Nashville  recording
artists  and  the  Presley  Estate)  have  prevailed  upon  the  local judiciary  to
sanction  a  diversion  of  wealth  from  consumers  in  other  states  to  actors
located in Tennessee. Whether the Tennessee legislature, not to mention the
U.S.  Congress,  would be as  willing to recognize  a  property  right in  these
circumstances is open to question. 39
In sum,  the  comparison  of legislatures  and  courts  as  sources  of legal
innovation must be sensitive to context. Even if legislatures  come out ahead
in  terms  of generating  rules  with  lower  information  costs  to  regulated
parties, there is always the possibility that legislatures  will be susceptible to
interest-group  capture  or  other  imperfections.  With  respect to  changes  in
property  rights,  however,  there  are  reasons  to  believe  that  these  sorts  of
legislative  failures  are  less  pronounced  than  may  be  the  case  in  other
contexts.  This  gives  us  further  confidence  in  saying  that  the  numerus
clausus  operates  as  a  rule  of  institutional  choice  to  further  the  basic
information cost-lowering objectives we have identified.
VI. CONCLUSION
Virtually  all postfeudal legal  systems  draw  an important  and pervasive
distinction between  contract rights  and property  rights:  Contract rights  are
freely  customizable,  but  property  rights  are  restricted  to  a  closed  list  of
237.  See  Michael  Madow,  Private Ownership  of Public  Image:  Popular  Culture  and
Publicity Rights,  81  CAL.  L.  REV.  125,  136-37  (1993)  (noting  that  the  "right  of  publicity
redistributes wealth upwards").
238.  MCCARTHY,  supra  note  77,  §  6.12[A],  at  6-84.10  (summarizing  the  "mass  of
complicated lawsuits"  over whether Elvis Presley's right of publicity survived his death).
239.  The Tennessee  legislature  adopted a  more  limited statutory  right  of publicity  in  1984,
but it is unclear whether this applies  to personalities who died before the act was passed  (Presley
allegedly died in  1977). See id. § 6.12[B],  at 6-84.12.
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standardized  forms.  In  civil-law  countries,  the  numerus clausus defines  a
fixed  universe of property  rights, and the principle  is rigorously  enforced.
In  common-law  countries,  the  principle  has  no  name  and  has  not  been
widely analyzed  or appreciated.  Nevertheless, the principle exists as  part of
the  "furniture"  of the  common  law, even  in  the  United States,  where  the
courts are most accustomed to tinkering with established  legal doctrines.
We  have  argued  that  the  numerus  clausus  makes  sense  from  an
economic  perspective.  By  permitting  a  significant  number  of  different
forms of property but forbidding courts to recognize new ones, the numerus
clausus strikes a balance between the proliferation of property forms,  on the
one  hand, and  excessive  rigidity  on  the  other. Proliferation  is  a  problem
because third parties  must ascertain the legal dimensions  of property rights
in order  to avoid  violating  the  rights of  others  and  to  assess  whether  to
acquire the  rights of others. Permitting free customization of new forms of
property would impose significant external costs on third parties in the form
of higher  measurement  costs. On  the  other hand,  insisting on  a  "one  size
fits  all"  system  of  property  rights  would  frustrate  those  legitimate
objectives  that can  be achieved only by using different property  rights that
fall short of full ownership.  Optimal standardization  is the solution, and the
numerus clausus moves  the  legal  system  closer  to the optimum, although
we do not claim it generates  a perfect mix of forms.
By insisting  that courts respect  the status  quo in terms of the menu  of
property  rights, the numerus clausus also channels legal change in property
rights  to  the  legislature.  This  institutional-choice  dimension,  we  have
argued,  reinforces  the  information-cost  minimization  features  of  the
doctrine,  because  legislated  changes  communicate  information  about  the
legal  dimensions  of  property  more  effectively  than  judicially  mandated
changes.
The  understanding  that  property  rights by  their  very  nature  require  a
significant  degree  of  standardization  has  a  host  of  potentially  valuable
applications in assessing particular issues regarding property. These include
proposals  to  expand  the  list  of  available  intellectual  property  rights,24°
proposals  to use digital technology  in conjunction with notice  to substitute
for  standardization,2 4'  and  proposals  suggesting  that  all  landlord-tenant
issues be resolved in accordance  with contract law precepts.242 It also sheds
important  light  on  traditional  disputes  about  the  appropriate  domain  of
freedom  of contract,  as  well  as on  more  contemporary  debates  about  the
240.  See supra text accompanying notes 71-79 (discussing judicial  recognition of intellectual
property rights under the misappropriation of information and right of publicity doctrines).
241.  See supra text accompanying notes  148-151  (discussing  the predicted  relaxation of the
numerus clausus as cheaper forms of notice develop).
242.  See Glendon, supra note  18 (noting that the  reform movement in landlord-tenant law has
argued that leases should be construed as contracts).
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significance  of network  effects.43  and  concern  with  fragmentation  or  an
"anticommons"  in assessing  the development  of the law.'" Similarly,  our
contention that standardization  is advanced by forcing legal  change to occur
through legislation has important implications for fledgling efforts to devise
criteria  for comparative  institutional  analysis  of courts  and  legislatures. 245
Drawing  out these  implications  must  await another  day.  But  we hope  we
have  said enough  to suggest  that the  numerus clausus is relevant to  more
than  the  driest  and  dustiest  aspect  of property-the  system  of  estates  in
land.  It  is  key  to  understanding  one  of  the  law's  most  important  and
dynamic institutions.
243.  See supra Subsection  IV.A.2 (contrasting  network externalities  and  network  confusion
effects).
244.  See supra Section IV.B  (criticizing antifragmentation  as an explanation for the numerus
clausus).
245.  See  KOMESAR,  supra note  217;  Thomas  W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political
Faith, 22  L.  &  SOC.  INQUIRY  959  (1997)  (reviewing  KOMESAR,  supra note  217)  (applauding
Komesar's  call for comparative institutional  analysis but  noting  that  the  techniques  for  such  an
analysis exist in a very primitive state).
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